wc_SlhDsaKey_{Sign,Verify}Hash* previously accepted the raw message and
performed the pre-hash internally. They now require the caller to hash the
message first and pass the resulting digest -- the functions no longer call
wc_*Hash() themselves and feed the supplied digest directly into the M'
construction. Parameters are renamed from msg/msgSz to hash/hashSz to reflect
this, and hashSz is validated against wc_HashGetDigestSize(hashType) per
FIPS 205 Section 10.2.2 (32 for SHAKE128, 64 for SHAKE256), returning
BAD_LENGTH_E on mismatch.
This matches ML-DSA's wc_dilithium_{sign,verify}_ctx_hash, NIST ACVP
signatureInterface=external / preHash=preHash vectors, and other libraries
(OpenSSL HASH-ML-DSA, leancrypto, mldsa-native). It also enables distributed
signers and HSM-style flows where the digest is computed separately from the
signing operation.
Migration: callers must now hash the message before invoking these APIs;
passing the raw message will either fail length validation or produce
signatures over the wrong input. The M'-supplied wc_SlhDsaKey_SignMsg* /
VerifyMsg family (FIPS 205 internal interface, Algorithms 19/20) is
unchanged but gains stricter input validation and doxygen coverage.
Replace the liboqs-based pre-standardization SPHINCS+ implementation
with the native FIPS 205 SLH-DSA implementation across the
certificate / ASN.1 / X.509 layers, and add SLH-DSA-rooted test
certificates plus TLS 1.3 .conf scenarios that exercise the new
verification path. All liboqs SPHINCS+ code is removed.
This enables SLH-DSA for certificate chain authentication: CA
certificates signed with SLH-DSA, certificate signature verification
against an SLH-DSA root. TLS 1.3 entity authentication via
CertificateVerify with SLH-DSA will be added in a follow-up PR.
Follows RFC 9909 (X.509 Algorithm Identifiers for SLH-DSA) and
NIST FIPS 205. Supports both SHAKE and SHA-2 parameter families
across all twelve standardized variants.
DER codec:
- New PrivateKeyDecode, PublicKeyDecode, KeyToDer, PrivateKeyToDer,
PublicKeyToDer with RFC 9909 encoding (bare OCTET STRING containing
4*n raw bytes = SK.seed || SK.prf || PK.seed || PK.root, no nested
wrapper). OID auto-detection across all twelve SHAKE / SHA-2 variants.
- PublicKeyDecode raw-bytes fast path mirrors wc_Falcon_PublicKeyDecode
and wc_Dilithium_PublicKeyDecode so callers (notably
wolfssl_x509_make_der and ConfirmSignature, which pass the raw
BIT STRING contents stashed by StoreKey) decode correctly. Honours
the caller's *inOutIdx start offset.
- Error paths in Private/PublicKeyDecode preserve params/flags/
inOutIdx and only ForceZero the buffer half each helper actually
writes; skip the wipe entirely on BAD_LENGTH_E (no bytes touched).
- ImportPublic uses |= on flags so a Private-then-Public import
sequence retains FLAG_PRIVATE.
OID dispatch:
- 12 standardized NIST OIDs (6 SHAKE + 6 SHA-2) per RFC 9909. The
pre-standardization OID-collision mechanism is removed since NIST
OIDs do not collide.
- wc_SlhDsaOidToParam / wc_SlhDsaOidToCertType return NOT_COMPILED_IN
(rather than -1) for recognised SLH-DSA OIDs whose parameter set
isn't built; wc_IsSlhDsaOid recognises both. The x509 dispatch
surfaces this as a precise diagnostic instead of the generic
"No public key found".
- wc_GetKeyOID picks a placeholder parameter from whatever variant is
compiled in and #errors at compile time if none is.
- asn_orig.c EncodeCert / EncodeCertReq accept SHA-2 SLH-DSA keyTypes
alongside SHAKE.
Tests and fixtures:
- Test cert chain in certs/slhdsa/: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s and
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s self-signed roots that sign reused ML-DSA-44
entity keys (server + client), plus the gen script
(gen-slhdsa-mldsa-certs.sh, OpenSSL >= 3.5).
- New TLS 1.3 .conf scenarios under tests/suites.c dispatch:
test-tls13-slhdsa-shake.conf, test-tls13-slhdsa-sha2.conf, and a
wrong-CA negative test test-tls13-slhdsa-fail.conf.
- DER round-trip and on-disk decode tests; bench_slhdsa_*_key.der
fixtures regenerated with wolfSSL's own encoder so the codec is
pinned to RFC 9909.
- New unit test test_wc_slhdsa_x509_i2d_roundtrip exercises the raw
PublicKeyDecode entry point that wolfssl_x509_make_der relies on.
- test_wc_slhdsa_check_key now tests both Public-then-Private and
Private-then-Public import orderings.
Build / ABI:
- DYNAMIC_TYPE_SPHINCS = 98 kept as RESERVED with a tombstone comment
for ABI stability; new code should use DYNAMIC_TYPE_SLHDSA (107).
- All build system / IDE project files updated; SPHINCS+ sources,
headers, and test data removed.
- Dead bench_slhdsa_*_key arrays removed from gencertbuf.pl and
certs_test.h; the .der files on disk drive the decode tests.
RFC 8446 section 8 requires any server instance to accept 0-RTT for a
given ClientHello at most once. Prior to this change wolfSSL's behaviour
diverged from that requirement in several ways:
* ctx->maxEarlyDataSz defaulted to MAX_EARLY_DATA_SZ whenever the
library was built with WOLFSSL_EARLY_DATA, so servers auto-
advertised 0-RTT in NewSessionTicket without the application
asking. RFC 8446 E.5 says 0-RTT MUST NOT be enabled unless
specifically requested.
* The post-accept eviction is compiled out under NO_SESSION_CACHE,
so builds without the cache accepted 0-RTT with no replay defence.
* Stateless self-encrypted tickets do not carry a session ID on the
stateless DoClientTicket decrypt path, so wolfSSL_SSL_CTX_remove_
session could not locate them to evict.
* wolfSSL_SSL_CTX_remove_session always returned 0 on success
regardless of whether the session was actually in the cache,
diverging from OpenSSL's SSL_CTX_remove_session (1 on success,
0 on not-found).
Changes:
* src/internal.c: ctx->maxEarlyDataSz defaults to 0; applications
must opt in with wolfSSL_CTX_set_max_early_data.
* src/tls13.c: #error when WOLFSSL_EARLY_DATA is built with
HAVE_SESSION_TICKET and NO_SESSION_CACHE. Escape hatch
WOLFSSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_ANTI_REPLAY for deployments that take
application-layer responsibility.
* wolfssl/internal.h: imply WOLFSSL_TICKET_HAVE_ID from
WOLFSSL_EARLY_DATA so stateless-ticket issuance populates the
cache under an ID that eviction can find.
* src/ssl_sess.c: wolfSSL_SSL_CTX_remove_session returns 1 when the
session was found (internal-cache hit, or ctx->rem_sess_cb fired
for an external cache), 0 otherwise. Matches OpenSSL semantics.
* src/tls13.c: the 0-RTT acceptance condition in CheckPreSharedKeys
now calls wolfSSL_SSL_CTX_remove_session and checks its return:
the eviction is the check. If the session was in the cache, 0-RTT
is accepted and the single-use requirement is satisfied. If not,
the early_data extension is rejected through the normal path so
the record layer correctly skips in-flight 0-RTT records.
WOLFSSL_MSG at each rejection site.
* doc/dox_comments/header_files/ssl.h: document runtime opt-in.
* tests: four new tests —
test_tls13_0rtt_default_off (fails without default-to-0 fix),
test_tls13_0rtt_stateless_replay (fails without TICKET_HAVE_ID
implication and remove_session gate),
test_tls13_remove_session_return (fails without return-value fix),
test_tls13_0rtt_ext_cache_eviction (fails without ext-cache
counts-as-found fix).
test_tls13_early_data explicitly opts in via
wolfSSL_CTX_set_max_early_data.
tests/api.c: two SSL_CTX_remove_session == 0 assertions updated
to == 1.
Add SRAM PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) support to wolfCrypt. Derives device-unique cryptographic keys from the power-on state of SRAM memory using a BCH(127,64,t=10) fuzzy extractor with HKDF key derivation.
- **wolfCrypt PUF API** (`wolfcrypt/src/puf.c`, `wolfssl/wolfcrypt/puf.h`)
- `wc_PufInit`, `wc_PufReadSram`, `wc_PufEnroll`, `wc_PufReconstruct`
- `wc_PufDeriveKey` (HKDF-SHA256), `wc_PufGetIdentity` (SHA-256 device fingerprint)
- `wc_PufZeroize` (secure context cleanup)
- `wc_PufSetTestData` (synthetic SRAM for testing without hardware)
- **BCH(127,64,t=10) error-correcting codec** - corrects up to 10 bit flips per 127-bit codeword across 16 codewords
- **`WC_PUF_SHA3` build option** - select SHA3-256 instead of SHA-256 for identity hash and HKDF (default: SHA-256)
- **Precomputed GF(2^7) tables** - `const` arrays in `.rodata` (no runtime init, thread-safe, flash-resident on embedded)
- `./configure --enable-puf` (auto-enables HKDF dependency)
- CMake: `WOLFSSL_PUF=yes`
- `WOLFSSL_USER_SETTINGS`: define `WOLFSSL_PUF` and `WOLFSSL_PUF_SRAM`
- See wolfssl-examples/puf for example implementation on STM32 NUCLEO-H563ZI (Cortex-M33, STM32H563ZI)
- Supports test mode (synthetic SRAM)
- Builds to ~13KB `.elf`
- Tested on NUCLEO-H563ZI: enrollment, noisy reconstruction, key derivation all pass
- `.github/workflows/puf.yml`: host build + test workflow for PUF feature
- Doxygen API docs for all 8 public functions
- PUF group added to `doxygen_groups.h`
Implement RFC8773bis (draft-ietf-tls-8773bis-13)
cert_with_extern_psk for TLS 1.3, including protocol checks
and API support.
Includes unit tests for API and handshake behavior as well
as tests in the testsuite using extended examples.
.github/workflows/wolfCrypt-Wconversion.yml: Add -Wcast-qual to all scenarios.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/signature.h, wolfcrypt/src/signature.c, doc/dox_comments/header_files/signature.h:
Remove incorrect const qualifier on the key argument in
* wc_SignatureVerifyHash()
* wc_SignatureVerify()
* wc_SignatureGenerateHash()
* wc_SignatureGenerateHash_ex()
* wc_SignatureGenerate()
* wc_SignatureGenerate_ex()
This fixes UB code patterns throughout signature.c. key is inherently
accessed readwrite by the underlying low level crypto. Fortunately, wolfCrypt
has no APIs/methods to allow actual const MPI key objects, therefore these
seeming breaking API changes can't actually break any users.
globally:
* Add const qualifiers to all struct pointer members that are assigned values
computed from const pointers.
* Add const qualifiers to intermediate casts for accessors and read-only
dereference constructs, as needed for -Wcast-qual hygiene, e.g. for a macro
GET_U16(a), use (*(const word16*)(a)) rather than (*(word16*)(a)).
* Add const qualifiers to internal declarations, and remove illegal casts, as
needed for -Wcast-qual hygiene.
* Add missing const qualifiers to all casts for argument, operand, and
assignment type agreement, as needed for -Wcast-qual hygiene, e.g.
"*data = (const byte*)dataASN->data.ref.data" rather than
"*data = (byte*)dataASN->data.ref.data".
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/asn.h, wolfssl/wolfcrypt/asn_public.h, wolfcrypt/src/asn.c, wolfcrypt/src/asn_orig.c:
* Add additional lifecycle management for object members that are only sometimes locally allocated:
DNS_entry.nameStored
DNS_entry.ipStringStored
DNS_entry.ridStringStored
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/types.h: add WC_BARRIER() macro -- a portable construct that
prevents compiler optimizers from reordering operations across the barrier.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/blake2-impl.h, wolfcrypt/src/blake2s.c, wolfcrypt/src/blake2b.c:
* In blake2b_init(), blake2b_init_key(), blake2s_init(), and
blake2s_init_key(), refactor blake2b_param initialization using WC_BARRIER()
(fixes volatile abuse that triggered -Wcast-qual).
* Remove the residual and unused WOLFSSL_BLAKE2[BS]_INIT_EACH_FIELD code.
wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c and wolfssl/wolfcrypt/ecc.h:
Remove incorrect const qualifier on curve arg to wc_ecc_free_curve() (internal function).
Add full RSA-PSS (RSASSA-PSS) support to PKCS#7 SignedData
encoding and verification.
This change enables SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm to use
id-RSASSA-PSS with explicit RSASSA-PSS-params (hash, MGF1,
salt length), as required by RFC 4055 and CMS profiles.
Key changes:
- Add RSA-PSS encode and verify paths for PKCS7 SignedData
- Encode full RSASSA-PSS AlgorithmIdentifier parameters
- Decode RSA-PSS parameters from SignerInfo for verification
- Treat RSA-PSS like ECDSA (sign raw digest, not DigestInfo)
- Fix certificate signatureAlgorithm parameter length handling
- Add API test coverage for RSA-PSS SignedData
This resolves failures when using RSA-PSS signer certificates
(e.g. -173 invalid signature algorithm) and maintains backward
compatibility with RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and ECDSA.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
Add CryptoCB-based AES key import support to enable Secure Element
offload without exposing raw AES key material to wolfCrypt.
When WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_AES_SETKEY is defined, wolfCrypt invokes a CryptoCB
callback during AES key setup. Behavior is determined by the callback
return value:
- If callback returns 0: Key is imported to the device (aes->devCtx).
Key is NOT copied to wolfCrypt RAM; GCM H/M tables are NOT generated.
Full hardware offload is assumed.
- If callback returns CRYPTOCB_UNAVAILABLE: Device does not support
SetKey. Normal software path is used; key is copied to devKey for
optional encrypt/decrypt acceleration.
- Any other error: Propagated to the caller.
Key points:
- Add wc_CryptoCb_AesSetKey() callback for AES key import
- Update AES SetKey paths to call CryptoCB and branch on return value
- Skip GCM H/M table generation when callback succeeded (devCtx set)
- Preserve existing behavior when devId is INVALID_DEVID or
WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_AES_SETKEY is not defined
Testing:
- Add unit test for CryptoCB AES SetKey (verifies key isolation when
callback succeeds)
- Add end-to-end AES-GCM offload test (SetKey, Encrypt, Decrypt, Free
via CryptoCB)
- Tests use a mock SE with software AES to validate routing
Enable with: CPPFLAGS="-DWOLF_CRYPTO_CB_AES_SETKEY -DWOLF_CRYPTO_CB_FREE"
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
Update ret code to match docs and update docs
Replace magic numbers with appropriate define
Define MAX_ENTROPY_BITS when MEMUSE not enabled
Fix type cast windows detection
Older FIPS modules still need the old check
CodeSpell you're wrong, that is what I want to name my variable
Turn the hostap into a manual dispatch until it gets fixed
Upon closer review we can not skip the test when memuse enabled
Fix whitespace stuff found by multitest
More syntax things
Correct comments based on latest findings
Tobias Frauenschläger
Hideki Miyazaki
David Garske
Takashi Kojo
Mark Atwood
Daniel Pouzzner
Juliusz Sosinowicz
kaleb-himes
Roy Carter
night1rider
Paul Adelsbach
Sameeh Jubran
Sean Parkinson
jackctj117
Kareem
Eric Blankenhorn
Josh Holtrop
Marco Oliverio