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298 lines
12 KiB
C
298 lines
12 KiB
C
// Copyright 2015-2020 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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#include <string.h>
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#include "esp_log.h"
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#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
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#include "soc/efuse_reg.h"
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#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
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#include "bootloader_sha.h"
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#include "bootloader_utility.h"
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#include "esp_rom_crc.h"
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#include "esp_efuse.h"
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#include "esp_efuse_table.h"
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#include "esp32c3/rom/efuse.h"
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#include "esp32c3/rom/secure_boot.h"
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static const char *TAG = "secure_boot_v2";
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#define ALIGN_UP(num, align) (((num) + ((align) - 1)) & ~((align) - 1))
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/* A signature block is valid when it has correct magic byte, crc and image digest. */
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static esp_err_t validate_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *block, int block_num, const uint8_t *image_digest)
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{
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uint32_t crc = esp_rom_crc32_le(0, (uint8_t *)block, CRC_SIGN_BLOCK_LEN);
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if (block->magic_byte != ETS_SECURE_BOOT_V2_SIGNATURE_MAGIC) {
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// All signature blocks have been parsed, no new signature block present.
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ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Signature block(%d) invalid/absent.", block_num);
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return ESP_FAIL;
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}
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if (block->block_crc != crc) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Magic byte correct but incorrect crc.");
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return ESP_FAIL;
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}
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if (memcmp(image_digest, block->image_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN)) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Magic byte & CRC correct but incorrect image digest.");
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return ESP_FAIL;
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} else {
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ESP_LOGD(TAG, "valid signature block(%d) found", block_num);
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return ESP_OK;
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}
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return ESP_FAIL;
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}
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/* Generates the public key digests of the valid public keys in an image's
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signature block, verifies each signature, and stores the key digests in the
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public_key_digests structure.
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@param flash_offset Image offset in flash
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@param flash_size Image size in flash (not including signature block)
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@param[out] public_key_digests Pointer to structure to hold the key digests for valid sig blocks
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Note that this function doesn't read any eFuses, so it doesn't know if the
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keys are ultimately trusted by the hardware or not
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@return - ESP_OK if no signatures failed to verify, or if no valid signature blocks are found at all.
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- ESP_FAIL if there's a valid signature block that doesn't verify using the included public key (unexpected!)
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*/
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static esp_err_t s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(uint32_t flash_offset, uint32_t flash_size, esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t *public_key_digests)
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{
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esp_err_t ret;
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uint8_t image_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
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uint8_t __attribute__((aligned(4))) key_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
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size_t sig_block_addr = flash_offset + ALIGN_UP(flash_size, FLASH_SECTOR_SIZE);
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ESP_LOGD(TAG, "calculating public key digests for sig blocks of image offset 0x%x (sig block offset 0x%x)", flash_offset, sig_block_addr);
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bzero(public_key_digests, sizeof(esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t));
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ret = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(flash_offset, sig_block_addr - flash_offset, image_digest);
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if (ret != ESP_OK) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "error generating image digest, %d", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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ESP_LOGD(TAG, "reading signatures");
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const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *signatures = bootloader_mmap(sig_block_addr, sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t));
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if (signatures == NULL) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed", sig_block_addr, sizeof(ets_secure_boot_signature_t));
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return ESP_FAIL;
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}
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for (int i = 0; i < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; i++) {
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const ets_secure_boot_sig_block_t *block = &signatures->block[i];
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ret = validate_signature_block(block, i, image_digest);
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if (ret != ESP_OK) {
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ret = ESP_OK; // past the last valid signature block
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break;
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}
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/* Generating the SHA of the public key components in the signature block */
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bootloader_sha256_handle_t sig_block_sha;
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sig_block_sha = bootloader_sha256_start();
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bootloader_sha256_data(sig_block_sha, &block->key, sizeof(block->key));
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bootloader_sha256_finish(sig_block_sha, key_digest);
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// Check we can verify the image using this signature and this key
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uint8_t temp_verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
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bool verified = ets_rsa_pss_verify(&block->key, block->signature, image_digest, temp_verified_digest);
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if (!verified) {
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/* We don't expect this: the signature blocks before we enable secure boot should all be verifiable or invalid,
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so this is a fatal error
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*/
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ret = ESP_FAIL;
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure boot key (%d) verification failed.", i);
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break;
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}
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ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Signature block (%d) is verified", i);
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/* Copy the key digest to the buffer provided by the caller */
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memcpy((void *)public_key_digests->key_digests[i], key_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
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public_key_digests->num_digests++;
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}
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if (ret == ESP_OK && public_key_digests->num_digests > 0) {
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Digests successfully calculated, %d valid signatures (image offset 0x%x)",
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public_key_digests->num_digests, flash_offset);
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}
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bootloader_munmap(signatures);
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return ret;
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}
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static esp_err_t check_and_generate_secure_boot_keys(const esp_image_metadata_t *image_data)
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{
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esp_err_t ret;
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/* Verify the bootloader */
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esp_image_metadata_t bootloader_data = { 0 };
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ret = esp_image_verify_bootloader_data(&bootloader_data);
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if (ret != ESP_OK) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader image appears invalid! error %d", ret);
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return ret;
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}
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/* Check if secure boot digests are present */
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bool has_secure_boot_digest = esp_efuse_find_purpose(ESP_EFUSE_KEY_PURPOSE_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST0, NULL);
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has_secure_boot_digest |= esp_efuse_find_purpose(ESP_EFUSE_KEY_PURPOSE_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST1, NULL);
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has_secure_boot_digest |= esp_efuse_find_purpose(ESP_EFUSE_KEY_PURPOSE_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST2, NULL);
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Secure boot digests %s", has_secure_boot_digest ? "already present":"absent, generating..");
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if (!has_secure_boot_digest) {
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esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t boot_key_digests = {0};
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esp_image_sig_public_key_digests_t app_key_digests = {0};
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/* Generate the bootloader public key digests */
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ret = s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(bootloader_data.start_addr, bootloader_data.image_len - SIG_BLOCK_PADDING, &boot_key_digests);
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if (ret != ESP_OK) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Bootloader signature block is invalid");
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return ret;
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}
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if (boot_key_digests.num_digests == 0) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "No valid bootloader signature blocks found.");
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return ESP_FAIL;
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}
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "%d signature block(s) found appended to the bootloader.", boot_key_digests.num_digests);
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esp_efuse_purpose_t secure_boot_key_purpose[SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS] = {
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ESP_EFUSE_KEY_PURPOSE_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST0,
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ESP_EFUSE_KEY_PURPOSE_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST1,
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ESP_EFUSE_KEY_PURPOSE_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST2,
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};
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ret = esp_efuse_write_keys(secure_boot_key_purpose, boot_key_digests.key_digests, boot_key_digests.num_digests);
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if (ret) {
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if (ret == ESP_ERR_NOT_ENOUGH_UNUSED_KEY_BLOCKS) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Bootloader signatures(%d) more than available key slots.", boot_key_digests.num_digests);
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} else {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed to write efuse block with purpose (err=0x%x). Can't continue.", ret);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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/* Generate the application public key digests */
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ret = s_calculate_image_public_key_digests(image_data->start_addr, image_data->image_len - SIG_BLOCK_PADDING, &app_key_digests);
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if (ret != ESP_OK) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "App signature block is invalid.");
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return ret;
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}
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if (app_key_digests.num_digests == 0) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "No valid applications signature blocks found.");
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return ESP_FAIL;
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}
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "%d signature block(s) found appended to the app.", app_key_digests.num_digests);
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if (app_key_digests.num_digests > boot_key_digests.num_digests) {
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ESP_LOGW(TAG, "App has %d signature blocks but bootloader only has %d. Some keys missing from bootloader?");
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}
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/* Confirm if at least one public key from the application matches a public key in the bootloader
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(Also, ensure if that public revoke bit is not set for the matched key) */
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bool match = false;
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for (int i = 0; i < boot_key_digests.num_digests; i++) {
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if (esp_efuse_get_digest_revoke(i)) {
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Key block(%d) has been revoked.", i);
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continue; // skip if the key block is revoked
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}
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for (int j = 0; j < app_key_digests.num_digests; j++) {
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if (!memcmp(boot_key_digests.key_digests[i], app_key_digests.key_digests[j], ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN)) {
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Application key(%d) matches with bootloader key(%d).", j, i);
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match = true;
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}
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}
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}
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if (match == false) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "No application key digest matches the bootloader key digest.");
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return ESP_FAIL;
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}
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/* Revoke the empty signature blocks */
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if (boot_key_digests.num_digests < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS) {
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/* The revocation index can be 0, 1, 2. Bootloader count can be 1,2,3. */
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for (uint8_t i = boot_key_digests.num_digests; i < SECURE_BOOT_NUM_BLOCKS; i++) {
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Revoking empty key digest slot (%d)...", i);
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esp_efuse_set_digest_revoke(i);
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}
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}
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}
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return ESP_OK;
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}
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esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_v2_permanently_enable(const esp_image_metadata_t *image_data)
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{
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "enabling secure boot v2...");
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if (esp_secure_boot_enabled()) {
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "secure boot v2 is already enabled, continuing..");
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return ESP_OK;
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}
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esp_efuse_batch_write_begin(); /* Batch all efuse writes at the end of this function */
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esp_err_t key_state = check_and_generate_secure_boot_keys(image_data);
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if (key_state != ESP_OK) {
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esp_efuse_batch_write_cancel();
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return key_state;
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}
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esp_efuse_write_field_bit(ESP_EFUSE_DIS_LEGACY_SPI_BOOT);
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_ENABLE_SECURE_ROM_DL_MODE
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Enabling Security download mode...");
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esp_efuse_write_field_bit(ESP_EFUSE_ENABLE_SECURITY_DOWNLOAD);
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#else
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ESP_LOGW(TAG, "Not enabling Security download mode - SECURITY COMPROMISED");
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#endif
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#ifndef CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_ALLOW_JTAG
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Disable hardware & software JTAG...");
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esp_efuse_write_field_bit(ESP_EFUSE_DIS_PAD_JTAG);
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esp_efuse_write_field_bit(ESP_EFUSE_DIS_USB_JTAG);
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esp_efuse_write_field_bit(ESP_EFUSE_SOFT_DIS_JTAG);
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#else
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ESP_LOGW(TAG, "Not disabling JTAG - SECURITY COMPROMISED");
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#endif
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_AGGRESSIVE_KEY_REVOKE
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esp_efuse_write_field_bit(ESP_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_AGGRESSIVE_REVOKE);
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#endif
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esp_efuse_write_field_bit(ESP_EFUSE_SECURE_BOOT_EN);
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esp_err_t err = esp_efuse_batch_write_commit();
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if (err != ESP_OK) {
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ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Error programming security eFuses (err=0x%x).", err);
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return err;
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}
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#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_AGGRESSIVE_KEY_REVOKE
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assert(ets_efuse_secure_boot_aggressive_revoke_enabled());
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#endif
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assert(esp_rom_efuse_is_secure_boot_enabled());
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ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Secure boot permanently enabled");
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return ESP_OK;
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}
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