Merge branch 'bugfix/misc_secure_boot_v4.1' into 'release/v4.1'

Bugfix/misc secure boot v2 (v4.1)

See merge request espressif/esp-idf!11744
This commit is contained in:
Mahavir Jain
2020-12-31 18:35:58 +08:00
4 changed files with 13 additions and 5 deletions

View File

@ -252,9 +252,7 @@ static esp_err_t encrypt_bootloader(void)
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "bootloader is plaintext. Encrypting...");
#if CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
// Account for the signature sector after the bootloader
image_length = (image_length + FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE - 1) & ~(FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE - 1);
image_length += FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE;
/* The image length obtained from esp_image_verify_bootloader includes the sector boundary padding and the signature block lengths */
if (ESP_BOOTLOADER_OFFSET + image_length > ESP_PARTITION_TABLE_OFFSET) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Bootloader is too large to fit Secure Boot V2 signature sector and partition table (configured offset 0x%x)", ESP_PARTITION_TABLE_OFFSET);
return ESP_ERR_INVALID_STATE;

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@ -191,6 +191,15 @@ static esp_err_t encrypt_bootloader(void)
/* Check for plaintext bootloader (verification will fail if it's already encrypted) */
if (esp_image_verify_bootloader(&image_length) == ESP_OK) {
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "bootloader is plaintext. Encrypting...");
#if CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
/* The image length obtained from esp_image_verify_bootloader includes the sector boundary padding and the signature block lengths */
if (ESP_BOOTLOADER_OFFSET + image_length > ESP_PARTITION_TABLE_OFFSET) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Bootloader is too large to fit Secure Boot V2 signature sector and partition table (configured offset 0x%x)", ESP_PARTITION_TABLE_OFFSET);
return ESP_ERR_INVALID_SIZE;
}
#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_V2_ENABLED
err = esp_flash_encrypt_region(ESP_BOOTLOADER_OFFSET, image_length);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed to encrypt bootloader in place: 0x%x", err);

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@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ static esp_err_t image_load(esp_image_load_mode_t mode, const esp_partition_pos_
if (true) {
#endif // end checking for JTAG
err = verify_secure_boot_signature(sha_handle, data, image_digest, verified_digest);
sha_handle = NULL; // verify_secure_boot_signature finishes sha_handle
}
#else // SECURE_BOOT_CHECK_SIGNATURE
// No secure boot, but SHA-256 can be appended for basic corruption detection

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@ -260,8 +260,8 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signa
goto exit;
}
ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( &pk, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, 32,
sig_block->block[i].image_digest, sig_be);
ret = mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( &pk, mbedtls_ctr_drbg_random, &ctr_drbg, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256, DIGEST_LEN,
image_digest, sig_be);
if (ret != 0) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify, err: %d", ret);
} else {