diff --git a/wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c b/wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c
index f4cc1e831..19aeb2de0 100644
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c
@@ -1877,7 +1877,8 @@ int wc_ecc_mulmod(mp_int* k, ecc_point *G, ecc_point *R, mp_int* a,
 #else /* ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT */
 
 
-#if defined(TFM_TIMINING_RESISTANT) && defined(USE_FAST_MATH)
+#ifndef WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT
+#if defined(TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT) && defined(USE_FAST_MATH)
     /* let's use the one we already have */
     extern const wolfssl_word wc_off_on_addr[2];
 #else
@@ -1895,7 +1896,8 @@ int wc_ecc_mulmod(mp_int* k, ecc_point *G, ecc_point *R, mp_int* a,
         0xffffffffU
     #endif
     };
-#endif
+#endif /* TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT && USE_FAST_MATH */
+#endif /* WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT */
 
 /**
    Perform a point multiplication  (timing resistant)
@@ -2034,6 +2036,10 @@ int wc_ecc_mulmod_ex(mp_int* k, ecc_point *G, ecc_point *R,
            if (err == MP_OKAY)
                err = ecc_projective_add_point(M[0], M[1], M[i^1], a, modulus,
                                                                        mp);
+#ifdef WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT
+           if (err == MP_OKAY)
+               err = ecc_projective_dbl_point(M[i], M[i], a, modulus, mp);
+#else
             /* instead of using M[i] for double, which leaks key bit to cache
              * monitor, use M[2] as temp, make sure address calc is constant,
              * keep &M[0] and &M[1] in cache */
@@ -2072,6 +2078,7 @@ int wc_ecc_mulmod_ex(mp_int* k, ecc_point *G, ecc_point *R,
                                ((wolfssl_word)&M[1]->z & wc_off_on_addr[i])) );
            if (err != MP_OKAY)
                break;
+#endif /* WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT */
        } /* end for */
    }
 
diff --git a/wolfcrypt/src/tfm.c b/wolfcrypt/src/tfm.c
index 7c6a55518..c3da84b61 100644
--- a/wolfcrypt/src/tfm.c
+++ b/wolfcrypt/src/tfm.c
@@ -1035,6 +1035,7 @@ int fp_addmod(fp_int *a, fp_int *b, fp_int *c, fp_int *d)
 
 #ifdef TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT
 
+#ifndef WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT
 /* all off / all on pointer addresses for constant calculations */
 /* ecc.c uses same table */
 const wolfssl_word wc_off_on_addr[2] =
@@ -1052,6 +1053,8 @@ const wolfssl_word wc_off_on_addr[2] =
 #endif
 };
 
+#endif /* WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT */
+
 /* timing resistant montgomery ladder based exptmod
    Based on work by Marc Joye, Sung-Ming Yen, "The Montgomery Powering Ladder",
    Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2002
@@ -1111,6 +1114,9 @@ static int _fp_exptmod(fp_int * G, fp_int * X, fp_int * P, fp_int * Y)
     /* do ops */
     fp_mul(&R[0], &R[1], &R[y^1]); fp_montgomery_reduce(&R[y^1], P, mp);
 
+#ifdef WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT
+    fp_sqr(&R[y], &R[y]);          fp_montgomery_reduce(&R[y], P, mp);
+#else
     /* instead of using R[y] for sqr, which leaks key bit to cache monitor,
      * use R[2] as temp, make sure address calc is constant, keep
      * &R[0] and &R[1] in cache */
@@ -1121,6 +1127,7 @@ static int _fp_exptmod(fp_int * G, fp_int * X, fp_int * P, fp_int * Y)
     fp_copy(&R[2],
             (fp_int*) ( ((wolfssl_word)&R[0] & wc_off_on_addr[y^1]) +
                         ((wolfssl_word)&R[1] & wc_off_on_addr[y]) ) );
+#endif /* WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT */
   }
 
    fp_montgomery_reduce(&R[0], P, mp);