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3013cdd9255c4da4e93cdd00a0b838271e1165d9
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2330 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
toddouska
3013cdd925 Merge pull request #2095 from SparkiDev/asm_macosx 
Get Mac OS X working with the x86_64 assembly files
 2019-02-20 09:19:29 -08:00
toddouska
025fba8ec6 Merge pull request #2093 from dgarske/tls13_async_dh 
Fix for TLSv1.3 with DH key share when using QAT
 2019-02-20 09:16:54 -08:00
David Garske
dc1f0d7822 Fix for DH with QuickAssist to only use hardware for supported key sizes. Fix in random.c for seed devId when building async without crypto callbacks. 2019-02-19 11:57:55 -08:00
Sean Parkinson
e3997558a9 Fixes from review and added REAMEs and setup.sh 
Add README.md and setup.sh.
Add READMEs with license information.
 2019-02-19 11:47:45 +10:00
Sean Parkinson
2c447b24cd Fixes from review and add IDE files 2019-02-19 11:47:44 +10:00
Sean Parkinson
3366acc9ce Zephyr port of crypto 2019-02-19 11:47:44 +10:00
Sean Parkinson
16f31cf8c6 Get Mac OS X working with the x86_64 assembly files 2019-02-15 15:08:47 +10:00
David Garske
a9f29dbb61 Adds strict checking of the ECDSA signature DER encoding length. With this change the total signature size should be (sequence + r int + s int) as ASN.1 encoded. While I could not find any "must" rules for the signature length I do think this is a good change. 
If the old length checking method is desired `NO_STRICT_ECDSA_LEN` can be used. This would allow extra signature byes at the end (unused and not altering verification result). This is kept for possible backwards compatibility.

Per RFC6979: `How a signature is to be encoded is not covered by the DSA and ECDSA standards themselves; a common way is to use a DER-encoded ASN.1 structure (a SEQUENCE of two INTEGERs, for r and s, in that order).`

ANSI X9.62: ASN.1 Encoding of ECDSA:

```
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
  r INTEGER,
  s INTEGER
}
```

Fixes #2088
 2019-02-14 12:05:34 -08:00
Sean Parkinson
5856d6b3dc Fix PKCS #11 AES-GCM and handling of unsupported algorithms 2019-02-14 17:06:15 +10:00
toddouska
46bb2591c8 Merge pull request #2070 from dgarske/fix_cryptocb 
Fixes and improvements to Crypto Callbacks and STM32 RNG performance
 2019-02-13 12:44:19 -08:00
David Garske
d98ebc4da2 Reverted the Hmac_UpdateFinal change to call final as it causing constant timing issues. Improved the wc_HmacFree to handle the case were final isn't called for Crypto callbacks. 2019-02-13 10:24:53 -08:00
toddouska
272181bc2e Merge pull request #2086 from dgarske/atecc_makekey 
Fix for ATECC make key case when `curve_id == 0`
 2019-02-13 09:52:54 -08:00
toddouska
817b82e453 Merge pull request #2084 from cconlon/cmsFeb19 
Changes for CMS signedData default signed attributes
 2019-02-13 09:49:55 -08:00
David Garske
c9521b56f2 Fix warning about HAL_RNG_GenerateRandomNumber type. 2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00
David Garske
454687f429 Fix for TLS HMAC constant timing to ensure final is called for dummy operations. Added devCtx to AES for CryptoCb. 2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00
David Garske
dcdb1d7094 Added flag to indicate if hash is copied. 2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00
David Garske
e7b23646a5 Updates to HMAC crypto callback support to capture raw KEY and require hmac struct. 2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00
David Garske
838652c03b Added flags build option to hashing algorithms. This allows indicator to determine if hash will be "copied" as done during a TLS handshake. 2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00
David Garske
40a7bcfc20 Fix for new random seed crypto callback to properly reset error code in NOT_COMPILED_IN case. 2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00
David Garske
88d3abb1e6 Added Crypto callback HMAC support. 2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00
David Garske
18d5b3393c Correct NULL cryptocb case. 2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00
David Garske
891abe130a Added Crypto callback support for ASN CalcHashId. Added arg checking to cryptocb functions. 2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00
David Garske
9fc0610720 Fix to ensure hash devCtx is cleared. 2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00
David Garske
dad88b4c81 Improvements to the STM32L4 random generation code for improved performance and error handling. Added new WOLFSSL_STM32_RNG_NOLIB define to support generic STM32 series RNG without external ST library. 2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00
Kaleb Himes
f824c8c769 Merge pull request #2077 from ejohnstown/ocsp-ecdsa 
OCSP and ECDSA Signers
 2019-02-12 09:50:37 -07:00
David Garske
acb983a154 Fix for ATECC make key case when curve_id == 0 (default). ZD 4383 2019-02-12 08:34:34 -08:00
Sean Parkinson
66ab6d8c22 Check FindObjectFinal call for error 2019-02-12 09:07:14 +10:00
Chris Conlon
fb6aaf2ae2 rearrange order of default CMS SignedData signed attributes for better interop compatibility 2019-02-11 14:48:37 -07:00
Chris Conlon
56736a3563 always include default signed attributes for CMS SignedData bundles, add function to remove if needed 2019-02-11 14:41:32 -07:00
Sean Parkinson
e86aae00ed Change to allow setting of devId for private key 2019-02-11 12:37:44 +10:00
John Safranek
6298074f93 OCSP and ECDSA Signers 
OCSP uses an identified hash of the issuer's public key to identify the
certificate's signer. (Typically this is SHA-1, but can be any SHA
hash.) The AKID/SKID for the certificates usually are the SHA-1 hash of
the public key, but may be anything. We cannot depend on the AKID for
OCSP purposes. For OCSP lookups, wolfSSL calculates the hash of the
public key based on the copy saved for use with the handshake signing.
For RSA, that was fine. For ECDSA, we use the whole public key including
the curve ID, but for OCSP the curve ID isn't hashed. Stored the hash of
the public key at the point where we are looking at the key when reading
in the certificate, and saving the hash in the signer record.
 2019-02-07 17:34:25 -08:00
toddouska
4f4d16d9e5 Merge pull request #2068 from dgarske/pkcs7_verify_degenerate 
Fixes to handle degenerate PKCS 7 with BER encoding
 2019-02-07 15:00:21 -08:00
Jacob Barthelmeh
ec28376e7f add PKCS7 BER verify test and fix for streaming 2019-02-06 11:05:15 -07:00
toddouska
4a5652f318 Merge pull request #2061 from SparkiDev/x86_asm_not_in_c 
Pull out x86_64 ASM into separate files
 2019-02-01 10:01:34 -08:00
toddouska
1258467b0a Merge pull request #2054 from SparkiDev/pkcs11_rng 
Add support for random and getting entropy (seed) with PKCS#11
 2019-02-01 09:59:12 -08:00
toddouska
4a177a8a30 Merge pull request #1997 from tmael/portingDeos 
Initial Deos RTOS port
 2019-02-01 09:56:55 -08:00
David Garske
c82d11f47d Cleanup of the PKCS7 stream long rc and braces. 2019-01-31 14:37:25 -08:00
David Garske
3a0afc3506 Fixes to handle degenerate PKCS 7 with BER encoding in PKCS7_VerifySignedData. Fix for PKCS7 API unit test with SHA512 disabled. ZD 4757. 2019-01-31 14:36:46 -08:00
Sean Parkinson
7822cef1ac Pull out x86_64 ASM into separate files 2019-01-29 13:08:24 +10:00
toddouska
0d8ca06928 Merge pull request #2052 from dgarske/atecc_fixes 
Fixes for ATECC with PMS outlen and `ATECC_MAX_SLOT`
 2019-01-25 14:26:09 -08:00
Sean Parkinson
743f8b576f Add support for random and getting entropy (seed) with PKCS#11 
Getting the seed from a device has been added.
If the HASH_DRBG is available, PKCS#11 will be used for generating the
seed.
Otherwise, all generated random data will come from PKCS#11 device.
 2019-01-25 08:01:30 +10:00
toddouska
d16c2ca7c6 Merge pull request #1865 from JacobBarthelmeh/Optimizations 
--enable-afalg=xilinx
 2019-01-22 14:19:54 -08:00
David Garske
7c4fa33937 Improve the error handling for non ECC_SECP256R1 curve in wc_ecc_make_key_ex. 2019-01-22 14:04:18 -08:00
David Garske
7ce255aa4d Fixes for ATECC with PMS outlen and ATECC_MAX_SLOT. 2019-01-21 18:45:42 -08:00
David Garske
eaf5c3042d Merge pull request #2050 from toddouska/sub 
remove outdated submission note
 2019-01-21 18:41:38 -08:00
Todd Ouska
f7c0a77c9c reomved outdated submission note 2019-01-21 09:14:58 -08:00
Daniele Lacamera
501a3a287b Allow ECC Verify-only operations with NO_ASN and SP_MATH 2019-01-21 07:11:35 +01:00
Jacob Barthelmeh
253915866d make build more modular 2019-01-18 16:25:24 -07:00
JacobBarthelmeh
4fb6e65857 alignment check and authin size check 2019-01-18 16:25:24 -07:00
Jacob Barthelmeh
f0a3045d62 af_alg sha3 addition 
hardware acceleration with RSA

add AES-GCM hardware acceleration

refactor setting RSA IV flag

check and set AF_ALG flags

fix for default AF_ALG use

set buffer alignment with Xilinx RSA

macro guard after rebase

use ALIGN64

clean up test cases
 2019-01-18 16:25:24 -07:00