Leak fixes: free existing ssl->buffers.key before overwriting in SetSSL_CTX() (internal.c) and wolfSSL_set_SSL_CTX() (ssl.c)
UAF fix: wc_CheckRsaKey() — mp_memzero_check(tmp) moved before the free (rsa.c)
Build guards: #ifndef NO_ED25519/ED448_VERIFY around forged-sig test data (test_ed25519/ed448.c); guard equal()/cmov() for verify-only builds (ge_operations.c); guard unused pointers under WOLFSSL_MLDSA_SIGN_SMALL_MEM_PRECALC (wc_mldsa.c)
Test cleanups (test.c): fix UB from out-of-range enum in hash_test(), always free AES dec object, fix der buffer declaration under small-stack builds
wolfcrypt/src/sp_x86_64.c:
* fix ASSERT_SAVED_VECTOR_REGISTERS() in C wrappers: add where missing for implementations that use AVX2, and remove frivolous checks for ones that don't.
* refactor vector save-restore with a single locally tracked save in sp_RsaPublic_#(), sp_RsaPrivate_#(), sp_ecc_mulmod_add_#(), sp_ecc_mulmod_base_add_#(), sp_ecc_make_key_#(), and sp_#_calc_s_#().
* fix feature test in sp_ModExp_Fp_star_1024(), sp_Pairing_1024(), and sp_Pairing_gen_precomp_1024(), to properly gate on IS_INTEL_AVX2(cpuid_flags) and SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS2() == 0.
wolfcrypt/src/{dh.c,dsa.c,ecc.c,eccsi.c,rsa.c,sp_int.c}:
* remove all vector register provisions (SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS(), RESTORE_VECTOR_REGISTERS(), ASSERT_SAVED_VECTOR_REGISTERS());
* add explicit WC_CHECK_FOR_INTR_SIGNALS() and WC_RELAX_LONG_LOOP() to the lengthy loops in wc_DhGenerateParams(), wc_MakeDsaParameters(), ecc_sign_hash_sw(), and wc_MakeRsaKey().
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/{error-crypt.h,logging.h,memory.h}:
* make wc_backtrace_render() and wc_backtrace_set_fp() available whenever defined(WOLFSSL_DEBUG_BACKTRACE_ERROR_CODES);
* add support for DEBUG_VECTOR_REGISTERS_BACKTRACE_ON_FAIL, activating backtraces on vector register errors.
* also improve the debugging format from the DEBUG_VECTOR_REGISTER_ACCESS variants of SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS() and friends.
linuxkm/lkcapi_{dh,ecdh,ecdsa,rsa}_glue.c: harmonize PK driver names with AES, SHA, and DRBG, notably adding AVX2 annotation when enabled.
wolfcrypt/src/{sp_x86_64_asm.S,sp_x86_64_asm.asm}: synchronize with wolfssl/scripts#581 (removes SSE2 implementations of sp_#_get_from_table_#(), which no longer have users).
Copilot fixes:
- atmel.c: ATCA_ENABLE_DEPRECATED I2C path now uses ATECC_I2C_ADDR
instead of slave_address=1 (matches the non-deprecated path).
- atmel.c: capture and propagate atmel_createHandles() return value;
abort init via WC_HW_E if handle creation fails.
- atmel.h: include calib_aes_gcm.h with the same <calib/...> form used
for calib_command.h so a single -I (.../include or
.../include/cryptoauthlib) resolves both.
- configure.ac: drop the duplicated AM_CONDITIONAL([BUILD_CRYPTOAUTHLIB])
(kept only in the consolidated section near the end).
- settings.h: remove leftover commented-out '#ifdef WOLFSSL_ATECC508A'.
- benchmark.c: drop the broken TA100 wc_RsaSSL_Verify branch (it passed
message/enc as if they were sig/out).
- test.c: stop calling atmel_ecc_free() with the slot-TYPE enum
constants; wc_ecc_free(userA/userB) already releases the allocated
slots.
- ecc.c (microchip_curve_id_for_key): switch on key->dp->id, not size,
so SECP256K1 / BRAINPOOLP256R1 are not silently mapped to SECP256R1.
Helper is now defined for ATECC508A/608A as well, fixing the
TA100-only gating that broke ATECC builds.
- ecc.c (_ecc_make_key_ex): keep ATECC508A/608A's curve check at
SECP256R1-only (hardware does not support the wider curve set);
TA100 retains the multi-curve list.
Fenrir fixes:
- ecc.c (wc_ecc_init_ex): under TA100 + ALT_ECC_SIZE the pubkey x/y/z
pointers must be aimed at key->pubkey.xyz[] (with alt_fp_init) before
mp_init_multi - otherwise mp_init_multi dereferenced NULL.
- atmel.c (atmel_get_rev_info): check atcab_wakeup return and bail out
via atmel_ecc_translate_err before calling atcab_info.
- atmel.c (atmel_ecc_create_pms, TA100+ECDH_ENC): pass
MAP_TO_HANDLE(slotId) (the ephemeral private-key handle) into
talib_ecdh_compat instead of MAP_TO_HANDLE(slotIdEnc).
- atmel.c (wc_Microchip_rsa_create_key): on any failure after the first
talib_create_element succeeds, delete the previously created
handle(s) and clear rKeyH/uKeyH so device elements are not leaked.
- aes.c (wc_AesGcmEncrypt / wc_AesGcmDecrypt TA100 fast paths): replace
'(authInSz + sz) <= MAX' with bounds on each operand individually so
word32 wraparound cannot bypass the 996-byte hardware limit.
- rsa.c (RsaPrivateDecryptEx): drop the TA100 RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
short-circuit. wc_Microchip_rsa_verify expects (digest, digestLen,
sig, sigLen, ...) and the verified flag must be honored; the proper
TA100 fast-path already lives in wc_RsaPSS_CheckPadding_ex2.
utilities for generic SetKey and ExportKey operations on HMAC, RSA, ECC,
and AES. Add wc_ecc_size/wc_ecc_sig_size callback hooks for hardware-only
keys. Integrate into configure.ac as --enable-cryptocbutils=setkey,export
options with CI test configurations in os-check.yml.
Add test handlers in test.c and api.c with export/import delegation
pattern, small-stack-safe allocations, custom curve support, and
DEBUG_CRYPTOCB helpers.
Refactor CMAC init to common function, add wc_AesNew_Id/Label API, do same for RSA new
functions, and add test init helpers for id[] support along with some test disable options
.github/workflows/wolfCrypt-Wconversion.yml: Add -Wcast-qual to all scenarios.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/signature.h, wolfcrypt/src/signature.c, doc/dox_comments/header_files/signature.h:
Remove incorrect const qualifier on the key argument in
* wc_SignatureVerifyHash()
* wc_SignatureVerify()
* wc_SignatureGenerateHash()
* wc_SignatureGenerateHash_ex()
* wc_SignatureGenerate()
* wc_SignatureGenerate_ex()
This fixes UB code patterns throughout signature.c. key is inherently
accessed readwrite by the underlying low level crypto. Fortunately, wolfCrypt
has no APIs/methods to allow actual const MPI key objects, therefore these
seeming breaking API changes can't actually break any users.
globally:
* Add const qualifiers to all struct pointer members that are assigned values
computed from const pointers.
* Add const qualifiers to intermediate casts for accessors and read-only
dereference constructs, as needed for -Wcast-qual hygiene, e.g. for a macro
GET_U16(a), use (*(const word16*)(a)) rather than (*(word16*)(a)).
* Add const qualifiers to internal declarations, and remove illegal casts, as
needed for -Wcast-qual hygiene.
* Add missing const qualifiers to all casts for argument, operand, and
assignment type agreement, as needed for -Wcast-qual hygiene, e.g.
"*data = (const byte*)dataASN->data.ref.data" rather than
"*data = (byte*)dataASN->data.ref.data".
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/asn.h, wolfssl/wolfcrypt/asn_public.h, wolfcrypt/src/asn.c, wolfcrypt/src/asn_orig.c:
* Add additional lifecycle management for object members that are only sometimes locally allocated:
DNS_entry.nameStored
DNS_entry.ipStringStored
DNS_entry.ridStringStored
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/types.h: add WC_BARRIER() macro -- a portable construct that
prevents compiler optimizers from reordering operations across the barrier.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/blake2-impl.h, wolfcrypt/src/blake2s.c, wolfcrypt/src/blake2b.c:
* In blake2b_init(), blake2b_init_key(), blake2s_init(), and
blake2s_init_key(), refactor blake2b_param initialization using WC_BARRIER()
(fixes volatile abuse that triggered -Wcast-qual).
* Remove the residual and unused WOLFSSL_BLAKE2[BS]_INIT_EACH_FIELD code.
wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c and wolfssl/wolfcrypt/ecc.h:
Remove incorrect const qualifier on curve arg to wc_ecc_free_curve() (internal function).
RSA-PSS fix:
Skip SE050 hardware path for RSA-PSS sign and verify operations in
RsaPublicEncryptEx() and RsaPrivateDecryptEx(). The SE050's PSS sign
API (Se05x_API_RSASign) is a hash-then-sign operation, which
double-hashes when wolfSSL passes a pre-computed digest (as done during
TLS CertificateVerify). PSS operations now fall through to the software
RSA path. PKCS#1 v1.5 signing continues to use SE050 hardware.
Key object leak fix:
Add se050_rsa_free_key() called from wc_FreeRsaKey() to erase
wolfSSL-allocated RSA key objects from SE050 persistent storage on
free. Without this, persistent key slots on the SE050 are never
reclaimed and eventually exhaust secure storage. Add matching
sss_key_store_erase_key() calls to se050_ecc_free_key(),
se050_ed25519_free_key(), and se050_curve25519_free_key(). Only keys
with keyId >= SE050_KEYID_START are erased (pre-provisioned keys are
left intact).
Mutex leak fix:
Add missing wolfSSL_CryptHwMutexUnLock() calls before early returns in
se050_rsa_sign(), se050_rsa_verify(), se050_rsa_public_encrypt(), and
se050_rsa_private_decrypt() when the algorithm lookup fails after the
mutex has already been acquired.
ZD 21212