DoTls13NewSessionTicket rejects a ticket lifetime greater than
MAX_LIFETIME (RFC 8446 Section 4.6.1, 7 days), but no test
exercised the rejection: every server in the suite stays well
within the limit, so a mutation deleting that bound check would
go unnoticed.
Add a manual memio test that pokes ctx_s->ticketHint to
MAX_LIFETIME + 1 (the public setter clamps to 604800), runs a
full TLS 1.3 handshake, and reads the post-handshake
NewSessionTicket on the client. The test confirms the over-limit
lifetime surfaces from wolfSSL_read as SERVER_HINT_ERROR.
F-2121
When resuming a session wolfSSL_SetSession unconditionally
overwrote ssl->version with the version stored in the cached
session, even if that version was below the WOLFSSL's configured
minDowngrade. The overwritten version then fed straight into
SendClientHello, so a client configured to require TLS 1.2 or
higher could still emit a ClientHello advertising e.g. TLS 1.0
when resuming an old cached session. The ServerHello path catches
the actual downgrade, but the ClientHello version is already a
protocol-conformance issue and can confuse middleboxes.
Reject the session if its stored minor version is below
ssl->options.minDowngrade. The check is DTLS-aware: DTLS minor
versions decrease as the protocol version increases, so the
direction of the comparison is flipped for DTLS.
F-2105
Extend the swdev callback to handle ECC operations: keygen, ECDH, sign,
verify, get-size, get-sig-size.
Relax WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_ECC guards in the test suite so that tests run
under swdev, and wire wc_SwDev_Init/Cleanup into testsuite, client, and
server. Two tests are intentionally kept excluded even with swdev because
they call raw ECC math primitives (wc_ecc_mulmod, on-curve validation in
wc_ecc_import_x963) that are stripped below the cryptocb dispatch layer:
- ecc_mulmod_test (wolfcrypt/test/test.c)
- test_wc_ecc_import_x963_off_curve (tests/api/test_ecc.c)
Add a software crypto-callback device (wc_swdev) that lets the wolfcrypt
test suite run under WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_* flags without per-test devId
plumbing. The bundle is a separately-compiled second copy of wolfcrypt
(software implementations enabled, WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_* stripped) linked
into testwolfcrypt as a single relocatable object; every symbol is demoted
to local via objcopy --keep-global-symbol except wc_SwDev_Callback, so there
is no collision with the main libwolfssl.
A find callback routes unbound operations (devId == INVALID_DEVID) to the
swdev while letting real device IDs pass through.
wc_SwDev_Init / wc_SwDev_Cleanup hooks are wired into wolfcrypt/test/test.c.
cryptocb_test's WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FIND and WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_ONLY_RSA blocks are
gated off under WOLFSSL_SWDEV.
Enable via --enable-swdev (requires --enable-cryptocb).
* in pbkdf2_test(), pwdbased_test(), and pkcs12_test(), add missing FIPS v7+
gates around stanzas that use wc_PBKDF_max_iterations_set() and
wc_PBKDF_max_iterations_get() or depend on erroring for excessive PBKDF
iterations (fixes#10050);
* in ecc_test_buffers(), omit new corrupt HMAC tag test on FIPS <v6 (fixes
8f2a3f9563).
tests/api/test_dtls.c: add FIPS v7+ gate to test_dtls13_frag_ch2_with_ch1_rtx().
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/memory.h: #include "../../linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.h" rather than "linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.h", following pattern in wc_port.h.
Adds resp_certid_keyhash_mismatch — a forged response signed by the
legitimate ocsp-responder whose CertID pairs the legitimate root CA's
issuerNameHash with the imposter root CA's issuerKeyHash. The new
test_ocsp_responder_keyhash_binding asserts wolfSSL_OCSP_basic_verify
rejects it, exercising the fix that requires both halves of the
CertID to match the responder's issuer.
Follow up to PR #10450 with some minor fixes:
* FIPS 205 numbering: slh_sign is §10.2.1 Alg 22; slh_verify is Alg 24;
hash_slh_verify is Alg 25 (impl comments and doxygen).
* Widen wc_SlhDsaKey_SignHashWithRandom's addRnd to const byte* to
match wc_SlhDsaKey_SignWithRandom.
* Make the SLHDSA_PHMSG_MAX_LEN invariant explicit with a named
SLHDSA_LARGEST_APPROVED_PHM_LEN constant and a wc_static_assert.
* SHAKE128/SHAKE256 round-trip and length-rejection coverage for both
SignHash and VerifyHash.
* Doxygen: briefs for the five DER encode/decode APIs; accurate
decoder failure-rollback wording; tighter return-code lists for
Verify and VerifyMsg.
* ChangeLog: silent-failure caveat for raw messages whose length
happens to equal the digest size of the chosen hashType.
Fixes F-3478
Add a fuzzing test for each cipher that modifies a random byte at a
random offset of an encrypted message and checks that the reading fails
with an appropriate return and error code.
Fuzzes both sides 5 times each for each cipher suite.
David Garske
JacobBarthelmeh
Kareem
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Sean Parkinson
Ruby Martin
rizlik
Tobias Frauenschläger
Daniel Pouzzner
Jeremiah Mackey
Eric Blankenhorn
jordan