diff --git a/src/internal.c b/src/internal.c index 3e0e55bbe5..54c4002c9f 100644 --- a/src/internal.c +++ b/src/internal.c @@ -13542,6 +13542,57 @@ static int PatternHasWildcardInALabel(const char* pattern, word32 patternLen) return 0; } +/* Validate the placement of a wildcard ('*') in a presented identifier per + * RFC 6125 sec. 6.4.3 / RFC 9525 sec. 6.3 and CA/Browser Forum Baseline + * Requirements sec. 3.2.2.6: + * - a wildcard may only appear in the left-most label of the pattern, and + * - a left-most label consisting solely of the wildcard ("*") may match only + * when at least two further labels (i.e. at least two dots) follow it. + * + * This rejects a bare "*" (matches any single-label name), "*.com" (wildcard + * immediately to the left of a registry/public suffix), and + * "foo.*.example.com" (wildcard not in the left-most label), while still + * accepting the legitimate "*.example.com" form. Partial left-most wildcards + * such as "a*" or "a*b*" retain their existing matching behavior - they are + * not bare wildcard labels and are not subject to the two-label requirement. + * pattern/patternLen must already have any single trailing FQDN dot stripped. + * + * Returns 1 if the pattern has no wildcard or its wildcard placement is + * acceptable, 0 otherwise. */ +static int WildcardPlacementOK(const char* pattern, word32 patternLen) +{ + word32 i; + int sawWildcard = 0; + int sawDot = 0; + int dots = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < patternLen; i++) { + if (pattern[i] == '*') { + /* A wildcard is only permitted in the left-most label: reject any + * '*' that appears after a label separator. */ + if (sawDot) + return 0; + sawWildcard = 1; + } + else if (pattern[i] == '.') { + sawDot = 1; + dots++; + } + } + + if (!sawWildcard) + return 1; + + /* A left-most label that is exactly "*" (a bare wildcard label) requires at + * least two further labels. This rejects a bare "*" (0 dots) and "*.tld" + * (1 dot) but still allows "*.example.com" (2 dots). */ + if (pattern[0] == '*' && (patternLen == 1 || pattern[1] == '.') && + dots < 2) + return 0; + + return 1; +} + /* Match names with wildcards, each wildcard can represent a single name component or fragment but not multiple names, i.e., *.z.com matches y.z.com but not x.y.z.com @@ -13598,6 +13649,13 @@ int MatchDomainName(const char* pattern, int patternLen, const char* str, } } + /* RFC 6125 sec. 6.4.3 / RFC 9525 sec. 6.3 + CA/Browser Forum BR + * sec. 3.2.2.6: reject a pattern whose wildcard is not confined to the + * left-most label, or that has fewer than two labels to the right of the + * wildcard (e.g. "*", "*.com", "foo.*.example.com"). */ + if (!WildcardPlacementOK(pattern, (word32)patternLen)) + return 0; + while (patternLen > 0) { /* Get the next pattern char to evaluate */ char p = (char)XTOLOWER((unsigned char)*pattern); diff --git a/src/x509_str.c b/src/x509_str.c index 9d1d1f1107..ad160afd47 100644 --- a/src/x509_str.c +++ b/src/x509_str.c @@ -629,6 +629,99 @@ static int X509StoreCertIsTrusted(WOLFSSL_X509_STORE* store, return 0; } +/* Enforce the BasicConstraints pathLenConstraint (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9 and + * the path validation rules in sec. 6.1.4 (l)/(m)) over the certification path + * assembled in ctx->chain. + * + * wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert() authenticates each certificate individually via + * the CertManager, which parses every certificate as CERT_TYPE. The issuer + * pathLen check in ParseCertRelative() is gated on a non-CERT_TYPE certificate + * type (it is reached on the TLS handshake path via CHAIN_CERT_TYPE), so the + * OpenSSL-compatibility path never enforced it. Re-create that check here over + * the completed path so that a CA asserting pathlen:N cannot issue more than N + * subordinate intermediate CAs. + * + * ctx->chain is ordered leaf first (index 0) up to the trust anchor (highest + * index). Walk from the trust anchor down toward the leaf, tracking the + * remaining number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates permitted. + * WOLFSSL_MAX_PATH_LEN is used as the "no constraint" sentinel, mirroring + * InitDecodedCert_ex()/ParseCertRelative(). The leaf (index 0) issues nothing + * and is therefore not subject to the constraint. + * + * Returns WOLFSSL_SUCCESS if the path satisfies every pathLenConstraint, or + * WOLFSSL_FAILURE (with ctx->error set) on the first violation. */ +static int X509StoreCheckPathLen(WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* ctx) +{ + int num; + int i; + word32 maxPathLen = WOLFSSL_MAX_PATH_LEN; + WOLFSSL_X509* anchor; + + if (ctx == NULL || ctx->chain == NULL) + return WOLFSSL_SUCCESS; + + num = wolfSSL_sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); + /* A pathLen violation requires at least one intermediate between the leaf + * (index 0) and the trust anchor, i.e. a chain of three or more. */ + if (num < 3) + return WOLFSSL_SUCCESS; + + /* The trust anchor (top of chain) is not part of the prospective + * certification path (RFC 5280 sec. 6.1): it does not consume path-length + * budget. A self-signed anchor that asserts its own pathLenConstraint does + * still bound the path, matching ParseCertRelative()'s trust-anchor + * handling, so seed the budget from it. The partial-chain branch of + * wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert() pushes the terminal certificate twice, so the + * anchor pointer can also appear at num-2; it is skipped by pointer below + * to avoid double-counting. */ + anchor = wolfSSL_sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); + if (anchor != NULL && anchor->isCa && anchor->basicConstPlSet) + maxPathLen = (word32)anchor->pathLength; + + for (i = num - 2; i >= 1; i--) { + WOLFSSL_X509* cert = wolfSSL_sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); + int selfIssued; + + if (cert == NULL || cert == anchor) + continue; + + selfIssued = + (wolfSSL_X509_NAME_cmp(&cert->issuer, &cert->subject) == 0); + + /* RFC 5280 sec. 6.1.4 (l): a non-self-issued certificate consumes one + * unit of the issuer's remaining path length budget. */ + if (!selfIssued) { + if (maxPathLen == 0) { + SetupStoreCtxError_ex(ctx, + WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, i); + #if defined(OPENSSL_ALL) || defined(WOLFSSL_QT) + /* Allow an application verify callback to override, matching + * the INVALID_CA handling in wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(). */ + if (ctx->store != NULL && ctx->store->verify_cb != NULL && + ctx->store->verify_cb(0, ctx) == 1) { + /* Overridden: keep walking without decrementing (budget is + * already exhausted). */ + continue; + } + #endif + return WOLFSSL_FAILURE; + } + else if (maxPathLen != WOLFSSL_MAX_PATH_LEN) { + maxPathLen--; + } + } + + /* RFC 5280 sec. 6.1.4 (m): tighten the budget with this CA's own + * pathLenConstraint, if present. */ + if (cert->isCa && cert->basicConstPlSet && + (word32)cert->pathLength < maxPathLen) { + maxPathLen = (word32)cert->pathLength; + } + } + + return WOLFSSL_SUCCESS; +} + /* Verifies certificate chain using WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX * returns 1 on success or <= 0 on failure. */ @@ -878,6 +971,13 @@ int wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* ctx) ret = WOLFSSL_FAILURE; } + /* RFC 5280 sec. 6.1.4: the per-certificate CertManager verification above + * does not enforce the issuer's BasicConstraints pathLenConstraint on this + * API path, so check it over the assembled path before reporting success. */ + if (ret == WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) { + ret = X509StoreCheckPathLen(ctx); + } + exit: /* Copy back failed certs. */ numFailedCerts = wolfSSL_sk_X509_num(failedCerts); diff --git a/tests/api/test_ossl_x509.c b/tests/api/test_ossl_x509.c index 47e1b6a02d..f6120c14ac 100644 --- a/tests/api/test_ossl_x509.c +++ b/tests/api/test_ossl_x509.c @@ -1862,6 +1862,82 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_check_host_embedded_nul_san(void) return EXPECT_RESULT(); } +/* Verify that MatchDomainName() enforces RFC 6125 sec. 6.4.3 / RFC 9525 + * sec. 6.3 and CA/Browser Forum BR sec. 3.2.2.6 wildcard placement rules: + * a wildcard is confined to the left-most label, and a bare wildcard label + * ("*") requires at least two further labels. Regression test for the + * x509-limbo findings that "*", "*.com" and "foo.*.example.com" were matched. + * + * MatchDomainName() is exposed for testing via the visibility mechanism + * declared in wolfssl/internal.h. */ +int test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_wildcard(void) +{ + EXPECT_DECLS; +#if !defined(NO_ASN) && !defined(WOLFCRYPT_ONLY) && !defined(NO_CERTS) + static const struct { + const char* pattern; + const char* host; + unsigned int flags; + int expected; /* 1 = match, 0 = no match */ + const char* note; + } cases[] = { + /* --- The reported forbidden patterns must NOT match. --- */ + /* Bare wildcard: matches any single-label name. */ + { "*", "com", 0, 0, "bare wildcard" }, + { "*", "anything", 0, 0, + "bare wildcard 2" }, + /* Wildcard not in the left-most label. */ + { "foo.*.example.com", "foo.bar.example.com", 0, 0, + "wildcard in middle label" }, + { "foo.*.example.com", "foo.x.example.com", 0, 0, + "wildcard in middle label 2" }, + /* Bare wildcard immediately left of a public/registry suffix. */ + { "*.com", "example.com", 0, 0, + "public-suffix wildcard" }, + { "*.com", "evil.com", 0, 0, + "public-suffix wildcard 2" }, + /* Two label-spanning wildcards: the second is not left-most. */ + { "*.*.example.com", "a.b.example.com", 0, 0, + "second wildcard not left-most" }, + + /* --- Legitimate wildcards must still match. --- */ + { "*.example.com", "foo.example.com", 0, 1, + "single left-most wildcard" }, + { "*.example.com", "bar.example.com", 0, 1, + "single left-most wildcard 2" }, + /* Two labels after the wildcard is sufficient; no public-suffix list + * is consulted (matching OpenSSL). */ + { "*.co.uk", "foo.co.uk", 0, 1, + "two labels after wildcard" }, + /* Partial left-most wildcards retain their existing behavior and are + * not subject to the bare-wildcard two-label requirement. */ + { "a*.example.com", "abc.example.com", 0, 1, + "partial left-most wildcard" }, + /* A wildcard never spans a label separator. */ + { "*.example.com", "foo.bar.example.com", 0, 0, + "wildcard does not cross a dot" }, + }; + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) { + int got = MatchDomainName( + cases[i].pattern, (int)XSTRLEN(cases[i].pattern), + cases[i].host, (word32)XSTRLEN(cases[i].host), + cases[i].flags); + ExpectIntEQ(got, cases[i].expected); + if (! EXPECT_SUCCESS()) { + fprintf(stderr, + "MatchDomainName(\"%s\", \"%s\", flags=0x%x) = %d, " + "expected %d (%s)\n", + cases[i].pattern, cases[i].host, cases[i].flags, + got, cases[i].expected, cases[i].note); + break; + } + } +#endif /* !NO_ASN && !WOLFCRYPT_ONLY && !NO_CERTS */ + return EXPECT_RESULT(); +} + int test_wolfSSL_X509_max_altnames(void) { EXPECT_DECLS; diff --git a/tests/api/test_ossl_x509.h b/tests/api/test_ossl_x509.h index a4b06cfa96..fa6dd3a6b5 100644 --- a/tests/api/test_ossl_x509.h +++ b/tests/api/test_ossl_x509.h @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_name_match3(void); int test_wolfssl_local_IsValidFQDN(void); int test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_idn(void); int test_wolfSSL_X509_check_host_embedded_nul_san(void); +int test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_wildcard(void); int test_wolfSSL_X509_max_altnames(void); int test_wolfSSL_X509_max_name_constraints(void); int test_wolfSSL_X509_check_ca(void); @@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_cmp(void); TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfssl_local_IsValidFQDN), \ TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_idn), \ TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_check_host_embedded_nul_san),\ + TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_wildcard), \ TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_max_altnames), \ TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_max_name_constraints), \ TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_check_ca), \ diff --git a/tests/api/test_ossl_x509_str.c b/tests/api/test_ossl_x509_str.c index 01deabf8e1..145a264fa0 100644 --- a/tests/api/test_ossl_x509_str.c +++ b/tests/api/test_ossl_x509_str.c @@ -957,6 +957,173 @@ static int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex12(void) #endif #endif +#if defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA) && !defined(NO_CERTS) && defined(HAVE_ECC) +/* Regression test for the x509-limbo "pathlen" finding: + * wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert() must enforce the BasicConstraints + * pathLenConstraint (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9 / sec. 6.1.4). A CA asserting + * pathlen:0 may only issue end-entity certificates; it must not be permitted + * to issue a further intermediate CA. + * + * root -> ica0 (CA, pathlen:0) -> ica1 (CA, pathlen:0) -> leaf + * + * ica1 is an intermediate CA following ica0, which ica0's pathlen:0 forbids, + * so the chain must be rejected with X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED. Before + * the fix this OpenSSL-compatibility path accepted the chain because each + * certificate was verified individually (as CERT_TYPE) without the issuer + * pathLen check the TLS handshake path performs. */ +static X509* pathlen_pem_to_x509(const char* pem) +{ + X509* x = NULL; + BIO* bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, -1); + if (bio != NULL) { + x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); + BIO_free(bio); + } + return x; +} + +static int test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen(void) +{ + EXPECT_DECLS; + /* x509-limbo intermediate-pathlen-0 chain (NIST P-256). */ + static const char* root_pem = + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" + "MIIBjzCCATWgAwIBAgIUBr1M7Bi+lJsTuNKLX1Me8do6eaQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n" + "GjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPeDUwOS1saW1iby1yb290MCAXDTcwMDEwMTAwMDAwMVoYDzI5\n" + "NjkwNTAzMDAwMDAxWjAaMRgwFgYDVQQDDA94NTA5LWxpbWJvLXJvb3QwWTATBgcq\n" + "hkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAQbEiFksWbYAbT6XaE4bwPlfA9TBdDVohu/uCIL\n" + "xP51Zj39ZQijgxN9jxXyvCgo8Of/x5M0IHSUuc17eaBD+EEbo1cwVTAPBgNVHRMB\n" + "Af8EBTADAQH/MAsGA1UdDwQEAwIBBjAWBgNVHREEDzANggtleGFtcGxlLmNvbTAd\n" + "BgNVHQ4EFgQUonHZJ38dXr7snblbNqaxj6KZwOYwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIh\n" + "ANxM3gjJ/3FIvHLgFt9MlFXDUZs38+f+90xZ+UWEtg/sAiBwDNrH5LaFE+kGvHih\n" + "aXu0ueUy9q+2v7FMk1DqDF5QMA==\n" + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; + static const char* ica0_pem = + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" + "MIIB/zCCAaWgAwIBAgIUWQmq3hQYYc2aAeHbkAhBu2TswggwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n" + "GjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPeDUwOS1saW1iby1yb290MCAXDTcwMDEwMTAwMDAwMVoYDzI5\n" + "NjkwNTAzMDAwMDAxWjBmMTgwNgYDVQQLDC8zODQ3NTQ4NjM0MDcyNTc1NDQyNDQy\n" + "MTQxNDk1NTczNzU0OTc0NTAyNTYxMjE5NjEqMCgGA1UEAwwheDUwOS1saW1iby1p\n" + "bnRlcm1lZGlhdGUtcGF0aGxlbi0wMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE\n" + "htjb5R5OipW7n8rfvqA7yP/yxpdq9QzwSxC41RjoE//1SX16xsjOAIOYu/1L8iEq\n" + "1Y6x7yBnkoFFpWW0R2JN0aN7MHkwEgYDVR0TAQH/BAgwBgEB/wIBADALBgNVHQ8E\n" + "BAMCAgQwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUonHZJ38d\n" + "Xr7snblbNqaxj6KZwOYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFI5psdjr2bzbP8AYzh747r3zKXjzMAoG\n" + "CCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIQChdmrAmCCIGBKdR31PSCKcBFkhqIg1rFH5n9ISC0XT\n" + "MwIgBpm/FQrFVRPNXUq3Pjp5nCCQNuusc/UF0WQtogoxMcs=\n" + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; + static const char* ica1_pem = + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" + "MIICTDCCAfKgAwIBAgIUUzHoF6QQi7Q1abKHM2OkqXAyhXAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n" + "ZjE4MDYGA1UECwwvMzg0NzU0ODYzNDA3MjU3NTQ0MjQ0MjE0MTQ5NTU3Mzc1NDk3\n" + "NDUwMjU2MTIxOTYxKjAoBgNVBAMMIXg1MDktbGltYm8taW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlLXBh\n" + "dGhsZW4tMDAgFw03MDAxMDEwMDAwMDFaGA8yOTY5MDUwMzAwMDAwMVowZzE5MDcG\n" + "A1UECwwwNTA4MzE1NzY5OTY4MTEzNTA3Njc4NzYzNDMxNDk4OTE0NTU3NTI4MDQ4\n" + "OTc2MzkyMSowKAYDVQQDDCF4NTA5LWxpbWJvLWludGVybWVkaWF0ZS1wYXRobGVu\n" + "LTAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAQJAU5C0BQNKWv1lpCWYvrbguNZ\n" + "7Ru3850SYzxAHVdqoqpXQqz1rxMGkIIQzNk1GhUXbMUVbQD0jvaJcoGfkNO5o3sw\n" + "eTASBgNVHRMBAf8ECDAGAQH/AgEAMAsGA1UdDwQEAwICBDAWBgNVHREEDzANggtl\n" + "eGFtcGxlLmNvbTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSOabHY69m82z/AGM4e+O698yl48zAdBgNV\n" + "HQ4EFgQUCRY9Zhvn1ujILJxVlXN6ngBEGUcwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIhAPWq\n" + "eItvUILeT5ZV1sA/2T2KXLmhO+lyaIJKbayTWTluAiBAnlFFqQhLRPC9aXnmvzld\n" + "4OQO4zOBVTRVR1fyTaGRLA==\n" + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; + static const char* leaf_pem = + "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" + "MIIB/jCCAaOgAwIBAgIUUgfgeS9xej4Xq/a8Bg2Dzj3MedEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n" + "ZzE5MDcGA1UECwwwNTA4MzE1NzY5OTY4MTEzNTA3Njc4NzYzNDMxNDk4OTE0NTU3\n" + "NTI4MDQ4OTc2MzkyMSowKAYDVQQDDCF4NTA5LWxpbWJvLWludGVybWVkaWF0ZS1w\n" + "YXRobGVuLTAwIBcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAxWhgPMjk2OTA1MDMwMDAwMDFaMBYxFDAS\n" + "BgNVBAMMC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAERG/C\n" + "Q3diuQGNPeztXUpMthR9/695MnMj/tpF6NHkEBO91bBKFdjhnievo6XnpfEOer/z\n" + "nHvUEwH3UH7swoP3qKN8MHowHQYDVR0OBBYEFMorXKe6f7/o5tnf5iacR/PPM9F3\n" + "MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFAkWPWYb59boyCycVZVzep4ARBlHMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIHgDAT\n" + "BgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATAWBgNVHREEDzANggtleGFtcGxlLmNvbTAKBggq\n" + "hkjOPQQDAgNJADBGAiEAjQovFZD9svq8vGyuCa82Cq3/YeoHkDyyRalhv4BV7X8C\n" + "IQDqXCv7h0gMIVsWOSef8zu4DubHxn7Icm7DwJg0O2lSuw==\n" + "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; + X509* root = NULL; + X509* ica0 = NULL; + X509* ica1 = NULL; + X509* leaf = NULL; + X509_STORE* store = NULL; + X509_STORE_CTX* ctx = NULL; + STACK_OF(X509)* inter = NULL; + + ExpectNotNull(root = pathlen_pem_to_x509(root_pem)); + ExpectNotNull(ica0 = pathlen_pem_to_x509(ica0_pem)); + ExpectNotNull(ica1 = pathlen_pem_to_x509(ica1_pem)); + ExpectNotNull(leaf = pathlen_pem_to_x509(leaf_pem)); + + ExpectNotNull(store = X509_STORE_new()); + ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, root), 1); + ExpectNotNull(inter = sk_X509_new_null()); + ExpectIntGT(sk_X509_push(inter, ica0), 0); + ExpectIntGT(sk_X509_push(inter, ica1), 0); + + ExpectNotNull(ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new()); + ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, inter), 1); + /* Must be rejected: ica1 violates ica0's pathlen:0 constraint. */ + ExpectIntNE(X509_verify_cert(ctx), 1); + ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx), + X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED); + + X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); + X509_STORE_free(store); + sk_X509_free(inter); + X509_free(root); + X509_free(ica0); + X509_free(ica1); + X509_free(leaf); + return EXPECT_RESULT(); +} + +#if !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM) && !defined(NO_RSA) +/* Positive control: a legitimate chain whose intermediates assert pathlen:1 + * must still verify, guarding the pathLen enforcement against over-rejection. + * + * ca-cert -> ca-int (pathlen:1) -> ca-int2 (pathlen:1) -> server-chain + * + * ca-int permits one following intermediate (ca-int2), so the chain is valid. */ +static int test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen_ok(void) +{ + EXPECT_DECLS; + X509* ca = NULL; + X509* caInt = NULL; + X509* caInt2 = NULL; + X509* leaf = NULL; + X509_STORE* store = NULL; + X509_STORE_CTX* ctx = NULL; + + ExpectNotNull(ca = test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex_helper( + "./certs/ca-cert.pem")); + ExpectNotNull(caInt = test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex_helper( + "./certs/intermediate/ca-int-cert.pem")); + ExpectNotNull(caInt2 = test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex_helper( + "./certs/intermediate/ca-int2-cert.pem")); + ExpectNotNull(leaf = test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex_helper( + "./certs/intermediate/server-chain.pem")); + + ExpectNotNull(store = X509_STORE_new()); + ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, ca), 1); + ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, caInt), 1); + ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, caInt2), 1); + ExpectNotNull(ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new()); + ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL), 1); + ExpectIntEQ(X509_verify_cert(ctx), 1); + ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx), X509_V_OK); + + X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); + X509_STORE_free(store); + X509_free(ca); + X509_free(caInt); + X509_free(caInt2); + X509_free(leaf); + return EXPECT_RESULT(); +} +#endif /* !NO_FILESYSTEM && !NO_RSA */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_EXTRA && !NO_CERTS && HAVE_ECC */ + int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex(void) { EXPECT_DECLS; @@ -1002,6 +1169,10 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex(void) &testData), 1); #ifdef HAVE_ECC ExpectIntEQ(test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex12(), 1); + ExpectIntEQ(test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen(), 1); +#if !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM) && !defined(NO_RSA) + ExpectIntEQ(test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen_ok(), 1); +#endif #endif if(testData.x509Ca) {