DTLS minor versions decrease as the protocol version increases
(DTLS 1.0=0xFF, DTLS 1.2=0xFD, DTLS 1.3=0xFC), but the ticket
version comparisons in DoClientTicketCheckVersion used the TLS
direction unconditionally. As a result a DTLS server resuming a
session ticket from a different DTLS version could land on the
wrong branch: a ticket from a newer DTLS version would be treated
as a downgrade instead of being rejected, and a ticket from an
older DTLS version would be flagged as 'greater version' and
refused outright. The minDowngrade check at the bottom had the
same inversion bug.
Branch on ssl->options.dtls so the greater-version, lesser-version,
and minDowngrade comparisons all use the right direction for the
active protocol family. TLS behavior is unchanged.
F-1828
Server-side OCSP stapling was unconditionally folding
OCSP_CERT_REVOKED, OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN, and OCSP_LOOKUP_FAIL into a
success result so a stapling failure would not break the handshake.
OCSP_CERT_REVOKED, however, is an explicit positive assertion of
revocation by the responder and must not be ignored: silently
suppressing it lets a server keep advertising a revoked certificate
to clients that rely on stapling for revocation status.
Drop OCSP_CERT_REVOKED from the suppression list in
CreateOcspResponse, the CSR2_OCSP_MULTI handler in
SendCertificateStatus, and ProcessChainOCSPRequest. Continue
suppressing OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN and OCSP_LOOKUP_FAIL, which are true
soft-fail responder conditions where the responder cannot answer.
F-1820
Add bounds check before computing inputLength from curStartIdx + curSize
to prevent unsigned underflow if *inOutIdx ever exceeds the record
content boundary.
Since ProcessReply already reduces curSize by padSz after decryption,
use curStartIdx + curSize to bound content data instead of recomputing
it from buffer.length - padSz. This removes three more padSz references
from message processing code.
Move padSz index advancement from individual message handlers to a
single location at the end of record processing in ProcessReply.
Previously, each handler (DoFinished, DoApplicationData, DoAlert,
DoCertificate, DoServerHello, etc.) advanced the index by padSz,
which then had to be corrected when processing multiple messages
in one record. This "middle padding" pattern was error-prone.
Now curSize is reduced by padSz after decryption/verification so
it reflects content size only. Message handlers advance the index
by content size only. padSz is added once when the record is fully
processed. The correction code for multi-message records is removed.
- x509_str: require CA:TRUE unconditionally in wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert;
verify leaf signature even when verify_cb overrides INVALID_CA
- x509_str: align WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA with OpenSSL value (79)
so OPENSSL_COEXIST builds compile; bump WC_OSSL_V509_V_ERR_MAX to 80
and extend error_test() missing-value table for the new gaps
- asn: reject embedded NUL in dNSName / rfc822Name / URI SAN entries
- internal: re-verify restored ticket peer cert against trust store with
CRL/OCSP checks; clear stale state from session cache on verification
failure
- ticket: bind SNI and ALPN into session ticket via compile-time selected
hash (TICKET_BINDING_HASH_TYPE); reject resumption on mismatch in both
TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2 paths
- ticket: defer SNI/ALPN binding check until after extensions are parsed
by consolidating into VerifyTicketBinding(), called once after
ALPN_Select in DoTls13ClientHello and DoClientHello; the early
per-call sites ran before extensions were parsed and rejected valid
resumptions in nginx, haproxy, grpc, and CPython integration tests
- ssl_sess: free previous session in wolfSSL_d2i_SSL_SESSION before
overwrite
- examples/client: increase SESSION_TICKET_LEN fallback from 256 to 2048
to support larger tickets
- tests: update SAN NUL fixtures and add parse-time rejection coverage;
add test_tls13_ticket_peer_cert_reverify for CA-removal scenario; skip
it under WOLFSSL_NO_DEF_TICKET_ENC_CB
* configure.ac: --enable-dtls13 auto-enables --enable-dtls and TLS 1.3,
with a targeted error if either is explicitly --disabled, plus a
post-finalization sanity check that errors out if a later
prerequisite test forces ENABLED_TLS13 back to "no" while
ENABLED_DTLS13 is yes.
* src/internal.c, src/wolfio.c, wolfssl/wolfio.h: new WOLFSSL_DTLS_ONLY
compile-time flag elides the EmbedReceive / EmbedSend default
callbacks. The DTLS_MAJOR runtime check stays in SetSSL_CTX so a
TLS-method ctx in a DTLS-only build doesn't get datagram callbacks
by default, and WriteSEQ keeps its ssl->options.dtls branch. A
#error in settings.h refuses WOLFSSL_DTLS_ONLY without WOLFSSL_DTLS.
* wolfcrypt/src/aes.c: add HAVE_AES_DECRYPT to the inv_col_mul
definition gate to match its only caller; without it the function is
emitted dead under WOLFSSL_AES_DIRECT && NO_AES_DECRYPT and
-Werror=unused-function fails the build.
* .github/workflows/os-check.yml: matrix entry for a minimal DTLS 1.3
client-only build.
RFC 8446 section 8 requires any server instance to accept 0-RTT for a
given ClientHello at most once. Prior to this change wolfSSL's behaviour
diverged from that requirement in several ways:
* ctx->maxEarlyDataSz defaulted to MAX_EARLY_DATA_SZ whenever the
library was built with WOLFSSL_EARLY_DATA, so servers auto-
advertised 0-RTT in NewSessionTicket without the application
asking. RFC 8446 E.5 says 0-RTT MUST NOT be enabled unless
specifically requested.
* The post-accept eviction is compiled out under NO_SESSION_CACHE,
so builds without the cache accepted 0-RTT with no replay defence.
* Stateless self-encrypted tickets do not carry a session ID on the
stateless DoClientTicket decrypt path, so wolfSSL_SSL_CTX_remove_
session could not locate them to evict.
* wolfSSL_SSL_CTX_remove_session always returned 0 on success
regardless of whether the session was actually in the cache,
diverging from OpenSSL's SSL_CTX_remove_session (1 on success,
0 on not-found).
Changes:
* src/internal.c: ctx->maxEarlyDataSz defaults to 0; applications
must opt in with wolfSSL_CTX_set_max_early_data.
* src/tls13.c: #error when WOLFSSL_EARLY_DATA is built with
HAVE_SESSION_TICKET and NO_SESSION_CACHE. Escape hatch
WOLFSSL_EARLY_DATA_NO_ANTI_REPLAY for deployments that take
application-layer responsibility.
* wolfssl/internal.h: imply WOLFSSL_TICKET_HAVE_ID from
WOLFSSL_EARLY_DATA so stateless-ticket issuance populates the
cache under an ID that eviction can find.
* src/ssl_sess.c: wolfSSL_SSL_CTX_remove_session returns 1 when the
session was found (internal-cache hit, or ctx->rem_sess_cb fired
for an external cache), 0 otherwise. Matches OpenSSL semantics.
* src/tls13.c: the 0-RTT acceptance condition in CheckPreSharedKeys
now calls wolfSSL_SSL_CTX_remove_session and checks its return:
the eviction is the check. If the session was in the cache, 0-RTT
is accepted and the single-use requirement is satisfied. If not,
the early_data extension is rejected through the normal path so
the record layer correctly skips in-flight 0-RTT records.
WOLFSSL_MSG at each rejection site.
* doc/dox_comments/header_files/ssl.h: document runtime opt-in.
* tests: four new tests —
test_tls13_0rtt_default_off (fails without default-to-0 fix),
test_tls13_0rtt_stateless_replay (fails without TICKET_HAVE_ID
implication and remove_session gate),
test_tls13_remove_session_return (fails without return-value fix),
test_tls13_0rtt_ext_cache_eviction (fails without ext-cache
counts-as-found fix).
test_tls13_early_data explicitly opts in via
wolfSSL_CTX_set_max_early_data.
tests/api.c: two SSL_CTX_remove_session == 0 assertions updated
to == 1.
tests/api/test_ossl_x509.c, tests/api/test_ossl_x509.h: add test_wolfssl_local_IsValidFQDN().
src/internal.c: in MatchDomainName(), when WOLFSSL_LEFT_MOST_WILDCARD_ONLY, do pattern matching and case folding only if target string validates as an FQDN.
Follow-up to #7731 ("Changes needed for default TLS support in zephyr
kernel"). Zephyr 4.3's TLS socket integration uses three additional
wolfSSL features that were not needed by the 3.7 integration, plus an
extension to the native_sim time-source gates introduced in #7731.
native_sim timer gates (src/internal.c, wolfcrypt/src/wc_port.c):
Extend the !CONFIG_BOARD_NATIVE_POSIX gate in LowResTimer() and the
CONFIG_BOARD_NATIVE_POSIX RTC path in z_time() to also cover
CONFIG_BOARD_NATIVE_SIM. Zephyr 4.3 renamed the simulator board from
native_posix to native_sim; without this, k_cpu_idle() on native_sim
advances simulated time during DTLS retransmit loops and the RTC path
falls through to uptime-since-boot. Behavior on native_posix is
unchanged.
New Kconfig options (zephyr/Kconfig, zephyr/user_settings.h):
CONFIG_WOLFSSL_SESSION_EXPORT -> HAVE_EXT_CACHE
Required by consumers that serialize TLS session state across
connections via wolfSSL_i2d_SSL_SESSION / wolfSSL_d2i_SSL_SESSION.
CONFIG_WOLFSSL_KEEP_PEER_CERT -> KEEP_PEER_CERT
Retain the peer certificate after handshake so the application
layer can inspect it via wolfSSL_get_peer_certificate.
CONFIG_WOLFSSL_ALWAYS_VERIFY_CB -> WOLFSSL_ALWAYS_VERIFY_CB
Invoke an application-set verify callback on successful chain
validation in addition to validation failures.
All three are default-off; customers opt in the same way they do for
the existing CONFIG_WOLFSSL_DTLS / ALPN / PSK feature options.
.wolfssl_known_macro_extras: register HAVE_EXT_CACHE.
Tobias Frauenschläger
Sean Parkinson
David Garske
Juliusz Sosinowicz
sebastian-carpenter
kaleb-himes
Eric Blankenhorn
Jeremiah Mackey
JacobBarthelmeh
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Joseph Chen
Kareem
Daniel Pouzzner
Mattia Moffa
Colton Willey
Lealem Amedie