mirror of
https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl.git
synced 2026-07-08 10:40:48 +02:00
Restore error code from DecodeGeneralName
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+21
-4
@@ -1378,7 +1378,9 @@ int test_wc_DecodeRsaPssParams(void)
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}
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/* Test that DecodeAltNames rejects a SAN entry whose length exceeds the
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* remaining SEQUENCE length (integer underflow on the length tracker). */
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* remaining SEQUENCE length (integer underflow on the length tracker), and
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* that a dNSName SAN carrying an embedded NUL is stored rather than rejected
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* so verification reports a name mismatch instead of a parse error. */
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int test_DecodeAltNames_length_underflow(void)
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{
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EXPECT_DECLS;
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@@ -1481,14 +1483,29 @@ int test_DecodeAltNames_length_underflow(void)
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WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(ASN_PARSE_E));
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wc_FreeDecodedCert(&cert);
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/* NUL in dNSName SAN must be rejected per RFC 5280 4.2.1.6. */
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/* An embedded NUL in a dNSName SAN is an invalid presented identifier
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* (RFC 6125 Sec. 6.3 / RFC 9525 Sec. 6.3), not a malformed certificate.
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* Set the third byte of the 4-byte dNSName ("a*b*") to NUL, giving
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* "a*\0*". The certificate must still parse: the entry is stored with
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* its embedded NUL intact (length 4, not truncated) so that hostname
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* verification reports DOMAIN_NAME_MISMATCH rather than the parser
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* aborting with ASN_PARSE_E (regression from curl test 311). */
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XMEMCPY(bad_san_cert, good_san_cert, sizeof(good_san_cert));
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bad_san_cert[SAN_SEQ_LEN_OFFSET + 5] = 0x00;
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wc_InitDecodedCert(&cert, bad_san_cert, (word32)sizeof(bad_san_cert),
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NULL);
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ExpectIntEQ(wc_ParseCert(&cert, CERT_TYPE, NO_VERIFY, NULL),
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WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(ASN_PARSE_E));
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ExpectIntEQ(wc_ParseCert(&cert, CERT_TYPE, NO_VERIFY, NULL), 0);
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ExpectNotNull(cert.altNames);
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if (cert.altNames != NULL) {
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ExpectIntEQ(cert.altNames->type, ASN_DNS_TYPE);
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ExpectIntEQ(cert.altNames->len, 4);
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/* Embedded NUL preserved at offset 2: stored, not truncated. */
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ExpectNotNull(cert.altNames->name);
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if (cert.altNames->name != NULL) {
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ExpectIntEQ(cert.altNames->name[2], 0x00);
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}
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}
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wc_FreeDecodedCert(&cert);
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#endif /* !NO_CERTS && !NO_RSA && !NO_ASN */
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@@ -1795,6 +1795,73 @@ int test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_idn(void)
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return EXPECT_RESULT();
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}
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/* Regression test mirroring curl test 311 ("HTTPS wrong subjectAltName but
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* right CN"). The leaf Subject CN is the wanted host ("localhost") while its
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* only dNSName SAN carries an embedded NUL ("localhost\0h"). Such a SAN is an
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* invalid presented identifier (RFC 6125 Sec. 6.3 / RFC 9525 Sec. 6.3), not a
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* malformed certificate, so the certificate must parse. Verification must then
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* report DOMAIN_NAME_MISMATCH: the SAN presence suppresses Subject CN fallback
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* and the NUL name can never match the NUL-free reference host, so the
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* otherwise-correct CN must not rescue it. Before the parser stored rather than
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* rejected the entry, verification aborted earlier with ASN_PARSE_E. */
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int test_wolfSSL_X509_check_host_embedded_nul_san(void)
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{
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EXPECT_DECLS;
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#if !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM) && !defined(NO_CERTS) && !defined(NO_RSA) && \
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defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA) && defined(WOLFSSL_CERT_GEN) && \
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defined(WOLFSSL_CERT_EXT) && defined(WOLFSSL_ALT_NAMES) && \
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!defined(NO_SHA256) && !defined(NO_ASN)
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WOLFSSL_EVP_PKEY* priv = NULL;
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WOLFSSL_X509* leaf = NULL;
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const char* server_cert = "./certs/test/server-goodcn.pem";
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const char host[] = "localhost";
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/* dNSName "localhost" + embedded NUL + 'h', length 11. */
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static const byte nulSan[] = {
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'l', 'o', 'c', 'a', 'l', 'h', 'o', 's', 't', '\0', 'h'
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};
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byte* keyPt = NULL;
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const byte* der = NULL;
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int derSz = 0;
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DecodedCert dCert;
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int parseRet = -1;
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keyPt = (byte*)server_key_der_2048;
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ExpectNotNull(priv = wolfSSL_d2i_PrivateKey(EVP_PKEY_RSA, NULL,
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(const unsigned char**)&keyPt, sizeof_server_key_der_2048));
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/* server-goodcn.pem has CN=localhost and no SAN; add one dNSName SAN that
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* carries an embedded NUL, then re-sign so the SAN is serialized. */
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ExpectNotNull(leaf = wolfSSL_X509_load_certificate_file(server_cert,
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WOLFSSL_FILETYPE_PEM));
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ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_add_altname_ex(leaf, (const char*)nulSan,
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sizeof(nulSan), ASN_DNS_TYPE), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
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ExpectIntGT(wolfSSL_X509_sign(leaf, priv, EVP_sha256()), 0);
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/* Regression pin: the signed certificate must parse despite the embedded
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* NUL (it aborted with ASN_PARSE_E before the parser stored the entry). */
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ExpectNotNull(der = wolfSSL_X509_get_der(leaf, &derSz));
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ExpectIntGT(derSz, 0);
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if ((der != NULL) && (derSz > 0)) {
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wc_InitDecodedCert(&dCert, der, (word32)derSz, NULL);
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parseRet = wc_ParseCert(&dCert, CERT_TYPE, NO_VERIFY, NULL);
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ExpectIntEQ(parseRet, 0);
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wc_FreeDecodedCert(&dCert);
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}
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/* Security pin: the host must still be rejected. With parsing now
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* succeeding, the only remaining failure path in check_host for a
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* non-IP host is the hostname comparison, so a failure here means
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* DOMAIN_NAME_MISMATCH: the SAN presence suppressed CN fallback and the
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* NUL name did not match. The correct CN must not rescue the wrong SAN. */
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ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_check_host(leaf, host, XSTRLEN(host), 0, NULL),
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WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WOLFSSL_FAILURE));
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wolfSSL_X509_free(leaf);
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wolfSSL_EVP_PKEY_free(priv);
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#endif
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return EXPECT_RESULT();
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}
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int test_wolfSSL_X509_max_altnames(void)
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{
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EXPECT_DECLS;
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@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_name_match2(void);
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int test_wolfSSL_X509_name_match3(void);
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int test_wolfssl_local_IsValidFQDN(void);
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int test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_idn(void);
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int test_wolfSSL_X509_check_host_embedded_nul_san(void);
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int test_wolfSSL_X509_max_altnames(void);
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int test_wolfSSL_X509_max_name_constraints(void);
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int test_wolfSSL_X509_check_ca(void);
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@@ -83,6 +84,7 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_cmp(void);
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_name_match3), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfssl_local_IsValidFQDN), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_idn), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_check_host_embedded_nul_san),\
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_max_altnames), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_max_name_constraints), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_check_ca), \
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