### `wolfssl/internal.h`
- **`InternalTicket` struct gains a flexible array member**: A new `peerCert[]` field (with a preceding `peerCertLen[2]`) is added to `InternalTicket`. This allows the peer's DER-encoded certificate to be stored directly inside the session ticket.
- **`ExternalTicket` struct becomes variable-length**: The `enc_ticket` field is changed from a fixed-size array to a flexible array member (`byte enc_ticket[]`). The `mac` field is removed from the struct — the MAC is now placed dynamically after the encrypted data in `enc_ticket`.
### `src/internal.c`
- The `GetRecordHeader` function now only adds `MAX_COMP_EXTRA` to the maximum allowed record size when `ssl->options.usingCompression` is true, tightening the length validation. The max fragment length extension check is now much stricter.
- **Peer certificate is serialized into the ticket**: During ticket creation, the code attempts to find the peer certificate from `ssl->peerCert` or from `ssl->session->chain` (fallback). If found and within `MAX_TICKET_PEER_CERT_SZ`, it's copied into `it->peerCert`. DTLS is explicitly excluded (peer cert length set to 0) to keep ticket size small for MTU constraints. If `HAVE_MAX_FRAGMENT` is defined and max fragment is not `MAX_RECORD_SIZE` for TLS 1.3, the cert is also skipped since `SendTls13NewSessionTicket` doesn't support fragmentation yet.
- **Peer certificate restoration from ticket**: On successful ticket decryption, if the ticket contains a peer certificate (`peerCertLen > 0`), it is decoded back into `ssl->peerCert` via `ParseCertRelative`/`CopyDecodedToX509`, and also added to `ssl->session->chain` via `AddSessionCertToChain`.
- The `CLEAR_ASN_NO_PEM_HEADER_ERROR` macro was rewritten to loop and remove all consecutive PEM no-start-line errors (not just the last one), wrapped in a `do { ... } while(0)` for safety.
- The `SendTicket` function is simplified to use `SendHandshakeMsg` to support fragmenting the larger ticket.
---
### `src/x509.c`
- `loadX509orX509REQFromPemBio` now accepts `TRUSTED_CERT_TYPE` in addition to `CERT_TYPE` and `CERTREQ_TYPE`.
- **Streaming BIO support**: When `wolfSSL_BIO_get_len()` returns ≤ 0 (e.g., pipes/FIFOs), the function no longer returns an error. Instead, it sets an initial buffer of `MAX_X509_SIZE` and dynamically grows (doubling) up to `MAX_BIO_READ_BUFFER` (`MAX_X509_SIZE * 16`) as data is read byte-by-byte.
- **Alternate footer detection**: For `TRUSTED_CERT_TYPE`, the PEM reader also checks for the regular `CERT_TYPE` footer (`-----END CERTIFICATE-----`) in addition to the trusted cert footer (`-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----`), so it can parse either format.
- Removed two lines that set `cert->srcIdx` to `SIGALGO_SEQ` offset. This makes `cert->srcIdx` reflect the end of parsed certificate data. This is used by `loadX509orX509REQFromBuffer` to detect where auxiliary trust data begins in trusted certificates.
---
### `src/ssl_sk.c`
- Added a `STACK_TYPE_X509_CRL` case to `wolfssl_sk_dup_data` that calls `wolfSSL_X509_CRL_dup` for deep-copying CRL stack elements. Previously, `STACK_TYPE_X509_CRL` fell through to the unsupported default case.
---
### `wolfssl/openssl/ssl.h`
- `sk_X509_dup` now maps to `wolfSSL_shallow_sk_dup` (was `wolfSSL_sk_dup`/deep copy). This matches OpenSSL's behavior where `sk_X509_dup` does a shallow copy.
- `sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup` similarly changed to `wolfSSL_shallow_sk_dup`.
---
### `src/ssl_api_cert.c`
- When `ssl->ourCert` is `NULL` and the SSL owns its cert, the function now checks if `ssl->ctx->ourCert` points to the same certificate (by comparing DER buffers). If so, it returns the ctx's `X509` pointer directly. This maintains pointer compatibility for applications (like nginx OCSP stapling) that use the `X509*` from `SSL_CTX_use_certificate` as a lookup key.
### `src/bio.c`
- When `wolfssl_file_len` returns `WOLFSSL_BAD_FILETYPE` (now returned for pipes/FIFOs), `wolfSSL_BIO_get_len` treats it as length 0 instead of propagating the error.
---
### `tests/test-maxfrag.conf` and `tests/test-maxfrag-dtls.conf`
- Removed `DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384` test entries because the ClientKeyExchange doesn't fit in the selected max fragment length.
Add full RSA-PSS (RSASSA-PSS) support to PKCS#7 SignedData
encoding and verification.
This change enables SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm to use
id-RSASSA-PSS with explicit RSASSA-PSS-params (hash, MGF1,
salt length), as required by RFC 4055 and CMS profiles.
Key changes:
- Add RSA-PSS encode and verify paths for PKCS7 SignedData
- Encode full RSASSA-PSS AlgorithmIdentifier parameters
- Decode RSA-PSS parameters from SignerInfo for verification
- Treat RSA-PSS like ECDSA (sign raw digest, not DigestInfo)
- Fix certificate signatureAlgorithm parameter length handling
- Add API test coverage for RSA-PSS SignedData
This resolves failures when using RSA-PSS signer certificates
(e.g. -173 invalid signature algorithm) and maintains backward
compatibility with RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and ECDSA.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
In ImportKeyState(), wordAdj was always zero because it was computed
after clamping wordCount, and the subtraction direction was reversed.
This caused misaligned parsing of all subsequent fields when importing
state from a peer compiled with a larger WOLFSSL_DTLS_WINDOW_WORDS.
Fix both window and prevWindow blocks to compute the adjustment before
clamping, with the correct subtraction direction.
Add test that imports a state buffer with wordCount > WOLFSSL_DTLS_WINDOW_WORDS
to verify the fix.
Add missing bounds validation in wolfSSL_select_next_proto. Three
issues fixed:
1. Outer loop: no check that length byte + position stays within inLen,
allowing XMEMCMP to read past the server protocol list buffer.
2. Inner loop: same missing check for clientNames/clientLen boundary.
3. No-overlap fallback unconditionally dereferences clientNames[0] even
when clientLen is 0, and returns an outLen that may exceed the buffer.
Also reject zero-length protocol entries (invalid per RFC 7301) to
prevent infinite loops.
Add unit test test_wolfSSL_select_next_proto with 8 cases covering NULL
params, normal match, no overlap, malformed length overruns, zero-length
entries, and empty client lists.
The CRL_STATIC_REVOKED_LIST code path stored revoked certificates in a
fixed array but never sorted it after parsing, causing binary search to
silently miss revoked serials when entries arrived in non-sorted wire
order. Additionally, comparisons used rc[0].serialSz instead of
rc[mid].serialSz, omitted the length-equality check before XMEMCMP,
and ignored the serialHash lookup path entirely (causing a NULL
dereference when hash-based lookup was used).
Fixes:
- Sort the revoked cert array in InitCRL_Entry after populating it
- Use rc[mid].serialSz instead of rc->serialSz in binary search
- Add serialSz equality check before XMEMCMP, matching linked-list path
- Implement serialHash-based linear scan for hash lookup callers
Add unit test that loads a CRL with serials in unsorted wire order and
verifies that a revoked certificate is correctly detected.
The while loop conditions in TLSX_TCA_Find were inverted, causing two
bugs: the loop short-circuited on type match alone without checking the
id content, and the XMEMCMP sense was reversed (continuing on match,
stopping on mismatch). This meant any TCA entry with a matching type
would be returned as a match regardless of whether the identifier
actually matched.
Restructure the loop to correctly require both type and id (size +
content) to match before returning an entry, and to match any entry
immediately for PRE_AGREED type.
Add test_TLSX_TCA_Find unit test exercising exact match, mismatched id,
and PRE_AGREED cases via memio handshake.
## Summary
- Add non-blocking (incremental) Curve25519 key generation and shared secret via `WC_X25519_NONBLOCK`, modeled after the existing ECC non-blocking pattern (`WC_ECC_NONBLOCK`)
- Implement `curve25519_nb()` and `fe_inv__distinct_nb()` in `fe_low_mem.c` as state-machine variants that return `FP_WOULDBLOCK` to yield after each field multiply
- Add `wc_curve25519_set_nonblock()` API to attach/detach non-blocking context to a key
- Integrate X25519 non-blocking with TLS 1.2/1.3 key share generation and shared secret in `tls.c` and `internal.c` (behind `WC_X25519_NONBLOCK && WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CRYPT_SW`)
- Add `--enable-curve25519=nonblock` configure option (auto-enables `--enable-asynccrypt` and `--enable-asynccrypt-sw`)
- Add X25519 async software dispatch cases in `async.c` and types in `async.h`
- Fix async guard in `curve25519.c` to require `WOLFSSL_ASYNC_CRYPT_SW` (matching other algorithms)
- Overhaul `examples/async/` client/server: non-blocking I/O via `WOLFSSL_USER_IO`, standalone `Makefile`, X25519/ECC mode selection, CI-friendly ready-file sync
- Add `examples/configs/user_settings_curve25519nonblock.h` and CI coverage in `os-check.yml` and new `async-examples.yml` workflow
- Add wolfcrypt test and API test coverage for X25519 non-blocking
JacobBarthelmeh
Sean Parkinson
Eric Blankenhorn
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Marco Oliverio
Sameeh Jubran
Tobias Frauenschläger
Andrew Hutchings
Ruby Martin
Anthony Hu
Chris Conlon
David Garske
Paul Adelsbach
Daniel Pouzzner
Reda Chouk
jackctj117
jackctj117