tests/api.c: use WOLFSSL_FILETYPE_PEM, not SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
tests/api/test_dtls.c and tests/api/test_dtls13.c: use WOLFSSL_ERROR_WANT_READ, not SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ.
ParseCipherList() only cleared the InitSuites mask for "!aNULL"/"!eNULL",
which governs generated defaults, so an explicitly listed ADH or NULL-cipher
suite survived (e.g. "ADH-AES128-SHA:!aNULL" still offered an unauthenticated
suite). Scrub the explicit suites after parsing; exclusions are order-
independent and sticky (a later "ALL" cannot re-enable them).
Add test_wolfSSL_set_cipher_list_exclusions.
Add wolfssl_local_MatchDnsNameConstraint() dispatching wildcard names
to the subtree matcher and literal names to plain base-name matching,
and use it for the ASN_DNS_TYPE branches of PermittedListOk() and
IsInExcludedList().
This also drops the outer name->len >= base len byte-length guard for
literal DNS names. That guard ran before MatchBaseName() could strip
the absolute-FQDN trailing dot, so a constraint base like
DNS:example.com. never matched the SAN example.com it denotes.
One trailing dot marks an absolute FQDN and is not part of the host:
"host.com." and "host.com" denote the same host. Strip it from the
URI host before classification (so "12.31.2.3." is still recognized
as an IPv4 address) and from the constraint base before the exact-match
comparison, mirroring what wolfssl_local_MatchBaseName() already does
for DNS name constraints. Only a single dot is the marker: an empty
last label ("host.com..") is rejected.
RFC 5280 4.2.1.10 defines URI name constraints in terms of a host that
is a fully qualified domain name; RFC 3986 IP-literal ([...]) and
IPv4address hosts are not DNS reg-names and cannot be meaningfully
matched against a DNS-style constraint base.
- Classify the host extracted by GetUriHost (IP-literal, IPv4address,
reg-name) and validate that a reg-name has no empty labels.
- wolfssl_local_MatchUriNameConstraint() no longer matches URIs whose
host is an IP address.
- ConfirmNameConstraints() fails closed: when URI constraints are
present, a URI SAN without a DNS host is rejected. A plain non-match
would otherwise let such names pass excluded-only constraints.
crl.c, internal.h: leak of sigParams requiring reorder the struct fields to that it is above memcpy part.
dtl13.c: free the DRLS fragments buffer in Dtls13FreeFsmResources in case fragment is never sent.
ocsp.c: only free cid if locally allocated.
tls.c: make sure ecc_kse is zeroized and can be freed.
tls13.c: set hsHashesEch after init so isn't lost on failure.
evp_pk.c: free key on the BIO error path
Fixed various tests to not leak or crash on memory allocation failure.
Address review on PR #10582:
- The client-side extended_master_secret consistency check skipped all
session-ticket resumptions, leaving a generic ticket resumption open to
an undetected EMS downgrade by a malicious server or MITM. The client
retains the EMS state for ticket sessions too (SetupSession), so the
check now applies to ticket resumption as well, mirroring the adjacent
cipher-suite check. Only EAP-FAST style resumption - where the
session-secret callback supplies the master secret for an opaque PAC
ticket - is exempt, matched precisely via ssl->sessionSecretCb just as
the callback invocation in DoServerHello does.
- Add test_tls_ems_resumption_server_downgrade, exercising the
client-direction downgrade (server resumes but omits EMS from its
ServerHello) for both session-ID and session-ticket resumption. This
client-side branch previously had no test coverage.
MAX_ENCODED_SIG_SZ grows to ~50KB once SLH-DSA is enabled, yet it was
used to size PKCS#1/signature scratch and output buffers across the
library, wasting stack and heap even for classic RSA/ECC operations.
- Add MAX_ENCODED_CLASSIC_SIG_SZ for RSA/DSA/ECC DigestInfo buffers that
can never hold a PQC signature.
- Size the certificate/CSR signing output buffer from the signing key at
runtime instead of the worst-case macro.
- Add overridable WOLFSSL_MAX_SIG_SZ for the WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC buffer.
- Reject a signature type that does not match the signing key.
SSL_CIPHER_get_name returns the internal cipher name (PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256)
instead of the IANA name when WOLFSSL_CIPHER_INTERNALNAME, NO_ERROR_STRINGS or
WOLFSSL_QT is defined. user_settings_all.h with the compatibility layer enables
WOLFSSL_QT, so the test failed in the 'make user_setting.h (with sed)' job.
Match the expected name to the build configuration, mirroring the existing
pattern used elsewhere in tests/api.c.
The cipher property helpers (SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid / get_auth_nid /
get_cipher_nid / get_digest_nid / is_aead) parse the cipher name looked
up via cipher->offset in GetCipherSegment(). That offset is only
populated when the cipher is obtained through wolfSSL_get_ciphers_compat()
(SSL_get_ciphers()). When the cipher comes from SSL_get_current_cipher(),
offset is left at 0, so these helpers parsed cipher_names[0] (a TLS 1.3
suite) instead of the negotiated cipher - e.g. returning NID_kx_any for a
plain PSK suite while SSL_CIPHER_get_name() (which uses the suite bytes)
reported the correct name.
Resolve the cipher_names entry from the always-populated suite bytes in
GetCipherSegment(), falling back to cipher->offset when no match is found.
Also add the missing plain "PSK" -> NID_kx_psk entry to the kx lookup
table so PSK suites report NID_kx_psk instead of NID_undef.
Add a regression test that drives the SSL_get_current_cipher() path for
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and checks all five property helpers.
The TLS 1.2 server derived the single advertised ClientCertificateType
and the signature_algorithms list in its CertificateRequest from the
negotiated cipher suite's own signature algorithm. On an ECDHE-ECDSA
suite only ecdsa_sign was offered (and only ECDSA sig algs), so RSA
clients could not authenticate even though the server could happily
verify an RSA certificate. The same was true in reverse for an RSA
server: the CertificateRequest only advertised rsa_sign.
Refactor SendCertificateRequest to advertise certificate_types and
signature_algorithms covering both sig families when both are compiled
in. Three static helpers in internal.c keep the logic in one place
without mutating ssl->suites:
GetServerCertReqCertTypes - certificate_types to emit
GetServerCertReqHashSigAlgo - signature_algorithms to emit
InServerCertReqHashSigAlgo - membership check used for verification
The advertised lists are written to stack buffers in the caller. To
keep DoCertificateVerify in agreement with what we actually sent, the
SupportedHashSigAlgo call site there is replaced with
InServerCertReqHashSigAlgo, which rebuilds the same list locally and
looks up the client's chosen algo.
Replace the magic certTypes buffer size with a new
MAX_CERT_REQ_CERT_TYPE_CNT constant declared next to
ClientCertificateType.
Add two end-to-end mutual-auth tests covering both directions:
test_tls12_ecdhe_ecdsa_rsa_client_cert - ECDSA server, RSA client
test_tls12_ecdhe_rsa_ecdsa_client_cert - RSA server, ECDSA client
Update test_certreq_sighash_algos to permit RSA / RSA-PSS sig algs in
the ECDHE-ECDSA CertificateRequest; the previous assertion locked in
the ECDSA-only behaviour that this change corrects.
TLS 1.3 is unaffected: RFC 8446 removed certificate_types from
CertificateRequest, and TLS 1.3 cipher suites do not bind a signature
algorithm, so the server's hashSigAlgo already covers both sig
families when either has been compiled in.
The documented 'reject peer-initiated renegotiation' option was accepted and
stored but never consulted. Now DoHelloRequest replies with a no_renegotiation
warning instead of starting SCR when the bit is set (client side), and the
server refuses a renegotiation ClientHello with a no_renegotiation warning
instead of resetting handshake state.
1. Side-aware ML-KEM in TLS (tls.c, tls13.c, ssl.c, internal.h):
TLSX_IsGroupSupported/TLSX_UseSupportedCurve take a `side` arg; new
TLSX_IsMlKemGroupSupported + client/server support macros. A build only
capable of one ML-KEM op no longer advertises groups it can't use for
its role.
2. NO_ASN_TIME support (ssl_asn1.c, ssl.h, settings.h): data-only
ASN1_TIME APIs now compile without system time; OCSP responder
auto-disabled under NO_ASN_TIME.
3. SP ECC (sp_*.c, sp_x86_64_asm.asm): curve `b` constants and
sp_ecc_is_point_* always compiled (point-check available in more
configs); asm movsxd -> movsx.
4. configure.ac: BUILD_MEMUSE fixed to trigger on != "xno".
5. Test fixes: HRR-aware TLS 1.3 memio tests (new
test_memio_msg_is_hello_retry_request); tightened build guards
(Ed25519/Ed448 key-import, AES decrypt, XMSS heights, SP sizes,
static-PSK).
WOLFSSL_FAILURE is 0, which equals X509_V_OK, so a NULL ssl was
indistinguishable from successful verification under the standard
"SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) \!= X509_V_OK" idiom. Return
WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION (50, matching the OpenSSL
compat value) instead, and add it to the X509 verify-error enum.
* don't disable URI validation when defined(WOLFSSL_FPKI).
* return immediately with ASN_ALT_NAME_E when URI contains an unexpected '/', as in asn_orig.c DecodeAltNames(), fixing OOB read defect.
wolfcrypt/src/asn_orig.c: fix URI validation gating (ignore WOLFSSL_FPKI) in DecodeAltNames().
tests/api/test_certman.c: fix uriSan in test_wolfSSL_X509_check_host_URI_SAN_not_DNS_match() (make it a URI).
tests/api.c: align gating in test_wolfSSL_URI() with new dynamics (URIs validated regardless of defined(WOLFSSL_FPKI)).
Daniel Pouzzner
Lealem Amedie
aidan garske
Emma Stensland
Ruby Martin
Eric Blankenhorn
Tobias Frauenschläger
Marco Oliverio
JacobBarthelmeh
David Garske
Sean Parkinson
Juliusz Sosinowicz