comment on sz value and sanity check before fuzzing

This commit is contained in:
Jacob Barthelmeh
2018-06-20 09:21:56 -06:00
parent 83324f39d7
commit 61655ef56d
2 changed files with 8 additions and 7 deletions

View File

@@ -11991,6 +11991,9 @@ int TimingPadVerify(WOLFSSL* ssl, const byte* input, int padLen, int macSz,
int ret = 0;
good = MaskPadding(input, pLen, macSz);
/* 4th argument has potential to underflow, all ssl->hmac functions need to
* either increment the size by (macSz + padLen + 1) before use or check on
* the size to make sure is valid. */
ret = ssl->hmac(ssl, verify, input, pLen - macSz - padLen - 1, padLen,
content, 1);
good |= MaskMac(input, pLen, ssl->specs.hash_size, verify);
@@ -12242,11 +12245,6 @@ static INLINE int VerifyMac(WOLFSSL* ssl, const byte* input, word32 msgSz,
padByte = 1;
if (ssl->options.tls) {
/* Sanity check for underflow, TimingPadVerify performs hash on size
* (msgSz - ivExtra) - digestSz - pad - 1 */
if (digestSz + pad + 1 > (msgSz - ivExtra)) {
return BUFFER_E;
}
ret = TimingPadVerify(ssl, input, pad, digestSz, msgSz - ivExtra,
content);
if (ret != 0)
@@ -13034,7 +13032,7 @@ static int SSL_hmac(WOLFSSL* ssl, byte* digest, const byte* in, word32 sz,
(void)padLen;
#ifdef HAVE_FUZZER
if (ssl->fuzzerCb)
if (ssl->fuzzerCb && (int)sz > 0)
ssl->fuzzerCb(ssl, in, sz, FUZZ_HMAC, ssl->fuzzerCtx);
#endif

View File

@@ -1300,7 +1300,10 @@ int TLS_hmac(WOLFSSL* ssl, byte* digest, const byte* in, word32 sz, int padSz,
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
#ifdef HAVE_FUZZER
if (ssl->fuzzerCb)
/* sz argument has potential to underflow, all ssl->hmac functions need to
* either increment the size by (macSz + padLen + 1) before use or check on
* the size to make sure is valid when sz is effected by IO */
if (ssl->fuzzerCb && (int)sz > 0)
ssl->fuzzerCb(ssl, in, sz, FUZZ_HMAC, ssl->fuzzerCtx);
#endif