wolfcrypt/src/asn.c, wolfssl/wolfcrypt/asn.h, src/ssl.c, wolfssl/ssl.h: move wolfssl_local_IsValidFQDN() from ASN.1 layer (where it has no users and is gated out in lean PSK builds) to TLS layer (where its users are);
scripts/crl-revoked.test: use `cp --symbolic-link` opportunistically but fall back to `cp -p`.
- x509_str: require CA:TRUE unconditionally in wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert;
verify leaf signature even when verify_cb overrides INVALID_CA
- x509_str: align WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA with OpenSSL value (79)
so OPENSSL_COEXIST builds compile; bump WC_OSSL_V509_V_ERR_MAX to 80
and extend error_test() missing-value table for the new gaps
- asn: reject embedded NUL in dNSName / rfc822Name / URI SAN entries
- internal: re-verify restored ticket peer cert against trust store with
CRL/OCSP checks; clear stale state from session cache on verification
failure
- ticket: bind SNI and ALPN into session ticket via compile-time selected
hash (TICKET_BINDING_HASH_TYPE); reject resumption on mismatch in both
TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2 paths
- ticket: defer SNI/ALPN binding check until after extensions are parsed
by consolidating into VerifyTicketBinding(), called once after
ALPN_Select in DoTls13ClientHello and DoClientHello; the early
per-call sites ran before extensions were parsed and rejected valid
resumptions in nginx, haproxy, grpc, and CPython integration tests
- ssl_sess: free previous session in wolfSSL_d2i_SSL_SESSION before
overwrite
- examples/client: increase SESSION_TICKET_LEN fallback from 256 to 2048
to support larger tickets
- tests: update SAN NUL fixtures and add parse-time rejection coverage;
add test_tls13_ticket_peer_cert_reverify for CA-removal scenario; skip
it under WOLFSSL_NO_DEF_TICKET_ENC_CB
Merging TranslateReturnCode into wolfSSL_LastError dropped the
IP_SOCK_getsockopt(SO_ERROR) lookup emNET integrations need to retrieve
the canonical IP_ERR_* for a failed recv/send, leaving a broken branch
that returned the raw value and mishandled the POSIX-facade convention.
Restore the historic lookup (fixing the optlen pointer-vs-int typo
along the way) and add a CI test that builds wolfSSL with
-DWOLFSSL_EMNET against a clean-room shim providing an emNET-faithful
IP_SOCK_getsockopt (SO_ERROR-then-errno fallback, since Linux does not
stash EAGAIN in SO_ERROR); recv/send fall through to glibc.
The emNET `wolfSSL_LastError` branches were incorrect. The second one
was never hit and would never compile. The first one inverts error codes
that should not be inverted.
This fixes that code and adds a test with a shim layer to test emNET
calls without using emNET.
Replace the liboqs-based pre-standardization SPHINCS+ implementation
with the native FIPS 205 SLH-DSA implementation across the
certificate / ASN.1 / X.509 layers, and add SLH-DSA-rooted test
certificates plus TLS 1.3 .conf scenarios that exercise the new
verification path. All liboqs SPHINCS+ code is removed.
This enables SLH-DSA for certificate chain authentication: CA
certificates signed with SLH-DSA, certificate signature verification
against an SLH-DSA root. TLS 1.3 entity authentication via
CertificateVerify with SLH-DSA will be added in a follow-up PR.
Follows RFC 9909 (X.509 Algorithm Identifiers for SLH-DSA) and
NIST FIPS 205. Supports both SHAKE and SHA-2 parameter families
across all twelve standardized variants.
DER codec:
- New PrivateKeyDecode, PublicKeyDecode, KeyToDer, PrivateKeyToDer,
PublicKeyToDer with RFC 9909 encoding (bare OCTET STRING containing
4*n raw bytes = SK.seed || SK.prf || PK.seed || PK.root, no nested
wrapper). OID auto-detection across all twelve SHAKE / SHA-2 variants.
- PublicKeyDecode raw-bytes fast path mirrors wc_Falcon_PublicKeyDecode
and wc_Dilithium_PublicKeyDecode so callers (notably
wolfssl_x509_make_der and ConfirmSignature, which pass the raw
BIT STRING contents stashed by StoreKey) decode correctly. Honours
the caller's *inOutIdx start offset.
- Error paths in Private/PublicKeyDecode preserve params/flags/
inOutIdx and only ForceZero the buffer half each helper actually
writes; skip the wipe entirely on BAD_LENGTH_E (no bytes touched).
- ImportPublic uses |= on flags so a Private-then-Public import
sequence retains FLAG_PRIVATE.
OID dispatch:
- 12 standardized NIST OIDs (6 SHAKE + 6 SHA-2) per RFC 9909. The
pre-standardization OID-collision mechanism is removed since NIST
OIDs do not collide.
- wc_SlhDsaOidToParam / wc_SlhDsaOidToCertType return NOT_COMPILED_IN
(rather than -1) for recognised SLH-DSA OIDs whose parameter set
isn't built; wc_IsSlhDsaOid recognises both. The x509 dispatch
surfaces this as a precise diagnostic instead of the generic
"No public key found".
- wc_GetKeyOID picks a placeholder parameter from whatever variant is
compiled in and #errors at compile time if none is.
- asn_orig.c EncodeCert / EncodeCertReq accept SHA-2 SLH-DSA keyTypes
alongside SHAKE.
Tests and fixtures:
- Test cert chain in certs/slhdsa/: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s and
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s self-signed roots that sign reused ML-DSA-44
entity keys (server + client), plus the gen script
(gen-slhdsa-mldsa-certs.sh, OpenSSL >= 3.5).
- New TLS 1.3 .conf scenarios under tests/suites.c dispatch:
test-tls13-slhdsa-shake.conf, test-tls13-slhdsa-sha2.conf, and a
wrong-CA negative test test-tls13-slhdsa-fail.conf.
- DER round-trip and on-disk decode tests; bench_slhdsa_*_key.der
fixtures regenerated with wolfSSL's own encoder so the codec is
pinned to RFC 9909.
- New unit test test_wc_slhdsa_x509_i2d_roundtrip exercises the raw
PublicKeyDecode entry point that wolfssl_x509_make_der relies on.
- test_wc_slhdsa_check_key now tests both Public-then-Private and
Private-then-Public import orderings.
Build / ABI:
- DYNAMIC_TYPE_SPHINCS = 98 kept as RESERVED with a tombstone comment
for ABI stability; new code should use DYNAMIC_TYPE_SLHDSA (107).
- All build system / IDE project files updated; SPHINCS+ sources,
headers, and test data removed.
- Dead bench_slhdsa_*_key arrays removed from gencertbuf.pl and
certs_test.h; the .der files on disk drive the decode tests.
* configure.ac: --enable-dtls13 auto-enables --enable-dtls and TLS 1.3,
with a targeted error if either is explicitly --disabled, plus a
post-finalization sanity check that errors out if a later
prerequisite test forces ENABLED_TLS13 back to "no" while
ENABLED_DTLS13 is yes.
* src/internal.c, src/wolfio.c, wolfssl/wolfio.h: new WOLFSSL_DTLS_ONLY
compile-time flag elides the EmbedReceive / EmbedSend default
callbacks. The DTLS_MAJOR runtime check stays in SetSSL_CTX so a
TLS-method ctx in a DTLS-only build doesn't get datagram callbacks
by default, and WriteSEQ keeps its ssl->options.dtls branch. A
#error in settings.h refuses WOLFSSL_DTLS_ONLY without WOLFSSL_DTLS.
* wolfcrypt/src/aes.c: add HAVE_AES_DECRYPT to the inv_col_mul
definition gate to match its only caller; without it the function is
emitted dead under WOLFSSL_AES_DIRECT && NO_AES_DECRYPT and
-Werror=unused-function fails the build.
* .github/workflows/os-check.yml: matrix entry for a minimal DTLS 1.3
client-only build.
The CRL refactor broke nginx's ssl_cache.t (and the wolfSSL/wolfssl
nginx_check matrix on 1.24.0/1.25.0/1.28.1) because nginx loads the test
CRL through a FIFO. wolfSSL_PEM_X509_X509_CRL_X509_PKEY_read_bio() asks
wolfSSL_BIO_get_len() for the BIO size up front; for a FIFO the
underlying ftell() returns ESPIPE, wolfssl_file_len() reports
WOLFSSL_BAD_FILETYPE, and BIO_get_len() returns 0. The function then hit
the l <= pem_struct_min_sz guard and bailed with ASN_NO_PEM_HEADER
before reading a byte, so the caller's loop saw "no CRL" and nginx
emitted "PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL() failed".
Treat l == 0 as "streaming source, size unknown" and allocate up to
MAX_BIO_READ_BUFFER (the same cap ReadPemFromBioToBuffer used for this
case before the refactor). The existing byte-by-byte reader already
stops at the END marker or at EOF, so this is enough; if the upstream
short-reads we still surface ASN_NO_PEM_HEADER from the
pem_struct_min_sz read below. Keep rejecting tiny non-zero lengths
since those are real "buffer too small" cases.