From 0160af0a0d0fbfd014b647118cdf56f60068e0c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Pouzzner <douzzer@wolfssl.com>
Date: Wed, 2 Jul 2025 14:24:17 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] linuxkm/patches/: update patches to reseed the wolfCrypt DRBG
 array only on explicit RNDRESEEDCRNG ioctl;

linuxkm/lkcapi_sha_glue.c: add error msg in wc_linuxkm_drbg_generate() if wc_InitRng() fails, and add "libwolfssl: " prefixes in pr_info() messages.
---
 linuxkm/lkcapi_sha_glue.c                     |  21 +--
 ...KM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v10v17.patch | 118 ++++++++++++---
 ...M_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v10v236.patch | 112 ++++++++++++---
 ...NUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v15.patch | 116 ++++++++++++---
 ...NUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v17.patch | 112 ++++++++++++---
 ...XKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v1v73.patch | 125 +++++++++++++---
 ...NUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v12.patch | 136 +++++++++++++++---
 ...NUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v15.patch | 136 +++++++++++++++---
 linuxkm/patches/regen-patches.sh              |   5 +
 wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h                  |   2 +-
 10 files changed, 735 insertions(+), 148 deletions(-)

diff --git a/linuxkm/lkcapi_sha_glue.c b/linuxkm/lkcapi_sha_glue.c
index 43117421c..dee6d0131 100644
--- a/linuxkm/lkcapi_sha_glue.c
+++ b/linuxkm/lkcapi_sha_glue.c
@@ -1101,9 +1101,12 @@ retry:
             pr_warn("WARNING: reinitialized DRBG #%d after RNG_FAILURE_E.", raw_smp_processor_id());
             goto retry;
         }
+        else {
+            pr_warn_once("ERROR: reinitialization of DRBG #%d after RNG_FAILURE_E failed with ret %d.", raw_smp_processor_id(), ret);
+            ret = -EINVAL;
+        }
     }
-
-    if (ret != 0) {
+    else if (ret != 0) {
         pr_warn_once("WARNING: wc_RNG_GenerateBlock returned %d\n",ret);
         ret = -EINVAL;
     }
@@ -1748,7 +1751,7 @@ static int wc_linuxkm_drbg_startup(void)
         crypto_put_default_rng();
         wc_linuxkm_drbg_default_instance_registered = 1;
         pr_info("%s registered as systemwide default stdrng.", wc_linuxkm_drbg.base.cra_driver_name);
-        pr_info("to unload module, first echo 1 > /sys/module/libwolfssl/deinstall_algs");
+        pr_info("libwolfssl: to unload module, first echo 1 > /sys/module/libwolfssl/deinstall_algs");
     }
     else {
         pr_err("ERROR: %s NOT registered as systemwide default stdrng -- found \"%s\".", wc_linuxkm_drbg.base.cra_driver_name, crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(&crypto_default_rng->base));
@@ -1766,7 +1769,7 @@ static int wc_linuxkm_drbg_startup(void)
 
     if (ret == 0) {
         wc_get_random_bytes_callbacks_installed = 1;
-        pr_info("Kernel global random_bytes handlers installed.");
+        pr_info("libwolfssl: kernel global random_bytes handlers installed.");
     }
     else {
         pr_err("ERROR: wolfssl_linuxkm_register_random_bytes_handlers() failed: %d\n", ret);
@@ -1777,7 +1780,7 @@ static int wc_linuxkm_drbg_startup(void)
     ret = register_kprobe(&wc_get_random_bytes_kprobe);
     if (ret == 0) {
         wc_get_random_bytes_kprobe_installed = 1;
-        pr_info("wc_get_random_bytes_kprobe installed\n");
+        pr_info("libwolfssl: wc_get_random_bytes_kprobe installed\n");
     }
     else {
         pr_err("ERROR: wc_get_random_bytes_kprobe installation failed: %d\n", ret);
@@ -1787,7 +1790,7 @@ static int wc_linuxkm_drbg_startup(void)
     ret = register_kretprobe(&wc_get_random_bytes_user_kretprobe);
     if (ret == 0) {
         wc_get_random_bytes_user_kretprobe_installed = 1;
-        pr_info("wc_get_random_bytes_user_kretprobe installed\n");
+        pr_info("libwolfssl: wc_get_random_bytes_user_kretprobe installed\n");
     }
     else {
         pr_err("ERROR: wc_get_random_bytes_user_kprobe installation failed: %d\n", ret);
@@ -1842,7 +1845,7 @@ static int wc_linuxkm_drbg_cleanup(void) {
                 pr_err("ERROR: wolfssl_linuxkm_unregister_random_bytes_handlers returned %d", ret);
                 return ret;
             }
-            pr_info("wc_get_random_bytes handlers uninstalled\n");
+            pr_info("libwolfssl: kernel global random_bytes handlers uninstalled\n");
             wc_get_random_bytes_callbacks_installed = 0;
         }
 
@@ -1852,14 +1855,14 @@ static int wc_linuxkm_drbg_cleanup(void) {
             wc_get_random_bytes_kprobe_installed = 0;
             barrier();
             unregister_kprobe(&wc_get_random_bytes_kprobe);
-            pr_info("wc_get_random_bytes_kprobe uninstalled\n");
+            pr_info("libwolfssl: wc_get_random_bytes_kprobe uninstalled\n");
         }
         #ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_USE_GET_RANDOM_USER_KRETPROBE
         if (wc_get_random_bytes_user_kretprobe_installed) {
             wc_get_random_bytes_user_kretprobe_installed = 0;
             barrier();
             unregister_kretprobe(&wc_get_random_bytes_user_kretprobe);
-            pr_info("wc_get_random_bytes_user_kretprobe uninstalled\n");
+            pr_info("libwolfssl: wc_get_random_bytes_user_kretprobe uninstalled\n");
         }
         #endif /* WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_USE_GET_RANDOM_USER_KRETPROBE */
 
diff --git a/linuxkm/patches/5.10.17/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v10v17.patch b/linuxkm/patches/5.10.17/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v10v17.patch
index 0a6a6bfd8..a6bc78749 100644
--- a/linuxkm/patches/5.10.17/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v10v17.patch
+++ b/linuxkm/patches/5.10.17/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v10v17.patch
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 --- ./drivers/char/random.c.dist	2020-12-13 16:41:30.000000000 -0600
-+++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-06-28 10:11:47.329492006 -0500
++++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-07-02 11:59:07.220250957 -0500
 @@ -344,6 +344,260 @@
  #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
  #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -261,22 +261,30 @@
  #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
  #include <trace/events/random.h>
  
-@@ -461,7 +715,13 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng =
+@@ -461,7 +715,22 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng =
   * its value (from 0->1->2).
   */
  static int crng_init = 0;
--#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
++
+ #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++    #define crng_ready_by_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) && call_crng_ready_cb())
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? (call_crng_ready_cb() || crng_ready()) : crng_ready())
++#else
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() crng_ready()
++#endif
 +
 +#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+    #define crng_ready() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? call_crng_ready_cb() : (likely(crng_init > 1)))
++    #define crng_ready_by_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) && call_crng_ready_cb())
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? (call_crng_ready_cb() || crng_ready()) : crng_ready())
 +#else
-+    #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() crng_ready()
 +#endif
 +
  static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
  static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
  #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
-@@ -593,6 +853,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entrop
+@@ -593,6 +862,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entrop
  {
  	unsigned long flags;
  
@@ -288,7 +296,7 @@
  	trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
  	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
  	_mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
-@@ -664,6 +929,10 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct e
+@@ -664,6 +938,10 @@ static void credit_entropy_bits(struct e
  	const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;
  	int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT;
  
@@ -299,19 +307,7 @@
  	if (!nbits)
  		return;
  
-@@ -954,6 +1223,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
- 		__u32	key[8];
- 	} buf;
- 
-+#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+        (void)call_crng_reseed_cb();
-+        /* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
-+#endif
-+
- 	if (r) {
- 		num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0);
- 		if (num == 0)
-@@ -1069,6 +1343,18 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __
+@@ -1069,6 +1347,18 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __
  	__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
  	int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
  
@@ -330,7 +326,16 @@
  	while (nbytes) {
  		if (large_request && need_resched()) {
  			if (signal_pending(current)) {
-@@ -1552,6 +1838,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
+@@ -1523,7 +1813,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	if (print_once ||
+-	    crng_ready() ||
++	    crng_ready_maybe_cb() ||
+ 	    (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
+ 		return;
+ 	WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
+@@ -1552,6 +1842,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
  
  	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
  
@@ -345,6 +350,77 @@
  	while (nbytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
  		extract_crng(buf);
  		buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+@@ -1638,12 +1936,12 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
+  */
+ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+ {
+-	if (likely(crng_ready()))
++	if (likely(crng_ready_maybe_cb()))
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	do {
+ 		int ret;
+-		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
++		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready_maybe_cb(), HZ);
+ 		if (ret)
+ 			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ 
+@@ -1665,7 +1963,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
+  */
+ bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+ {
+-	return crng_ready();
++	return crng_ready_maybe_cb();
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
+ 
+@@ -1843,7 +2141,7 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __u
+ 	unsigned long flags;
+ 	static int maxwarn = 10;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb() && maxwarn > 0) {
+ 		maxwarn--;
+ 		if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning))
+ 			pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
+@@ -1872,6 +2170,11 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_tabl
+ {
+ 	__poll_t mask;
+ 
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++	if (crng_ready_by_cb())
++		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
++#endif
++
+ 	poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
+ 	poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
+ 	mask = 0;
+@@ -1970,6 +2273,16 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
+ 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			return -EPERM;
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++		/* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
++		if (call_crng_reseed_cb() == 0) {
++			if (crng_init >= 2) {
++				crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
++				crng_global_init_time = jiffies - 1;
++                        }
++			return 0;
++		}
++#endif
+ 		if (crng_init < 2)
+ 			return -ENODATA;
+ 		crng_reseed(&primary_crng, NULL);
+@@ -2022,7 +2335,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 	if (count > INT_MAX)
+ 		count = INT_MAX;
+ 
+-	if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) {
++	if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+ 		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
 --- ./include/linux/random.h.dist	2020-12-13 16:41:30.000000000 -0600
 +++ ./include/linux/random.h	2025-06-30 12:05:59.106440700 -0500
 @@ -158,4 +158,37 @@ static inline bool __init arch_get_rando
diff --git a/linuxkm/patches/5.10.236/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v10v236.patch b/linuxkm/patches/5.10.236/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v10v236.patch
index 8f088bf9e..6c84902b7 100644
--- a/linuxkm/patches/5.10.236/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v10v236.patch
+++ b/linuxkm/patches/5.10.236/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v10v236.patch
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 --- ./drivers/char/random.c.dist	2025-04-29 18:54:03.390121890 -0500
-+++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-06-28 11:49:00.005493589 -0500
++++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-07-02 11:57:40.176497765 -0500
 @@ -60,6 +60,260 @@
  #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
  #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -261,34 +261,55 @@
  /*********************************************************************
   *
   * Initialization and readiness waiting.
-@@ -79,7 +333,13 @@ static enum {
+@@ -79,7 +333,15 @@ static enum {
  	CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */
  	CRNG_READY = 2  /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
  } crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
--#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY))
 +
+ #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY))
 +#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+    #define crng_ready() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? call_crng_ready_cb() : (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY)))
++    #define crng_ready_by_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) && call_crng_ready_cb())
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? (call_crng_ready_cb() || crng_ready()) : crng_ready())
 +#else
-+    #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init >= CRNG_READY))
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() crng_ready()
 +#endif
 +
  /* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
  static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
  static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-@@ -247,6 +507,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
- 	unsigned long next_gen;
- 	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+@@ -105,7 +367,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis
+  */
+ bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+ {
+-	return crng_ready();
++	return crng_ready_maybe_cb();
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
  
-+#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+        (void)call_crng_reseed_cb();
-+        /* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
-+#endif
-+
- 	extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
+@@ -124,11 +386,11 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
+  */
+ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+ {
+-	while (!crng_ready()) {
++	while (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		int ret;
  
- 	/*
-@@ -401,6 +666,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
+ 		try_to_generate_entropy();
+-		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
++		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready_maybe_cb(), HZ);
+ 		if (ret)
+ 			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ 	}
+@@ -182,7 +444,7 @@ static void __cold process_random_ready_
+ }
+ 
+ #define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
+-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready_maybe_cb()) \
+ 		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
+ 				__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
+ 
+@@ -401,6 +663,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
  	if (!len)
  		return;
  
@@ -303,7 +324,7 @@
  	first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
  	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
  	len -= first_block_len;
-@@ -450,6 +723,18 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(str
+@@ -450,6 +720,18 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(str
  	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
  		return 0;
  
@@ -322,7 +343,16 @@
  	/*
  	 * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
  	 * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_iter() below to sleep
-@@ -650,6 +935,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *b
+@@ -526,7 +808,7 @@ type get_random_ ##type(void)							\
+ 										\
+ 	warn_unseeded_randomness();						\
+ 										\
+-	if  (!crng_ready()) {							\
++	if  (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {						\
+ 		_get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));				\
+ 		return ret;							\
+ 	}									\
+@@ -650,6 +932,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *b
  {
  	unsigned long flags;
  
@@ -334,7 +364,7 @@
  	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
  	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
  	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-@@ -701,7 +991,11 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
+@@ -701,7 +988,11 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
  	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
  }
  
@@ -346,6 +376,50 @@
  
  static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
  {
+@@ -1229,7 +1520,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
+ 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+ 		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+@@ -1245,6 +1536,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 
+ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+ {
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++	if (crng_ready_by_cb())
++		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
++#endif
+ 	poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
+ 	return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+ }
+@@ -1286,7 +1581,7 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct
+ {
+ 	static int maxwarn = 10;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready()) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
+ 			++urandom_warning.missed;
+ 		else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
+@@ -1369,6 +1664,14 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
+ 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			return -EPERM;
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++		/* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
++		if (call_crng_reseed_cb() == 0) {
++			if (crng_ready())
++				crng_reseed();
++			return 0;
++		}
++#endif
+ 		if (!crng_ready())
+ 			return -ENODATA;
+ 		crng_reseed();
 --- ./include/linux/random.h.dist	2025-04-29 18:54:07.595202807 -0500
 +++ ./include/linux/random.h	2025-06-30 12:03:15.263141842 -0500
 @@ -138,4 +138,37 @@ int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
diff --git a/linuxkm/patches/5.15/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v15.patch b/linuxkm/patches/5.15/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v15.patch
index 2f6afad3c..efafb4357 100644
--- a/linuxkm/patches/5.15/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v15.patch
+++ b/linuxkm/patches/5.15/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v15.patch
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 --- ./drivers/char/random.c.dist	2021-10-31 15:53:10.000000000 -0500
-+++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-06-28 13:16:25.528404270 -0500
++++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-07-02 11:49:13.836320539 -0500
 @@ -344,6 +344,260 @@
  #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
  #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -261,22 +261,30 @@
  #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
  #include <trace/events/random.h>
  
-@@ -461,7 +715,13 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng =
+@@ -461,7 +715,22 @@ static struct crng_state primary_crng =
   * its value (from 0->1->2).
   */
  static int crng_init = 0;
--#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
++
+ #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++    #define crng_ready_by_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) && call_crng_ready_cb())
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? (call_crng_ready_cb() || crng_ready()) : crng_ready())
++#else
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() crng_ready()
++#endif
 +
 +#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+    #define crng_ready() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? call_crng_ready_cb() : (likely(crng_init > 1)))
++    #define crng_ready_by_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) && call_crng_ready_cb())
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? (call_crng_ready_cb() || crng_ready()) : crng_ready())
 +#else
-+    #define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() crng_ready()
 +#endif
 +
  static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
  static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
  #define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
-@@ -593,6 +853,12 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entrop
+@@ -593,6 +862,12 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entrop
  	unsigned long flags;
  
  	trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
@@ -289,19 +297,7 @@
  	spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
  	_mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
  	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-@@ -944,6 +1210,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_stat
- 		__u32	key[8];
- 	} buf;
- 
-+#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+        (void)call_crng_reseed_cb();
-+        /* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
-+#endif
-+
- 	if (r) {
- 		num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0);
- 		if (num == 0)
-@@ -1059,6 +1330,18 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __
+@@ -1059,6 +1334,18 @@ static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __
  	__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
  	int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
  
@@ -320,7 +316,16 @@
  	while (nbytes) {
  		if (large_request && need_resched()) {
  			if (signal_pending(current)) {
-@@ -1528,6 +1811,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
+@@ -1499,7 +1786,7 @@ static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(co
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	if (print_once ||
+-	    crng_ready() ||
++	    crng_ready_maybe_cb() ||
+ 	    (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
+ 		return;
+ 	WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
+@@ -1528,6 +1815,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
  
  	trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
  
@@ -335,6 +340,77 @@
  	while (nbytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
  		extract_crng(buf);
  		buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+@@ -1614,12 +1909,12 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
+  */
+ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+ {
+-	if (likely(crng_ready()))
++	if (likely(crng_ready_maybe_cb()))
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+ 	do {
+ 		int ret;
+-		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
++		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready_maybe_cb(), HZ);
+ 		if (ret)
+ 			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ 
+@@ -1641,7 +1936,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
+  */
+ bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+ {
+-	return crng_ready();
++	return crng_ready_maybe_cb();
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
+ 
+@@ -1819,7 +2114,7 @@ urandom_read(struct file *file, char __u
+ 	unsigned long flags;
+ 	static int maxwarn = 10;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb() && maxwarn > 0) {
+ 		maxwarn--;
+ 		if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning))
+ 			pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
+@@ -1848,6 +2143,11 @@ random_poll(struct file *file, poll_tabl
+ {
+ 	__poll_t mask;
+ 
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++	if (crng_ready_by_cb())
++		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
++#endif
++
+ 	poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
+ 	poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
+ 	mask = 0;
+@@ -1946,6 +2246,16 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
+ 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			return -EPERM;
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++		/* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
++		if (call_crng_reseed_cb() == 0) {
++			if (crng_init >= 2) {
++				crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
++				crng_global_init_time = jiffies - 1;
++                        }
++			return 0;
++		}
++#endif
+ 		if (crng_init < 2)
+ 			return -ENODATA;
+ 		crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
+@@ -1998,7 +2308,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 	if (count > INT_MAX)
+ 		count = INT_MAX;
+ 
+-	if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) {
++	if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+ 		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
 --- ./include/linux/random.h.dist	2021-10-31 15:53:10.000000000 -0500
 +++ ./include/linux/random.h	2025-06-28 13:09:13.392547118 -0500
 @@ -158,4 +158,37 @@ static inline bool __init arch_get_rando
diff --git a/linuxkm/patches/5.17/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v17.patch b/linuxkm/patches/5.17/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v17.patch
index 19340769f..c10745c3b 100644
--- a/linuxkm/patches/5.17/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v17.patch
+++ b/linuxkm/patches/5.17/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-5v17.patch
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 --- ./drivers/char/random.c.dist	2022-05-31 08:33:43.006547419 -0500
-+++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-06-28 14:03:07.062703841 -0500
++++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-07-02 11:42:10.098166804 -0500
 @@ -60,6 +60,260 @@
  #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
  #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -261,34 +261,55 @@
  /*********************************************************************
   *
   * Initialization and readiness waiting.
-@@ -80,7 +334,13 @@ static enum {
+@@ -80,7 +334,15 @@ static enum {
  	CRNG_READY = 2  /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
  } crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
  static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_is_ready);
--#define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
 +
+ #define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
 +#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+    #define crng_ready() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? call_crng_ready_cb() : (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY))
++    #define crng_ready_by_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) && call_crng_ready_cb())
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? (call_crng_ready_cb() || crng_ready()) : crng_ready())
 +#else
-+    #define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() crng_ready()
 +#endif
 +
  /* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
  static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
  static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-@@ -253,6 +513,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
- 	unsigned long next_gen;
- 	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+@@ -106,7 +368,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis
+  */
+ bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+ {
+-	return crng_ready();
++	return crng_ready_maybe_cb();
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
  
-+#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+        (void)call_crng_reseed_cb();
-+        /* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
-+#endif
-+
- 	extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
+@@ -130,11 +392,11 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
+  */
+ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+ {
+-	while (!crng_ready()) {
++	while (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		int ret;
  
- 	/*
-@@ -407,6 +672,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
+ 		try_to_generate_entropy();
+-		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
++		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready_maybe_cb(), HZ);
+ 		if (ret)
+ 			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ 	}
+@@ -188,7 +450,7 @@ static void __cold process_random_ready_
+ }
+ 
+ #define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
+-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready_maybe_cb()) \
+ 		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
+ 				__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
+ 
+@@ -407,6 +669,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
  	if (!len)
  		return;
  
@@ -303,7 +324,7 @@
  	first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
  	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
  	len -= first_block_len;
-@@ -456,6 +729,18 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(str
+@@ -456,6 +726,18 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(str
  	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
  		return 0;
  
@@ -322,7 +343,16 @@
  	/*
  	 * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
  	 * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep
-@@ -656,6 +941,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *b
+@@ -532,7 +814,7 @@ type get_random_ ##type(void)							\
+ 										\
+ 	warn_unseeded_randomness();						\
+ 										\
+-	if  (!crng_ready()) {							\
++	if  (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {						\
+ 		_get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));				\
+ 		return ret;							\
+ 	}									\
+@@ -656,6 +938,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *b
  {
  	unsigned long flags;
  
@@ -334,7 +364,7 @@
  	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
  	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
  	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-@@ -707,7 +997,11 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
+@@ -707,7 +994,11 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
  	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
  }
  
@@ -346,6 +376,50 @@
  
  static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
  {
+@@ -1233,7 +1524,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
+ 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+ 		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+@@ -1249,6 +1540,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 
+ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+ {
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++	if (crng_ready_by_cb())
++		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
++#endif
+ 	poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
+ 	return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+ }
+@@ -1290,7 +1585,7 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct
+ {
+ 	static int maxwarn = 10;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready()) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
+ 			++urandom_warning.missed;
+ 		else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
+@@ -1368,6 +1663,14 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
+ 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			return -EPERM;
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++		/* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
++		if (call_crng_reseed_cb() == 0) {
++			if (crng_ready())
++				crng_reseed();
++			return 0;
++		}
++#endif
+ 		if (!crng_ready())
+ 			return -ENODATA;
+ 		crng_reseed();
 --- ./include/linux/random.h.dist	2022-05-31 08:33:43.007547457 -0500
 +++ ./include/linux/random.h	2025-06-30 12:06:15.219731761 -0500
 @@ -138,4 +138,37 @@ int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
diff --git a/linuxkm/patches/6.1.73/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v1v73.patch b/linuxkm/patches/6.1.73/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v1v73.patch
index 6269e9a2c..7d90e7726 100644
--- a/linuxkm/patches/6.1.73/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v1v73.patch
+++ b/linuxkm/patches/6.1.73/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v1v73.patch
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 --- ./drivers/char/random.c.dist	2024-01-19 16:25:03.754138321 -0600
-+++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-06-30 12:39:40.400450784 -0500
++++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-07-02 10:45:31.769041473 -0500
 @@ -60,6 +60,260 @@
  #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
  #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -261,34 +261,55 @@
  /*********************************************************************
   *
   * Initialization and readiness waiting.
-@@ -80,7 +334,13 @@ static enum {
+@@ -80,7 +334,15 @@ static enum {
  	CRNG_READY = 2  /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
  } crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
  static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_is_ready);
--#define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
 +
+ #define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
 +#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+    #define crng_ready() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? call_crng_ready_cb() : (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY))
++    #define crng_ready_by_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) && call_crng_ready_cb())
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? (call_crng_ready_cb() || crng_ready()) : crng_ready())
 +#else
-+    #define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() crng_ready()
 +#endif
 +
  /* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
  static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
  static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-@@ -210,6 +470,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(void)
- 	unsigned long next_gen;
- 	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+@@ -104,7 +366,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis
+  */
+ bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+ {
+-	return crng_ready();
++	return crng_ready_maybe_cb();
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
  
-+#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+        (void)call_crng_reseed_cb();
-+        /* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
-+#endif
-+
- 	extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
+@@ -128,11 +390,11 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
+  */
+ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+ {
+-	while (!crng_ready()) {
++	while (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		int ret;
  
- 	/*
-@@ -362,6 +627,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
+ 		try_to_generate_entropy();
+-		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
++		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready_maybe_cb(), HZ);
+ 		if (ret)
+ 			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ 	}
+@@ -141,7 +403,7 @@ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
+ 
+ #define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
+-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready_maybe_cb()) \
+ 		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
+ 				__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
+ 
+@@ -362,6 +624,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
  	if (!len)
  		return;
  
@@ -303,7 +324,7 @@
  	first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
  	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
  	len -= first_block_len;
-@@ -408,6 +681,18 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(str
+@@ -408,6 +678,18 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(str
  	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
  		return 0;
  
@@ -322,7 +343,16 @@
  	/*
  	 * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
  	 * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_iter() below to sleep
-@@ -620,6 +905,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *b
+@@ -484,7 +766,7 @@ type get_random_ ##type(void)							\
+ 										\
+ 	warn_unseeded_randomness();						\
+ 										\
+-	if  (!crng_ready()) {							\
++	if  (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {						\
+ 		_get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));				\
+ 		return ret;							\
+ 	}									\
+@@ -620,6 +902,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *b
  {
  	unsigned long flags;
  
@@ -334,7 +364,7 @@
  	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
  	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
  	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-@@ -679,7 +969,11 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
+@@ -679,7 +966,11 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
  	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
  }
  
@@ -346,6 +376,63 @@
  
  static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
  {
+@@ -1321,7 +1612,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
+ 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+ 		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+@@ -1337,6 +1628,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 
+ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+ {
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++	if (crng_ready_by_cb())
++		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
++#endif
+ 	poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
+ 	return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+ }
+@@ -1382,10 +1677,10 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct
+ 	 * Opportunistically attempt to initialize the RNG on platforms that
+ 	 * have fast cycle counters, but don't (for now) require it to succeed.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!crng_ready())
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb())
+ 		try_to_generate_entropy();
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready()) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
+ 			++urandom_warning.missed;
+ 		else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
+@@ -1402,7 +1697,7 @@ static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct k
+ {
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() &&
++	if (!crng_ready_by_cb() &&
+ 	    ((kiocb->ki_flags & (IOCB_NOWAIT | IOCB_NOIO)) ||
+ 	     (kiocb->ki_filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)))
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+@@ -1468,6 +1763,14 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
+ 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			return -EPERM;
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++		/* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
++		if (call_crng_reseed_cb() == 0) {
++			if (crng_ready())
++				crng_reseed(NULL);
++			return 0;
++		}
++#endif
+ 		if (!crng_ready())
+ 			return -ENODATA;
+ 		crng_reseed();
 --- ./include/linux/random.h.dist	2024-01-19 16:25:07.891223702 -0600
 +++ ./include/linux/random.h	2025-06-30 12:38:54.353341542 -0500
 @@ -202,4 +202,37 @@ int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
diff --git a/linuxkm/patches/6.12/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v12.patch b/linuxkm/patches/6.12/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v12.patch
index f333e419c..3e2c7f770 100644
--- a/linuxkm/patches/6.12/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v12.patch
+++ b/linuxkm/patches/6.12/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v12.patch
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 --- ./drivers/char/random.c.dist	2025-01-19 19:03:47.877152701 -0600
-+++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-06-30 11:36:08.594481563 -0500
++++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-07-02 10:40:21.994303997 -0500
 @@ -67,6 +67,260 @@
  #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
  #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -261,34 +261,64 @@
  /*********************************************************************
   *
   * Initialization and readiness waiting.
-@@ -87,7 +341,13 @@ static enum {
+@@ -87,7 +341,15 @@ static enum {
  	CRNG_READY = 2  /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
  } crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
  static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_is_ready);
--#define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
 +
+ #define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
 +#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+    #define crng_ready() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? call_crng_ready_cb() : (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY))
++    #define crng_ready_by_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) && call_crng_ready_cb())
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? (call_crng_ready_cb() || crng_ready()) : crng_ready())
 +#else
-+    #define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() crng_ready()
 +#endif
 +
  /* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
  static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
  static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-@@ -258,6 +518,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_stru
- 	unsigned long next_gen;
- 	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+@@ -112,7 +374,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis
+  */
+ bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+ {
+-	return crng_ready();
++	return crng_ready_maybe_cb();
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
  
-+#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+        (void)call_crng_reseed_cb();
-+        /* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Immediately schedule the next reseeding, so that it fires sooner rather than later. */
- 	if (likely(system_unbound_wq))
- 		queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &next_reseed, crng_reseed_interval());
-@@ -402,6 +667,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
+@@ -136,11 +398,11 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
+  */
+ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+ {
+-	while (!crng_ready()) {
++	while (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		int ret;
+ 
+ 		try_to_generate_entropy();
+-		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
++		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready_maybe_cb(), HZ);
+ 		if (ret)
+ 			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ 	}
+@@ -160,7 +422,7 @@ int __cold execute_with_initialized_rng(
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 
+ 	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_notifier.lock, flags);
+-	if (crng_ready())
++	if (crng_ready_maybe_cb())
+ 		nb->notifier_call(nb, 0, NULL);
+ 	else
+ 		ret = raw_notifier_chain_register((struct raw_notifier_head *)&random_ready_notifier.head, nb);
+@@ -169,7 +431,7 @@ int __cold execute_with_initialized_rng(
+ }
+ 
+ #define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
+-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready_maybe_cb()) \
+ 		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
+ 				__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
+ 
+@@ -402,6 +664,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
  	if (!len)
  		return;
  
@@ -303,7 +333,7 @@
  	first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
  	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
  	len -= first_block_len;
-@@ -448,6 +721,18 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(str
+@@ -448,6 +718,18 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(str
  	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
  		return 0;
  
@@ -322,7 +352,16 @@
  	/*
  	 * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
  	 * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_iter() below to sleep
-@@ -660,6 +945,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *b
+@@ -524,7 +806,7 @@ type get_random_ ##type(void)							\
+ 										\
+ 	warn_unseeded_randomness();						\
+ 										\
+-	if  (!crng_ready()) {							\
++	if  (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {						\
+ 		_get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));				\
+ 		return ret;							\
+ 	}									\
+@@ -660,6 +942,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *b
  {
  	unsigned long flags;
  
@@ -334,7 +373,7 @@
  	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
  	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
  	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-@@ -719,7 +1009,11 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
+@@ -719,7 +1006,11 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
  	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
  }
  
@@ -346,6 +385,63 @@
  
  static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
  {
+@@ -1400,7 +1691,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
+ 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+ 		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+@@ -1416,6 +1707,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 
+ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+ {
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++	if (crng_ready_by_cb())
++		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
++#endif
+ 	poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
+ 	return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+ }
+@@ -1461,10 +1756,10 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct
+ 	 * Opportunistically attempt to initialize the RNG on platforms that
+ 	 * have fast cycle counters, but don't (for now) require it to succeed.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!crng_ready())
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb())
+ 		try_to_generate_entropy();
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready()) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
+ 			++urandom_warning.missed;
+ 		else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
+@@ -1481,7 +1776,7 @@ static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct k
+ {
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() &&
++	if (!crng_ready_by_cb() &&
+ 	    ((kiocb->ki_flags & (IOCB_NOWAIT | IOCB_NOIO)) ||
+ 	     (kiocb->ki_filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)))
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+@@ -1546,6 +1841,14 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
+ 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			return -EPERM;
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++		/* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
++		if (call_crng_reseed_cb() == 0) {
++			if (crng_ready())
++				crng_reseed(NULL);
++			return 0;
++		}
++#endif
+ 		if (!crng_ready())
+ 			return -ENODATA;
+ 		crng_reseed(NULL);
 --- ./include/linux/random.h.dist	2025-01-19 19:03:57.524328914 -0600
 +++ ./include/linux/random.h	2025-06-30 12:04:32.801676104 -0500
 @@ -161,4 +161,37 @@ int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
diff --git a/linuxkm/patches/6.15/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v15.patch b/linuxkm/patches/6.15/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v15.patch
index ce62a15c0..e21b76226 100644
--- a/linuxkm/patches/6.15/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v15.patch
+++ b/linuxkm/patches/6.15/WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS-6v15.patch
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 --- ./drivers/char/random.c.dist	2025-05-27 15:19:59.167827834 -0500
-+++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-06-28 10:10:59.552488658 -0500
++++ ./drivers/char/random.c	2025-07-02 09:34:56.197972526 -0500
 @@ -67,6 +67,260 @@
  #include <asm/irq_regs.h>
  #include <asm/io.h>
@@ -261,34 +261,64 @@
  /*********************************************************************
   *
   * Initialization and readiness waiting.
-@@ -87,7 +341,13 @@ static enum {
+@@ -87,7 +341,15 @@ static enum {
  	CRNG_READY = 2  /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
  } crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
  static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_is_ready);
--#define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
 +
+ #define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
 +#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+    #define crng_ready() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? call_crng_ready_cb() : (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY))
++    #define crng_ready_by_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) && call_crng_ready_cb())
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() (atomic_read(&random_bytes_cb_refcnt) ? (call_crng_ready_cb() || crng_ready()) : crng_ready())
 +#else
-+    #define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
++    #define crng_ready_maybe_cb() crng_ready()
 +#endif
 +
  /* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
  static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
  static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-@@ -258,6 +518,11 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct work_stru
- 	unsigned long next_gen;
- 	u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+@@ -112,7 +374,7 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Dis
+  */
+ bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+ {
+-	return crng_ready();
++	return crng_ready_maybe_cb();
+ }
+ EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
  
-+#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
-+        (void)call_crng_reseed_cb();
-+        /* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* Immediately schedule the next reseeding, so that it fires sooner rather than later. */
- 	if (likely(system_unbound_wq))
- 		queue_delayed_work(system_unbound_wq, &next_reseed, crng_reseed_interval());
-@@ -402,6 +667,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
+@@ -136,11 +398,11 @@ static void try_to_generate_entropy(void
+  */
+ int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+ {
+-	while (!crng_ready()) {
++	while (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		int ret;
+ 
+ 		try_to_generate_entropy();
+-		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
++		ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready_maybe_cb(), HZ);
+ 		if (ret)
+ 			return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ 	}
+@@ -160,7 +422,7 @@ int __cold execute_with_initialized_rng(
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 
+ 	spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_notifier.lock, flags);
+-	if (crng_ready())
++	if (crng_ready_maybe_cb())
+ 		nb->notifier_call(nb, 0, NULL);
+ 	else
+ 		ret = raw_notifier_chain_register((struct raw_notifier_head *)&random_ready_notifier.head, nb);
+@@ -169,7 +431,7 @@ int __cold execute_with_initialized_rng(
+ }
+ 
+ #define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
+-	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
++	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready_maybe_cb()) \
+ 		printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
+ 				__func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
+ 
+@@ -402,6 +664,14 @@ static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf,
  	if (!len)
  		return;
  
@@ -303,7 +333,7 @@
  	first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
  	crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
  	len -= first_block_len;
-@@ -448,6 +721,18 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(str
+@@ -448,6 +718,18 @@ static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(str
  	if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
  		return 0;
  
@@ -322,7 +352,16 @@
  	/*
  	 * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
  	 * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_iter() below to sleep
-@@ -660,6 +945,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *b
+@@ -524,7 +806,7 @@ type get_random_ ##type(void)							\
+ 										\
+ 	warn_unseeded_randomness();						\
+ 										\
+-	if  (!crng_ready()) {							\
++	if  (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {						\
+ 		_get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret));				\
+ 		return ret;							\
+ 	}									\
+@@ -660,6 +942,11 @@ static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *b
  {
  	unsigned long flags;
  
@@ -334,7 +373,7 @@
  	spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
  	_mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
  	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-@@ -719,7 +1009,11 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
+@@ -719,7 +1006,11 @@ static void extract_entropy(void *buf, s
  	memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
  }
  
@@ -346,6 +385,63 @@
  
  static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
  {
+@@ -1400,7 +1691,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 	if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
+ 		return -EINVAL;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
+ 		if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+ 			return -EAGAIN;
+ 		ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+@@ -1416,6 +1707,10 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *
+ 
+ static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
+ {
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++	if (crng_ready_by_cb())
++		return EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
++#endif
+ 	poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
+ 	return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
+ }
+@@ -1461,10 +1756,10 @@ static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct
+ 	 * Opportunistically attempt to initialize the RNG on platforms that
+ 	 * have fast cycle counters, but don't (for now) require it to succeed.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!crng_ready())
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb())
+ 		try_to_generate_entropy();
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready()) {
++	if (!crng_ready_maybe_cb()) {
+ 		if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
+ 			++urandom_warning.missed;
+ 		else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
+@@ -1481,7 +1776,7 @@ static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct k
+ {
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if (!crng_ready() &&
++	if (!crng_ready_by_cb() &&
+ 	    ((kiocb->ki_flags & (IOCB_NOWAIT | IOCB_NOIO)) ||
+ 	     (kiocb->ki_filp->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)))
+ 		return -EAGAIN;
+@@ -1546,6 +1841,14 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f,
+ 	case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ 		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ 			return -EPERM;
++#ifdef WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS
++		/* fall through to reseed native crng too. */
++		if (call_crng_reseed_cb() == 0) {
++			if (crng_ready())
++				crng_reseed(NULL);
++			return 0;
++		}
++#endif
+ 		if (!crng_ready())
+ 			return -ENODATA;
+ 		crng_reseed(NULL);
 --- ./include/linux/random.h.dist	2025-05-27 15:20:04.394946820 -0500
 +++ ./include/linux/random.h	2025-06-30 12:04:12.032296708 -0500
 @@ -154,4 +154,37 @@ int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
diff --git a/linuxkm/patches/regen-patches.sh b/linuxkm/patches/regen-patches.sh
index c6cb57f08..cd6349541 100755
--- a/linuxkm/patches/regen-patches.sh
+++ b/linuxkm/patches/regen-patches.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,9 @@
 #!/bin/bash
+
+# This script is an internal tool that regenerates kernel patches for
+# WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_HAVE_GET_RANDOM_CALLBACKS, using full kernel sources staged
+# for development.
+
 if [[ ! -d 6.15 ]]; then
     echo "6.15 not found -- wrong working dir?" >&2
     exit 1
diff --git a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
index 1a4371b27..fb09637c5 100644
--- a/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
+++ b/wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
@@ -3737,7 +3737,7 @@ extern void uITRON4_free(void *p) ;
          * NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1, to avoid unnecessary delays in DRBG
          * generation.
          */
-        #define WC_RESEED_INTERVAL (1UL<<48UL)
+        #define WC_RESEED_INTERVAL (((word64)1UL)<<48UL)
     #endif
 #endif