### `wolfssl/internal.h`
- **`InternalTicket` struct gains a flexible array member**: A new `peerCert[]` field (with a preceding `peerCertLen[2]`) is added to `InternalTicket`. This allows the peer's DER-encoded certificate to be stored directly inside the session ticket.
- **`ExternalTicket` struct becomes variable-length**: The `enc_ticket` field is changed from a fixed-size array to a flexible array member (`byte enc_ticket[]`). The `mac` field is removed from the struct — the MAC is now placed dynamically after the encrypted data in `enc_ticket`.
### `src/internal.c`
- The `GetRecordHeader` function now only adds `MAX_COMP_EXTRA` to the maximum allowed record size when `ssl->options.usingCompression` is true, tightening the length validation. The max fragment length extension check is now much stricter.
- **Peer certificate is serialized into the ticket**: During ticket creation, the code attempts to find the peer certificate from `ssl->peerCert` or from `ssl->session->chain` (fallback). If found and within `MAX_TICKET_PEER_CERT_SZ`, it's copied into `it->peerCert`. DTLS is explicitly excluded (peer cert length set to 0) to keep ticket size small for MTU constraints. If `HAVE_MAX_FRAGMENT` is defined and max fragment is not `MAX_RECORD_SIZE` for TLS 1.3, the cert is also skipped since `SendTls13NewSessionTicket` doesn't support fragmentation yet.
- **Peer certificate restoration from ticket**: On successful ticket decryption, if the ticket contains a peer certificate (`peerCertLen > 0`), it is decoded back into `ssl->peerCert` via `ParseCertRelative`/`CopyDecodedToX509`, and also added to `ssl->session->chain` via `AddSessionCertToChain`.
- The `CLEAR_ASN_NO_PEM_HEADER_ERROR` macro was rewritten to loop and remove all consecutive PEM no-start-line errors (not just the last one), wrapped in a `do { ... } while(0)` for safety.
- The `SendTicket` function is simplified to use `SendHandshakeMsg` to support fragmenting the larger ticket.
---
### `src/x509.c`
- `loadX509orX509REQFromPemBio` now accepts `TRUSTED_CERT_TYPE` in addition to `CERT_TYPE` and `CERTREQ_TYPE`.
- **Streaming BIO support**: When `wolfSSL_BIO_get_len()` returns ≤ 0 (e.g., pipes/FIFOs), the function no longer returns an error. Instead, it sets an initial buffer of `MAX_X509_SIZE` and dynamically grows (doubling) up to `MAX_BIO_READ_BUFFER` (`MAX_X509_SIZE * 16`) as data is read byte-by-byte.
- **Alternate footer detection**: For `TRUSTED_CERT_TYPE`, the PEM reader also checks for the regular `CERT_TYPE` footer (`-----END CERTIFICATE-----`) in addition to the trusted cert footer (`-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----`), so it can parse either format.
- Removed two lines that set `cert->srcIdx` to `SIGALGO_SEQ` offset. This makes `cert->srcIdx` reflect the end of parsed certificate data. This is used by `loadX509orX509REQFromBuffer` to detect where auxiliary trust data begins in trusted certificates.
---
### `src/ssl_sk.c`
- Added a `STACK_TYPE_X509_CRL` case to `wolfssl_sk_dup_data` that calls `wolfSSL_X509_CRL_dup` for deep-copying CRL stack elements. Previously, `STACK_TYPE_X509_CRL` fell through to the unsupported default case.
---
### `wolfssl/openssl/ssl.h`
- `sk_X509_dup` now maps to `wolfSSL_shallow_sk_dup` (was `wolfSSL_sk_dup`/deep copy). This matches OpenSSL's behavior where `sk_X509_dup` does a shallow copy.
- `sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup` similarly changed to `wolfSSL_shallow_sk_dup`.
---
### `src/ssl_api_cert.c`
- When `ssl->ourCert` is `NULL` and the SSL owns its cert, the function now checks if `ssl->ctx->ourCert` points to the same certificate (by comparing DER buffers). If so, it returns the ctx's `X509` pointer directly. This maintains pointer compatibility for applications (like nginx OCSP stapling) that use the `X509*` from `SSL_CTX_use_certificate` as a lookup key.
### `src/bio.c`
- When `wolfssl_file_len` returns `WOLFSSL_BAD_FILETYPE` (now returned for pipes/FIFOs), `wolfSSL_BIO_get_len` treats it as length 0 instead of propagating the error.
---
### `tests/test-maxfrag.conf` and `tests/test-maxfrag-dtls.conf`
- Removed `DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384` test entries because the ClientKeyExchange doesn't fit in the selected max fragment length.
Add full RSA-PSS (RSASSA-PSS) support to PKCS#7 SignedData
encoding and verification.
This change enables SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm to use
id-RSASSA-PSS with explicit RSASSA-PSS-params (hash, MGF1,
salt length), as required by RFC 4055 and CMS profiles.
Key changes:
- Add RSA-PSS encode and verify paths for PKCS7 SignedData
- Encode full RSASSA-PSS AlgorithmIdentifier parameters
- Decode RSA-PSS parameters from SignerInfo for verification
- Treat RSA-PSS like ECDSA (sign raw digest, not DigestInfo)
- Fix certificate signatureAlgorithm parameter length handling
- Add API test coverage for RSA-PSS SignedData
This resolves failures when using RSA-PSS signer certificates
(e.g. -173 invalid signature algorithm) and maintains backward
compatibility with RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and ECDSA.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
* add prefetch_ptr flag argument to AesEncrypt_C() and AesDecrypt_C(), and call PreFetchTe() and PreFetchSBox() only if *prefetch_ptr is zero, whereupon it is set to 1;
* when C implementations are available, add prefetch_ptr arg to wc_AesEncrypt() and wc_AesDecrypt(), and pass it through;
* in functions that directly call the AES block encryption methods, opportunistically inhibit prefetch on all but the first call;
* move AES-specific code in wc_CmacUpdate() in cmac.c to wc_local_CmacUpdateAes() in aes.c to let it use conditional prefetching;
* add WC_ARG_NOT_NULL(), WC_ARGS_NOT_NULL(), and WC_ALL_ARGS_NOT_NULL attribute abstractions.
Decapsulation needs H, hash of public key, and it is not present if you
have a new key made from a seed.
Code changed to check for and create H in decapsulate.
linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.c:
* fix straddle check in wc_reloc_normalize_text();
* fix seg_map bounds checks in wc_fips_generate_hash();
linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.h: fix initializer for wc_reloc_table_segments.bss_end;
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h: add WC_BITS_TO_BYTES() and WC_BITS_FULL_BYTES() and deploy opportunistically to wolfssl/internal.h, wolfssl/wolfcrypt/{asn.h,dh.h,rsa.h,types.h}, wolfcrypt/src/sakke.c, and wolfcrypt/test/test.c.
Add:
* linuxkm/linuxkm-fips-hash.c
* linuxkm/linuxkm-fips-hash-wrapper.sh
* linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.h
Move from linuxkm/module_hooks.c to linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.c:
* reloc_layouts[]
* find_reloc_tab_offset()
* the body of wc_linuxkm_normalize_relocations() as wc_reloc_normalize_text()
* most of updateFipsHash() as wc_fips_generate_hash()
Move from linuxkm/linuxkm_wc_port.h to linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.h:
* struct wc_linuxkm_pie_reloc_tab_ent
* enum wc_reloc_dest_segment
* enum wc_reloc_type
linuxkm/Makefile:
* Update GENERATE_RELOC_TAB recipe to populate new fields in struct wc_reloc_table_ent.
* Add targets:
* libwolfssl-user-build/src/.libs/libwolfssl.so
* linuxkm-fips-hash
* module-with-matching-fips-hash
* module-with-matching-fips-hash-no-sign
* Add support for alternate target module name, via LIBWOLFSSL_NAME make variable.
linuxkm/linuxkm_wc_port.h and linuxkm/module_hooks.c:
* Fixes to make linuxkm-pie work with CONFIG_KASAN.
* Implement WC_LINUXKM_STACK_DEBUG:
* wc_linuxkm_stack_bottom()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_top()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_current()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_left()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_hwm_prepare()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_hwm_measure_rel()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_hwm_measure_total()
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h:
* When WOLFSSL_KERNEL_MODE, make sure WOLFSSL_GENERAL_ALIGNMENT is at least SIZEOF_LONG.
* When WOLFCRYPT_FIPS_CORE_DYNAMIC_HASH_VALUE, make sure WOLFSSL_BASE16 is defined.
configure.ac and wolfcrypt/benchmark/benchmark.c: Disable scrypt when KERNEL_MODE_DEFAULTS, due to excessive memory requirements.
Paul Adelsbach
Eric Blankenhorn
Sean Parkinson
Daniel Pouzzner
night1rider
David Garske
jackctj117
JacobBarthelmeh
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Sameeh Jubran
aidan garske
Tobias Frauenschläger
Ruby Martin
Andrew Hutchings