Replace the liboqs-based pre-standardization SPHINCS+ implementation
with the native FIPS 205 SLH-DSA implementation across the
certificate / ASN.1 / X.509 layers, and add SLH-DSA-rooted test
certificates plus TLS 1.3 .conf scenarios that exercise the new
verification path. All liboqs SPHINCS+ code is removed.
This enables SLH-DSA for certificate chain authentication: CA
certificates signed with SLH-DSA, certificate signature verification
against an SLH-DSA root. TLS 1.3 entity authentication via
CertificateVerify with SLH-DSA will be added in a follow-up PR.
Follows RFC 9909 (X.509 Algorithm Identifiers for SLH-DSA) and
NIST FIPS 205. Supports both SHAKE and SHA-2 parameter families
across all twelve standardized variants.
DER codec:
- New PrivateKeyDecode, PublicKeyDecode, KeyToDer, PrivateKeyToDer,
PublicKeyToDer with RFC 9909 encoding (bare OCTET STRING containing
4*n raw bytes = SK.seed || SK.prf || PK.seed || PK.root, no nested
wrapper). OID auto-detection across all twelve SHAKE / SHA-2 variants.
- PublicKeyDecode raw-bytes fast path mirrors wc_Falcon_PublicKeyDecode
and wc_Dilithium_PublicKeyDecode so callers (notably
wolfssl_x509_make_der and ConfirmSignature, which pass the raw
BIT STRING contents stashed by StoreKey) decode correctly. Honours
the caller's *inOutIdx start offset.
- Error paths in Private/PublicKeyDecode preserve params/flags/
inOutIdx and only ForceZero the buffer half each helper actually
writes; skip the wipe entirely on BAD_LENGTH_E (no bytes touched).
- ImportPublic uses |= on flags so a Private-then-Public import
sequence retains FLAG_PRIVATE.
OID dispatch:
- 12 standardized NIST OIDs (6 SHAKE + 6 SHA-2) per RFC 9909. The
pre-standardization OID-collision mechanism is removed since NIST
OIDs do not collide.
- wc_SlhDsaOidToParam / wc_SlhDsaOidToCertType return NOT_COMPILED_IN
(rather than -1) for recognised SLH-DSA OIDs whose parameter set
isn't built; wc_IsSlhDsaOid recognises both. The x509 dispatch
surfaces this as a precise diagnostic instead of the generic
"No public key found".
- wc_GetKeyOID picks a placeholder parameter from whatever variant is
compiled in and #errors at compile time if none is.
- asn_orig.c EncodeCert / EncodeCertReq accept SHA-2 SLH-DSA keyTypes
alongside SHAKE.
Tests and fixtures:
- Test cert chain in certs/slhdsa/: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s and
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s self-signed roots that sign reused ML-DSA-44
entity keys (server + client), plus the gen script
(gen-slhdsa-mldsa-certs.sh, OpenSSL >= 3.5).
- New TLS 1.3 .conf scenarios under tests/suites.c dispatch:
test-tls13-slhdsa-shake.conf, test-tls13-slhdsa-sha2.conf, and a
wrong-CA negative test test-tls13-slhdsa-fail.conf.
- DER round-trip and on-disk decode tests; bench_slhdsa_*_key.der
fixtures regenerated with wolfSSL's own encoder so the codec is
pinned to RFC 9909.
- New unit test test_wc_slhdsa_x509_i2d_roundtrip exercises the raw
PublicKeyDecode entry point that wolfssl_x509_make_der relies on.
- test_wc_slhdsa_check_key now tests both Public-then-Private and
Private-then-Public import orderings.
Build / ABI:
- DYNAMIC_TYPE_SPHINCS = 98 kept as RESERVED with a tombstone comment
for ABI stability; new code should use DYNAMIC_TYPE_SLHDSA (107).
- All build system / IDE project files updated; SPHINCS+ sources,
headers, and test data removed.
- Dead bench_slhdsa_*_key arrays removed from gencertbuf.pl and
certs_test.h; the .der files on disk drive the decode tests.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_slhdsa.h: implement WOLFSSL_SLHDSA_NO_SHAKE and WOLFSSL_SLHDSA_NO_SHA2, and fix WC_SLHDSA_MAX_SIG_LEN setup to reflect SHA2 variants;
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h: if WOLFSSL_KERNEL_MODE, set WOLFSSL_SLHDSA_VERIFY_ONLY unless WOLFSSL_SLHDSA_NO_VERIFY_ONLY;
wolfcrypt/src/wc_slhdsa.c: fix WOLFSSL_SLHDSA_VERIFY_ONLY to work with --enable-slhdsa=sha2,verifyonly;
fix -Wunused-variables in slhdsakey_wots_pk_from_sig_x4();
wolfcrypt/test/test.c: in slhdsa_test(), fix gating for compatibility with --enable-slhdsa=sha2,verifyonly;
tests/api/test_slhdsa.c: fix gating in test_wc_slhdsa() and test_wc_slhdsa_sizes().
When WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_AES_SETKEY is enabled and a CryptoCB callback
imports the AES key into a Secure Element (aes->devCtx != NULL), the
TLS-layer copy in keys->{client,server}_write_key has no further
consumer: the software key schedule is not populated on offload.
ForceZero it in SetKeysSide() per provisioned side.
The static IVs (keys->{client,server}_write_IV and
keys->aead_{enc,dec}_imp_IV) are left intact because BuildTls13Nonce()
reads aead_{enc,dec}_imp_IV on every record (RFC 8446 Section 5.3).
Scope: TLS 1.3, non-DTLS, non-QUIC. DTLS 1.3 needs the write keys
in Dtls13EpochCopyKeys; TLS 1.2 needs them for rehandshake; QUIC is
untouched pending audit.
Add two memio tests (test_wc_CryptoCb_Tls13_Key_{Zero_After_Offload,
No_Zero_Without_Offload}) that pin AES-GCM and check key / IV state
after the handshake and a KeyUpdate round.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
Implement RFC8773bis (draft-ietf-tls-8773bis-13)
cert_with_extern_psk for TLS 1.3, including protocol checks
and API support.
Includes unit tests for API and handshake behavior as well
as tests in the testsuite using extended examples.
Daniel Pouzzner
JacobBarthelmeh
Tobias Frauenschläger
David Garske
kaleb-himes
Eric Blankenhorn
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Sean Parkinson
Roy Carter
Mattia Moffa
Lealem Amedie
Sameeh Jubran
Ruby Martin
Reda Chouk
Brett Nicholas
Jeremiah Mackey
night1rider