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secure_boot: Secure Boot V2 verify app signature on update (without Secure boot)

Browse Source 
- ESP32 ECO3, ESP32-S2/C3/S3
This commit is contained in:
KonstantinKondrashov
2021-03-05 22:22:29 +08:00
committed by bot
parent 9de1591660
commit 95564b4687
30 changed files with 934 additions and 960 deletions
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21
components/esp_rom/include/esp32s3/rom/secure_boot.h
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@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include "ets_sys.h"
#include "rsa_pss.h"
#ifdef __cplusplus
@@ -29,6 +30,14 @@ typedef struct ets_secure_boot_sig_block ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t;
typedef struct ets_secure_boot_signature ets_secure_boot_signature_t;
typedef struct ets_secure_boot_key_digests ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t;
/* Anti-FI measure: use full words for success/fail, instead of
0/non-zero
*/
typedef enum {
SB_SUCCESS = 0x3A5A5AA5,
SB_FAILED = 0x7533885E,
} secure_boot_status_t;
/* Verify bootloader image (reconfigures cache to map,
loads trusted key digests from efuse)
@@ -49,22 +58,24 @@ int ets_secure_boot_verify_bootloader(uint8_t *verified_hash, bool allow_key_rev
If result is ETS_OK, the "simple hash" of the bootloader is
copied into verified_hash.
*/
int ets_secure_boot_verify_bootloader_with_keys(uint8_t *verified_hash, const ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys);
secure_boot_status_t ets_secure_boot_verify_bootloader_with_keys(uint8_t *verified_hash, const ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys, bool stage_load);
/* Verify supplied signature against supplied digest, using
supplied trusted key digests.
Doesn't reconfigure cache or any other hardware access.
*/
int ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig, const uint8_t *image_digest, const ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys);
secure_boot_status_t ets_secure_boot_verify_signature(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig, const uint8_t *image_digest, const ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys, uint8_t *verified_digest);
/* Read key digests from efuse. Any revoked/missing digests will be
marked as NULL
Returns 0 if at least one valid digest was found.
*/
int ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys);
ETS_STATUS ets_secure_boot_read_key_digests(ets_secure_boot_key_digests_t *trusted_keys);
#define CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN 1196
#define SIG_BLOCK_PADDING 4096
#define ETS_SECURE_BOOT_V2_SIGNATURE_MAGIC 0xE7
/* Secure Boot V2 signature block (up to 3 can be appended) */
@@ -92,8 +103,10 @@ struct ets_secure_boot_signature {
_Static_assert(sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t) == 4096, "ets_secure_boot_signature_t should occupy 4096 Bytes in memory");
#define MAX_KEY_DIGESTS 3
struct ets_secure_boot_key_digests {
const void *key_digests[3];
const void *key_digests[MAX_KEY_DIGESTS];
bool allow_key_revoke;
};