Fixes quick disk shredding by using dd to shred data at additional offsets where ceph metadata is duplicated. For full shred, the shred utility remains in use.
Signed-off-by: Vilius Puškunalis <47086537+puskunalis@users.noreply.github.com>
This is the first implementation of CephX key rotation in Rook.
Adds key rotation API from design PR 15915.
Also add helper methods for rotating keys, determining when keys
need to be rotated, and for generating CephX key statuses. These will be
reusable for other Rook reconciles beyond object/RGW.
Signed-off-by: Blaine Gardner <blaine.gardner@ibm.com>
this commit remove the code which sets the dmcrypt encryption
key from secret as environment variable in the prepare pod job
spec. Now, the env will be set under function `setKEKinEnv`, which
tries to reads secret from k8s first method `c.IsK8s()`under
`GetSecret` and then check for KMS to ready and apply env directly.
Signed-off-by: subhamkrai <srai@redhat.com>
While adding a new encryption key to slot 1
if there exists a key in slot 1 which is not
equal to the one we want to update it with,
we kill the slot and then add the new key to it.
While killing the slot, the existing code uses
the new key, which is not valid in such cases.
This patch modifies the code to use the key in
slot 0 (the one that we know works) to kill the slot.
Signed-off-by: Niraj Yadav <niryadav@redhat.com>
This commit adds util functions to support encryption key rotation
such as RemoveEncryptionKeySlot, AddEncryptionKey and
ensureEncryptionKey.
Signed-off-by: Rakshith R <rar@redhat.com>
During osd-prepare-job,
The encrypted device is found to be closed in some cases when
the OSD deployment has been removed manually accompanied
by any of following cases:
- node reboot
- csi managed PVC being unmounted etc
while re-opening the block to re-hydrate the OSDInfo,
the dm device `<pvc-name>-block-dmcrypt` clashes with
the one used by OSD pod which is stale by now.
This commit adds cmd to remove this stale dm device.
Error with output "No such device" is ignored.
Signed-off-by: Rakshith R <rar@redhat.com>
This commit implements this corner case during osd-prepare job.
```
The encrypted block is not opened, this is an extreme corner case
The OSD deployment has been removed manually AND the node rebooted
So we need to re-open the block to re-hydrate the OSDInfo.
Handling this case would mean, writing the encryption key on a
temporary file, then call luksOpen to open the encrypted block and
then call ceph-volume to list against the opened encrypted block.
We don't implement this, yet and return an error.
```
When underlying PVC for osd are CSI provisioned, the encrypted device
is closed when PVC is unmounted due to osd pod being deleted.
Therefore, this may occur more frequently and needs to be handled.
This commit implements the fix for the same.
Signed-off-by: Rakshith R <rar@redhat.com>
The cluster-wide encryption feature now
supports KMIP (Key Management Interoperability Protocol)
kms.
KMIP is an extensible communication protocol that defines
message formats for the manipulation of cryptographic keys
on a key management server.
For more information, refer:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_Management_Interoperability_Protocol
Signed-off-by: Rakshith R <rar@redhat.com>
Once we are done cleaning up the content of the encrypted osd, let's
close the main LUKS device.
This avoids having dm devices on the system after the cleanup.
Closes: https://github.com/rook/rook/issues/10181
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
There is a corner case where an env variable populated with the prepare
job could influence and trigger some encryption code. We have an env
variable to discover whether the prepare job will encrypt a drive or not
so let's use that instead of running code as a noop and sometimes
trigger a corner case. In this scenario, the prepare job had an "IBM_"
env variable present in the OS image (IBM OS) so the setKEKinEnv()
function would get called for no reason.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
The cluster-wide encryption feature now has a new supported key
management system: IBM Key protect. More information about the backend
can be found in Rook documentation under the
Today's implementation stores OSD encryption keys has "Standard" keys.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
This is handling a tricky scenario where the OSD deployment is manually
removed and the OSD never reconvers. This is unlikely to happen, but
still OSD should be able to run after that action. Essentially after a
manual deletion, we need to run the prepare job again to re-hydrate the
OSD information so that the OSD deployment can be deployed.
On encryption, it is a little bit tricky since ceph-volume list again
the main block won't return anything, so we need to target the encrypted
block to list.
There is another case this PR does not handle, which is the removal of
the OSD deployment and then the node is restarted. This means that the
encrypted container is not opened anymore. However, opening it requires
more work like writing the key on the filesystem (if not coming from the
Kubernete secret, eg,. KMS vault) and then run luksOpen. This is an
extreme corner case probably not worth worrying about for now.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
Rook cluster-wide encryption can now use the native Kubernetes
authentication to interact with vault KMS instead of using the token
method.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
When configuring encrypted on-pvc clusters we now set the cluster fsid
in the LUKS header. If needed we can then determine if the encrypted
block is part of our cluster or not. We also attach the pvc_name in case
it might become useful.
Closes: https://github.com/rook/rook/issues/7991
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
When the Ceph cluster runs on PVC and the OSDs are encrypted we can
store LUKS's Key Encryption Key inside a Key Management System. Today,
Rook only supports HashiCorp Vault: https://www.vaultproject.io/
The CephCluster has now a new "security" field which will plug onto the
KMS. Here is an example:
security:
kms:
tokenSecretName: <name of the secret containing a Vault token, used
to authenticate>
connectionDetails: < a map of strings containing connection
information>
Refer to the ceph-cluster-crd documentation to lear more.
Closes: https://github.com/rook/rook/issues/6105
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
We can now encrypted OSD device that were provisioned via a storage
class using the PV interface.
The encryption works at the storageClassDeviceSets level, which means we
can have encrypted and non-encrypted sets.
Using the new key `encrypted` we can turn it on.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
Vilius Puškunalis
Blaine Gardner
subhamkrai
Joshua Hoblitt
Niraj Yadav
Rakshith R
Sébastien Han