tests/api.c: use WOLFSSL_FILETYPE_PEM, not SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
tests/api/test_dtls.c and tests/api/test_dtls13.c: use WOLFSSL_ERROR_WANT_READ, not SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ.
DecodeExtensionType() guarded the certificatePolicies duplicate check
(VERIFY_AND_SET_OID) under WOLFSSL_SEP only, because the extCertPolicySet
tracking bit was SEP-only. In a WOLFSSL_CERT_EXT-without-WOLFSSL_SEP build a
cert with two certificatePolicies extensions was accepted and the second
silently overwrote the first (RFC 5280 4.2 forbids repeats). Make the bit and
the guard available under WOLFSSL_CERT_EXT too, matching every other
non-repeatable extension.
Add test_DecodeCertExtensions_dup_certpol (DecodeExtensionType now
WOLFSSL_TEST_VIS).
ParseCipherList() only cleared the InitSuites mask for "!aNULL"/"!eNULL",
which governs generated defaults, so an explicitly listed ADH or NULL-cipher
suite survived (e.g. "ADH-AES128-SHA:!aNULL" still offered an unauthenticated
suite). Scrub the explicit suites after parsing; exclusions are order-
independent and sticky (a later "ALL" cannot re-enable them).
Add test_wolfSSL_set_cipher_list_exclusions.
Instead of failing when top bit is set, the standard and current research says to mask it.
WOLFSSL_X25519_NO_MASK_PEER is added to allow the rejection when required.
Regenerate the SP backends so the ECDH secret generators check the caller's
buffer against the number of bytes actually written. Adds a P-384/P-521
buffer-size regression test.
Only exempt the missing-certificate check during the initial handshake; once a
post-handshake CertificateRequest is outstanding the server again requires the
client certificate (and its CertificateVerify). Adds a post-handshake auth
test.
Ensure a peer's certificate form (X.509 vs raw public key) matches the
negotiated certificate type, defaulting to X.509 when none was negotiated,
on both the client and server. Adds RPK regression tests covering both
directions.
Require the keyCertSign key usage on non-root intermediate CAs added during
path building when a KeyUsage extension is present, per RFC 5280. Adds a
regression test.
Return PUBLIC_KEY_E for wc_ed25519_export_key if public key is not
present.
Return PUBLIC_KEY_E for wc_ed448_export_key if public key is not
present.
Rename several inLen parameters to outLen for consistency.
Fix F-4427
Robustness fixes in the OpenSSL-compatibility certificate verifier, independent
of the depth-exhaustion fix:
- Fail closed on allocation failure. When the failedCerts working stack could
not be allocated, the function fell through to exit with ret still set to
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS and reported the chain as verified without checking anything
(a fail-open regression from the leak fix that turned the early return into a
goto exit). Also check the ctx->chain allocation. Both now set an error.
- Remove caller-supplied intermediates from the correct stack. The intermediates
appended to the working cert list during chain building were popped from
ctx->store->certs by count, but they are appended to whichever stack is in use
- which may be the caller's setTrustedSk (X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack).
Remove them by pointer identity from that same stack, recomputed from
ctxIntermediates. Identity removal also survives the chain-building retries
that reorder the stack, where a positional pop could drop a legitimate trusted
entry and leave an injected intermediate behind - which a later verification
reusing the store/ctx would then snapshot as a trust anchor. The removal helper
walks the list once (O(n)) rather than indexing per position.
- NULL-guard ctx->store->param before dereferencing its flags in the
partial-chain check.
Add regression tests covering: the trusted stack being restored after
verification, and the retry path (tampered plus genuine same-subject
intermediates, both orderings) leaving the store clean for later use.
Fail compatibility-layer verification when the path-building loop runs
out of its depth budget before reaching a configured trust anchor,
instead of accepting the last verified link. Add a regression test.
Ensure caller-supplied intermediate certificates cannot terminate the
chain during compatibility-layer verification; a path must reach a
configured trust anchor. Add a regression test and supporting certs.
Replace the one-runner-per-configuration matrices across the
make-check workflow family with a generic pooled runner,
.github/scripts/parallel-make-check.py. Each workflow keeps its
configuration list as JSON next to the invocation; one runner (or a
small fixed set of shards, balanced by measured per-config minutes)
builds every config in its own out-of-tree (VPATH) build directory off
a single checkout/autogen, on a pool of one-per-CPU worker threads,
longest first. Concurrent checks are isolated with bubblewrap network
namespaces, compilations are cached with ccache, the first failure
aborts the rest (fail-fast, with --no-fail-fast to run everything),
and per-config timings plus pool efficiency land in the step summary.
Failure logs upload as artifacts. smoke-test.yml is likewise reworked
into a single pooled job that runs its nine configs on one runner.
Converted workflows (runner jobs per full pass):
os-check.yml 101 -> 8 (92 Ubuntu configs -> 4 shards;
the macOS matrix, the user-settings jobs and
the standalone
macos-apple-native-cert-validation.yml fold
into one macOS runner; Windows unchanged)
pq-all.yml 21 -> 2 shards
disable-pk-algs.yml 15 -> 1
wolfCrypt-Wconversion.yml 11 -> 1
trackmemory.yml 7 -> 1
cryptocb-only.yml 8 -> 1 (incl. the two new SHA512 entries)
multi-compiler.yml 6 -> 1
smallStackSize.yml 6 -> 1
multi-arch.yml 6 -> 1
async.yml 5 -> 1
psk.yml 5 -> 1
no-malloc.yml 3 -> 1
wolfsm.yml 3 -> 1
opensslcoexist.yml 2 -> 1
Measured against current upstream passing runs (job execution time,
queue excluded): ~200 runner jobs / ~374 runner-minutes per full pass
become 23 jobs / ~168 runner-minutes, with more coverage than before.
multi-arch's old matrix combined an "include" list of four
architectures with an "opts" axis; GitHub's include-merge rules made
each arch entry overwrite the previous one, so only the armel
combinations actually ran. The pooled list restores the intended
aarch64/armhf/riscv64 coverage (23 combinations; riscv64 x sp-math is
omitted as invalid - configure rejects sp-math without SP, and
--enable-riscv-asm, unlike --enable-sp-asm, does not bring SP in).
Out-of-tree build fixes this depends on:
- Makefile.am: symlink the read-only test data (certs/, tests/ config
files, sniffer captures and helpers, examples/crypto_policies,
input, quit) into the build tree via a BUILT_SOURCES stamp, removed
again in distclean-local. ChangeToWolfRoot() and the script tests
resolve everything relative to the working directory, so out-of-tree
make check and make distcheck now pass.
- scripts/multi-msg-record.py: locate the client binary from the build
tree working directory rather than the script's source directory.
- configure.ac + wolfssl/include.am: run
support/gen-debug-trace-error-codes.sh from $srcdir; it reads the
error-code headers from the source tree and generates into the build
tree.
- tests/swdev: a WOLFBUILD variable points the sub-make at the build
tree for the configure-generated headers (wolfssl/options.h,
wolfssl/version.h); the in-tree-only guards are dropped.
Portions of PR #10649 are incorporated: the cross-platform
ccache-setup composite action, repository_owner gates on check-headers
and check-source-text, the docs-only paths-ignore on os-check, and the
libspdm timeout bumps.
wolfcrypt/src/aes.c: enforce AES-XTS K1!=K2 constraint in wc_AesXtsSetKeyNoInit() unless WC_AES_XTS_ALLOW_DUPLICATE_KEYS and !HAVE_FIPS:
tests/api/test_aes.c: add negative tests to test_wc_AesXtsSetKey() for K1==K2;
wolfcrypt/test/test.c: fix keys in aes_xts_128_inplace_test() and aes_xts_192_inplace_test() so that K1!=K2, update test vectors, and remove associated !HAVE_FIPS gating;
linuxkm/lkcapi_aes_glue.c: synchronize aes_xts_128_test() test of ciphertext stealing in-place with wolfcrypt/test/test.c.
wrapper/rust/wolfssl-wolfcrypt/src/aes.rs: synchronize XTS streaming test with wolfcrypt/test/test.c.
linuxkm/: refactor self-test sensing with version-gated setup in linuxkm_wc_port.h and refactored gates in lkcapi_glue.c.
The client's resumed-session EMS (F-5807) and cipher-suite (F-5811) checks
were enforced in CompleteServerHello at ServerHello-parse time. For stateless
ticket resumption the client sends an empty session ID and cannot yet tell
whether the server accepted the ticket (RFC 5077 3.4): a server that declines
the ticket falls back to a full handshake under a freshly negotiated
suite/EMS state, which these checks wrongly aborted with MATCH_SUITE_ERROR,
breaking the RFC 5077 ticket-decline fallback to a full handshake.
Move both checks into CheckResumptionConsistency and run it only once
resumption is confirmed - from whichever the server sends first in the
abbreviated flight: a renewed NewSessionTicket (before SetupSession refreshes
the cached suite/EMS to the current values) or its ChangeCipherSpec. By then
the "Not resuming as thought" path has cleared 'resuming' for any ticket
decline, so the full-handshake fallback proceeds.
Add test_tls12_resume_ticket_decline_fallback (ticket declined by a fresh
server CTX, full handshake under a different suite must succeed) and gate
test_tls12_resume_ticket_wrong_suite on WOLFSSL_NO_DEF_TICKET_ENC_CB so it
skips rather than fails in builds without the default ticket encryption
callback.
crl.c, internal.h: leak of sigParams requiring reorder the struct fields to that it is above memcpy part.
dtl13.c: free the DRLS fragments buffer in Dtls13FreeFsmResources in case fragment is never sent.
ocsp.c: only free cid if locally allocated.
tls.c: make sure ecc_kse is zeroized and can be freed.
tls13.c: set hsHashesEch after init so isn't lost on failure.
evp_pk.c: free key on the BIO error path
Fixed various tests to not leak or crash on memory allocation failure.
Address review on PR #10582:
- The client-side extended_master_secret consistency check skipped all
session-ticket resumptions, leaving a generic ticket resumption open to
an undetected EMS downgrade by a malicious server or MITM. The client
retains the EMS state for ticket sessions too (SetupSession), so the
check now applies to ticket resumption as well, mirroring the adjacent
cipher-suite check. Only EAP-FAST style resumption - where the
session-secret callback supplies the master secret for an opaque PAC
ticket - is exempt, matched precisely via ssl->sessionSecretCb just as
the callback invocation in DoServerHello does.
- Add test_tls_ems_resumption_server_downgrade, exercising the
client-direction downgrade (server resumes but omits EMS from its
ServerHello) for both session-ID and session-ticket resumption. This
client-side branch previously had no test coverage.
Daniel Pouzzner
David Garske
Lealem Amedie
JacobBarthelmeh
Tobias Frauenschläger
Sean Parkinson
Josh Holtrop
Juliusz Sosinowicz
jordan