The cluster-wide encryption feature now
supports KMIP (Key Management Interoperability Protocol)
kms.
KMIP is an extensible communication protocol that defines
message formats for the manipulation of cryptographic keys
on a key management server.
For more information, refer:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_Management_Interoperability_Protocol
Signed-off-by: Rakshith R <rar@redhat.com>
The RGW support server side encryption with help of s3 protocol, till
now the `sse:kms` was support in which keys will be provided by the user
and but it will be saved in external management service like vault. Now
the support for `sse:s3` is added so the entire encryption key
management is performed by RGW itsels.
Signed-off-by: Jiffin Tony Thottan <thottanjiffin@gmail.com>
For better consistency with IBM_KP_SERVICE_API_KEY and use
"ibmkeyprotect" as a provider name for more clarity.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
The cluster-wide encryption feature now has a new supported key
management system: IBM Key protect. More information about the backend
can be found in Rook documentation under the
Today's implementation stores OSD encryption keys has "Standard" keys.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
Rook cluster-wide encryption can now use the native Kubernetes
authentication to interact with vault KMS instead of using the token
method.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
When deploying a cluster-wde encrypted cluster we now use the rook
binary to execute some code to fetch the key encryption key.
Using cURL all the time to fetch the key has its limitations. The
incoming integration with Kubernetes Authentication through service
accounts is leading the usage of cURL to its end.
The logic is really complex and prone to errors. Re-implementing the
Go logic into Bash is not a viable option.
Also, using the lib in a binary allows us to keep a consistent behavior
throughout the life cycle of our code.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
When TLS is used and includes a caert, client key/cert, we need to copy
the content of the secret to a file in the operator's container
filesystem so that we can build the TLS config and thus the HTTP Client,
which reads those files.
Also, removing the files after each API call so they don't persist on
the filesystem forever.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
Passing struct by value essentially gives you a copy, so when modified
within a function, the scope is then reduced to that function. Using
pointers solves that you mutate the struct as many times as you want from
anywhere.
As a result, the auto-detection of the Vault KV backend was not working
correctly.
Also, added a ton of unit tests for Vault.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
Rook will now auto detect the kv version of the vault server. This
allows users not having to pass the VAULT_BACKEND configuration in the
CephCluster CR.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
By default, keys stored in Vault KV Secret Engine are versioned and keys
are soft-deleted, see Vault documentation:
When deleting data the standard vault kv delete command will perform a soft
delete.
It will mark the version as deleted and populate a deletion_time timestamp.
Soft deletes do not remove the underlying version data from storage,
which allows the version to be undeleted.
The vault kv undelete command handles undeleting versions. A version's
data is permanently deleted only when the key has more versions than are
allowed by the max-versions setting, or when using vault kv destroy.
When the destroy command is used the underlying version data will be
removed and the key metadata will be marked as destroyed.
If a version is cleaned up by going over max-versions the version
metadata will also be removed from the key.
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
The ValidateConnectionDetails() contains `clusterSpec` assuming `SecuritySpec` only
part to `cephCluster` CRD. But we may need to validate same for `SecuritySpec` in
`cephObjectStore` CRD. Hence modifying the signature of the api.
Signed-off-by: Jiffin Tony Thottan <thottanjiffin@gmail.com>
When the Ceph cluster runs on PVC and the OSDs are encrypted we can
store LUKS's Key Encryption Key inside a Key Management System. Today,
Rook only supports HashiCorp Vault: https://www.vaultproject.io/
The CephCluster has now a new "security" field which will plug onto the
KMS. Here is an example:
security:
kms:
tokenSecretName: <name of the secret containing a Vault token, used
to authenticate>
connectionDetails: < a map of strings containing connection
information>
Refer to the ceph-cluster-crd documentation to lear more.
Closes: https://github.com/rook/rook/issues/6105
Signed-off-by: Sébastien Han <seb@redhat.com>
sp98
Rakshith R
Jiffin Tony Thottan
Divyansh Kamboj
Sébastien Han
Arun Kumar Mohan