mirror of
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl.git
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Update release notes.
This commit is contained in:
20
ChangeLog.md
20
ChangeLog.md
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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# wolfSSL Release 4.5.0 (August 13, 2020)
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# wolfSSL Release 4.5.0 (August 18, 2020)
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If you have questions about this release, feel free to contact us on our
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If you have questions about this release, feel free to contact us on our
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info@ address.
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info@ address.
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@ -50,6 +50,12 @@ Release 4.5.0 of wolfSSL embedded TLS has bug fixes and new features including:
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rshb range
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rshb range
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* Fix for sanity check on padding with DES3 conversion of PEM to DER
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* Fix for sanity check on padding with DES3 conversion of PEM to DER
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* Sanity check for potential out of bounds read with fp_read_radix_16
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* Sanity check for potential out of bounds read with fp_read_radix_16
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* Additional checking of ECC scalars.
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* Fixing the FIPS Ready build w.r.t. ecc.c.
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* When processing certificate names with OpenSSL compatibility layer
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enabled, unknown name item types were getting handled as having NID 0,
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and failing. Added a couple more items to what is handled correctly,
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and ignoring anything that is an unknown type.
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## Improvements/Optimizations
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## Improvements/Optimizations
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@ -73,11 +79,11 @@ Release 4.5.0 of wolfSSL embedded TLS has bug fixes and new features including:
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* Changed the configure option for FIPS Ready builds to be
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* Changed the configure option for FIPS Ready builds to be
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`--enable-fips=ready`.
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`--enable-fips=ready`.
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## This release of wolfSSL includes fixes for 5 security vulnerabilities.
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## This release of wolfSSL includes fixes for 6 security vulnerabilities.
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wolfSSL version 4.5.0 contains 5 vulnerability fixes: 2 fixes for TLS 1.3,
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wolfSSL version 4.5.0 contains 6 vulnerability fixes: 2 fixes for TLS 1.3,
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2 side channel attack mitigations, and 1 fix for a potential private key
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2 side channel attack mitigations, 1 fix for a potential private key leak
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leak in a specific use case.
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in a specific use case, 1 fix for DTLS.
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* In earlier versions of wolfSSL there exists a potential man in the middle
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* In earlier versions of wolfSSL there exists a potential man in the middle
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attack on TLS 1.3 clients. Malicious attackers with a privileged network
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attack on TLS 1.3 clients. Malicious attackers with a privileged network
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@ -120,6 +126,10 @@ leak in a specific use case.
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PEM certificates with PEM private keys in the same file when loading up the
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PEM certificates with PEM private keys in the same file when loading up the
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certificate file, then we recommend updating wolfSSL for this use case and
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certificate file, then we recommend updating wolfSSL for this use case and
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also recommend regenerating any private keys in the file.
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also recommend regenerating any private keys in the file.
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* During the handshake, clear application_data messages in epoch 0 are
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processed and returned to the application. Fixed by dropping received
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application_data messages in epoch 0. Thank you to Paul Fiterau of Uppsala
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University and Robert Merget of Ruhr-University Bochum for the report.
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For additional vulnerability information visit the vulnerability page at
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For additional vulnerability information visit the vulnerability page at
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https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/
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https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/
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20
README
20
README
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ should be used for the enum name.
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*** end Notes ***
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*** end Notes ***
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# wolfSSL Release 4.5.0 (August 13, 2020)
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# wolfSSL Release 4.5.0 (August 18, 2020)
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If you have questions about this release, feel free to contact us on our
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If you have questions about this release, feel free to contact us on our
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info@ address.
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info@ address.
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@ -125,6 +125,12 @@ Release 4.5.0 of wolfSSL embedded TLS has bug fixes and new features including:
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rshb range
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rshb range
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* Fix for sanity check on padding with DES3 conversion of PEM to DER
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* Fix for sanity check on padding with DES3 conversion of PEM to DER
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* Sanity check for potential out of bounds read with fp_read_radix_16
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* Sanity check for potential out of bounds read with fp_read_radix_16
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* Additional checking of ECC scalars.
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* Fixing the FIPS Ready build w.r.t. ecc.c.
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* When processing certificate names with OpenSSL compatibility layer
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enabled, unknown name item types were getting handled as having NID 0,
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and failing. Added a couple more items to what is handled correctly,
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and ignoring anything that is an unknown type.
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## Improvements/Optimizations
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## Improvements/Optimizations
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@ -148,11 +154,11 @@ Release 4.5.0 of wolfSSL embedded TLS has bug fixes and new features including:
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* Changed the configure option for FIPS Ready builds to be
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* Changed the configure option for FIPS Ready builds to be
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`--enable-fips=ready`.
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`--enable-fips=ready`.
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## This release of wolfSSL includes fixes for 5 security vulnerabilities.
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## This release of wolfSSL includes fixes for 6 security vulnerabilities.
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wolfSSL version 4.5.0 contains 5 vulnerability fixes: 2 fixes for TLS 1.3,
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wolfSSL version 4.5.0 contains 6 vulnerability fixes: 2 fixes for TLS 1.3,
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2 side channel attack mitigations, and 1 fix for a potential private key
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2 side channel attack mitigations, 1 fix for a potential private key leak
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leak in a specific use case.
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in a specific use case, 1 fix for DTLS.
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* In earlier versions of wolfSSL there exists a potential man in the middle
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* In earlier versions of wolfSSL there exists a potential man in the middle
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attack on TLS 1.3 clients. Malicious attackers with a privileged network
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attack on TLS 1.3 clients. Malicious attackers with a privileged network
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@ -195,6 +201,10 @@ leak in a specific use case.
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PEM certificates with PEM private keys in the same file when loading up the
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PEM certificates with PEM private keys in the same file when loading up the
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certificate file, then we recommend updating wolfSSL for this use case and
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certificate file, then we recommend updating wolfSSL for this use case and
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also recommend regenerating any private keys in the file.
|
also recommend regenerating any private keys in the file.
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* During the handshake, clear application_data messages in epoch 0 are
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processed and returned to the application. Fixed by dropping received
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application_data messages in epoch 0. Thank you to Paul Fiterau of Uppsala
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University and Robert Merget of Ruhr-University Bochum for the report.
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For additional vulnerability information visit the vulnerability page at
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For additional vulnerability information visit the vulnerability page at
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https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/
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https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/
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15
README.md
15
README.md
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ should be used for the enum name.
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*** end Notes ***
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*** end Notes ***
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# wolfSSL Release 4.5.0 (August 13, 2020)
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# wolfSSL Release 4.5.0 (August 18, 2020)
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If you have questions about this release, feel free to contact us on our
|
If you have questions about this release, feel free to contact us on our
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info@ address.
|
info@ address.
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@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Release 4.5.0 of wolfSSL embedded TLS has bug fixes and new features including:
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rshb range
|
rshb range
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* Fix for sanity check on padding with DES3 conversion of PEM to DER
|
* Fix for sanity check on padding with DES3 conversion of PEM to DER
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* Sanity check for potential out of bounds read with fp_read_radix_16
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* Sanity check for potential out of bounds read with fp_read_radix_16
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|
* Additional checking of ECC scalars.
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## Improvements/Optimizations
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## Improvements/Optimizations
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@ -148,11 +149,11 @@ Release 4.5.0 of wolfSSL embedded TLS has bug fixes and new features including:
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* Changed the configure option for FIPS Ready builds to be
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* Changed the configure option for FIPS Ready builds to be
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`--enable-fips=ready`.
|
`--enable-fips=ready`.
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|
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## This release of wolfSSL includes fixes for 5 security vulnerabilities.
|
## This release of wolfSSL includes fixes for 6 security vulnerabilities.
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|
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wolfSSL version 4.5.0 contains 5 vulnerability fixes: 2 fixes for TLS 1.3,
|
wolfSSL version 4.5.0 contains 6 vulnerability fixes: 2 fixes for TLS 1.3,
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2 side channel attack mitigations, and 1 fix for a potential private key
|
2 side channel attack mitigations, 1 fix for a potential private key leak
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leak in a specific use case.
|
in a specific use case, 1 fix for DTLS.
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|
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* In earlier versions of wolfSSL there exists a potential man in the middle
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* In earlier versions of wolfSSL there exists a potential man in the middle
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attack on TLS 1.3 clients. Malicious attackers with a privileged network
|
attack on TLS 1.3 clients. Malicious attackers with a privileged network
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@ -195,6 +196,10 @@ leak in a specific use case.
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PEM certificates with PEM private keys in the same file when loading up the
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PEM certificates with PEM private keys in the same file when loading up the
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certificate file, then we recommend updating wolfSSL for this use case and
|
certificate file, then we recommend updating wolfSSL for this use case and
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also recommend regenerating any private keys in the file.
|
also recommend regenerating any private keys in the file.
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* During the handshake, clear application_data messages in epoch 0 are
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|
processed and returned to the application. Fixed by dropping received
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|
application_data messages in epoch 0. Thank you to Paul Fiterau of Uppsala
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|
University and Robert Merget of Ruhr-University Bochum for the report.
|
||||||
|
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For additional vulnerability information visit the vulnerability page at
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For additional vulnerability information visit the vulnerability page at
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https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/
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https://www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/
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