This is related to F-1070 but not the same. We do not need to check
that hash_size being passed in matches the initialized digest size
because the C function will use the passed-in size as long as it is
non-zero.
Fix F-1062.
If wolfSSL returns an error after initializing ECC struct with
wc_ecc_init_ex(), wc_ecc_free() might not have been called in all cases.
Move construction of the ECC struct earlier ahead of further wolfSSL
calls after wc_ecc_init_ex() so if those subsequent wolfSSL calls return
an error the Drop impl for ECC will be called to deinitialize.
utilities for generic SetKey and ExportKey operations on HMAC, RSA, ECC,
and AES. Add wc_ecc_size/wc_ecc_sig_size callback hooks for hardware-only
keys. Integrate into configure.ac as --enable-cryptocbutils=setkey,export
options with CI test configurations in os-check.yml.
Add test handlers in test.c and api.c with export/import delegation
pattern, small-stack-safe allocations, custom curve support, and
DEBUG_CRYPTOCB helpers.
- se050_rsa_verify: when the function uploads only the public part of the key (keyCreated == 1), erase the transient SE050 object and don't persist keyIdSet = 1. A subsequent sign on the same RsaKey was reusing the public-only SE050 object and failing. Pre-existing bindings (from wc_RsaUseKeyId or a prior sign that uploaded a keypair) are preserved untouched.
- rsa_keygen_test: add WOLFSSL_SE050 to the existing WOLFSSL_CRYPTOCELL guard around the export-then-decode round-trip. SE050-generated keys keep their private components in the secure element, so wc_RsaKeyToDer + wc_RsaPrivateKeyDecode cannot complete. Matching guard on the idx declaration to avoid an unused-variable warning.
- se050_ed25519_verify_msg: initialize *res = 0 at entry so failures don't leak a stale res = 1 from a prior good verify.
- Ed25519 import functions: reset keyIdSet / keyId under WOLFSSL_SE050 in wc_ed25519_import_private_key_ex, wc_ed25519_import_private_only, wc_ed25519_import_public_ex so overwriting host-side key material invalidates any prior SE050 object binding.
- New workflow .github/workflows/se050-sim.yml: builds wolfSSL against the NXP Plug&Trust SDK and runs the wolfCrypt tests against the SE050Sim simulator. Patches the upstream Dockerfile to use the PR's wolfSSL source.
- ed25519_test SE050 adjustments:
- Cap the RFC 8032 loop at 5 iters — iter 5's 1023 B msg exceeds NXP SDK SE05X_TLV_BUF_SIZE_CMD = 900.
- rareEd verifies and private-only sign: expect WC_HW_E (SE050 delegates malformed-input rejection to the secure element) instead of BAD_FUNC_ARG / SIG_VERIFY_E.
- Skip ed25519ctx_test / ed25519ph_test — SE050 port drops the context/prehash params so RFC 8032 ctx/ph vectors can't byte-match.
Per RFC 8446 section 8, a server MUST ensure that any instance of it
would accept 0-RTT for the same 0-RTT handshake at most once. Without
this, the same ClientHello could be replayed to re-accept early data on
a subsequent connection.
After the PSK is authenticated (binder verified) in DoPreSharedKeys,
call wolfSSL_SSL_CTX_remove_session on ssl->session when the client
offered 0-RTT and the session permits it. That evicts the entry from
the internal cache (under the row's write lock) and invokes the
application's ctx->rem_sess_cb so any external cache can drop its copy
too. The session's timeout is also cleared so the live reference held
by the current handshake cannot be resumed again.
The mutation is paid only when the client actually included the
early_data extension on a 0-RTT-capable session, so normal resumptions
are unaffected and the existing remove-callback counts in
test_wolfSSL_CTX_add_session_ext_{tls13,dtls13} stay correct.
wolfSSL_SSL_CTX_remove_session was previously declared and defined only
under the OpenSSL compatibility layer. Because it is now called from
the core TLS 1.3 PSK path, the declaration in wolfssl/ssl.h and the
definition in src/ssl_sess.c are moved out of that block to match the
existing !NO_SESSION_CACHE gate under which the function is meaningful.
wolfSSL_SSL_get0_session stays in the compat block.
test_tls13_early_data_0rtt_replay verifies the behaviour. It does a
full TLS 1.3 handshake with stateful tickets (SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) and
max_early_data > 0, then tries to resume the saved session twice while
offering 0-RTT each time. A minimal single-slot external session cache
is wired up via wolfSSL_CTX_sess_set_{new,get,remove}_cb to confirm
both caches are cleared. Round 0 must resume and deliver the early
data, and rem_calls must hit 1 (the fix's single eviction). Round 1
must fall back to a full handshake (session_reused == 0), deliver no
early data, and leave rem_calls at 1.
Verified against multiple configurations (incl. --enable-all
--enable-earlydata, the no-compat -DHAVE_EXT_CACHE build, and the
os-check.yml combo). Valgrind under -g2 -O0 with OPENSSL_EXTRA +
HAVE_EXT_CACHE + HAVE_EX_DATA reports no errors and no
definitely-lost bytes.
Refs wolfSSL/wolfssl#10197
crl.c:
- wolfSSL_X509_CRL_dup: add NULL check on input before dereferencing crl->cm
- DupX509_CRL: distinguish empty source CRL list from allocation failure so
duplicating a CRL with no entries no longer returns MEMORY_E
- wolfSSL_X509_STORE_add_crl: free newly-allocated CRL when wc_LockRwLock_Rd
fails to avoid leaking it
- InitCRL: propagate wolfSSL_RefInit failure in OPENSSL_ALL +
WOLFSSL_REFCNT_ERROR_RETURN builds, freeing crlLock (and cond when
HAVE_CRL_MONITOR is enabled) on the error path
keys.c:
- GetCipherSpec: remove duplicate usingPSK_cipher assignment in
BUILD_TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 case
- GetCipherSpec: return UNSUPPORTED_SUITE for unknown cipher suite bytes in
the TLS13_BYTE, ECDHE_PSK_BYTE, and SM_BYTE switch blocks, matching the
behavior of the ECC_BYTE, CHACHA_BYTE, and normal suite switches
- SetKeys: fix misleading indentation on the AESCCM and SM4-CCM dec->aes
NULL-check return statements
ssl_certman.c / internal.h:
- AddTrustedPeer: remove dead code that checked peerCert->permittedNames
and peerCert->excludedNames immediately after XMEMSET zeroed the struct
- AddTrustedPeer: use cm->heap (matching allocation) instead of NULL when
freeing cert on the ParseCert failure path
- Extract the body of wolfSSL_CertManagerFree into a new static helper
DoCertManagerFree that unconditionally disposes of the certificate
manager, bypassing the reference count check. wolfSSL_CertManagerFree
now delegates to it after the RefDec check.
- Add caLockInit, tpLockInit, and refInit bitfield members to
WOLFSSL_CERT_MANAGER that track which sub-resources were successfully
initialized. DoCertManagerFree consults these flags so that it only
destroys mutexes and the reference count that were actually set up,
which makes partial-construction cleanup safe without relying on
platform-specific behavior of free-on-zeroed-storage.
- wolfSSL_CertManagerNew_ex: set the init flags as each sub-resource is
initialized, and on failure call DoCertManagerFree directly to free
exactly the resources that succeeded. Set cm->heap immediately after
XMEMSET so the forceful free path can use it.
Josh Holtrop
Sean Parkinson
night1rider
Kareem
Eric Blankenhorn
Ruby Martin
David Garske
Marco Oliverio
Andrew Hutchings
Jeremiah Mackey
Juliusz Sosinowicz