* for aarch64/arm64, only add -mno-outline-atomics if the compiler supports it.
* in ENABLED_LINUXKM_PIE setup, avoid -fPIE on arm32 <5.11 (missing reloc support).
linuxkm/linuxkm_wc_port.h, linuxkm/module_hooks.c, and wolfcrypt/src/wc_port.c: gate interception of alt_cb_patch_nops() on kernel >= 6.1.
linuxkm/linuxkm_wc_port.h: define WC_LINUXKM_SUPPORT_DUMP_TO_FILE implicitly when WC_SYM_RELOC_TABLES && DEBUG_LINUXKM_PIE_SUPPORT.
linuxkm/module_hooks.c: fixes for text_dump_path and rodata_dump_path handler code.
RSA-PSS signed certificates contain a valid RSA public key that can be
used for key transport, but wc_PKCS7_AddRecipient_KTRI and the
EnvelopedData/AuthEnvelopedData encode paths rejected them because they
only checked for RSAk. Allow RSAPSSk to fall through to the RSAk key
transport path, and always use RSAk as the KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier
since the operation is RSA encryption, not RSA-PSS signing.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
### `wolfssl/internal.h`
- **`InternalTicket` struct gains a flexible array member**: A new `peerCert[]` field (with a preceding `peerCertLen[2]`) is added to `InternalTicket`. This allows the peer's DER-encoded certificate to be stored directly inside the session ticket.
- **`ExternalTicket` struct becomes variable-length**: The `enc_ticket` field is changed from a fixed-size array to a flexible array member (`byte enc_ticket[]`). The `mac` field is removed from the struct — the MAC is now placed dynamically after the encrypted data in `enc_ticket`.
### `src/internal.c`
- The `GetRecordHeader` function now only adds `MAX_COMP_EXTRA` to the maximum allowed record size when `ssl->options.usingCompression` is true, tightening the length validation. The max fragment length extension check is now much stricter.
- **Peer certificate is serialized into the ticket**: During ticket creation, the code attempts to find the peer certificate from `ssl->peerCert` or from `ssl->session->chain` (fallback). If found and within `MAX_TICKET_PEER_CERT_SZ`, it's copied into `it->peerCert`. DTLS is explicitly excluded (peer cert length set to 0) to keep ticket size small for MTU constraints. If `HAVE_MAX_FRAGMENT` is defined and max fragment is not `MAX_RECORD_SIZE` for TLS 1.3, the cert is also skipped since `SendTls13NewSessionTicket` doesn't support fragmentation yet.
- **Peer certificate restoration from ticket**: On successful ticket decryption, if the ticket contains a peer certificate (`peerCertLen > 0`), it is decoded back into `ssl->peerCert` via `ParseCertRelative`/`CopyDecodedToX509`, and also added to `ssl->session->chain` via `AddSessionCertToChain`.
- The `CLEAR_ASN_NO_PEM_HEADER_ERROR` macro was rewritten to loop and remove all consecutive PEM no-start-line errors (not just the last one), wrapped in a `do { ... } while(0)` for safety.
- The `SendTicket` function is simplified to use `SendHandshakeMsg` to support fragmenting the larger ticket.
---
### `src/x509.c`
- `loadX509orX509REQFromPemBio` now accepts `TRUSTED_CERT_TYPE` in addition to `CERT_TYPE` and `CERTREQ_TYPE`.
- **Streaming BIO support**: When `wolfSSL_BIO_get_len()` returns ≤ 0 (e.g., pipes/FIFOs), the function no longer returns an error. Instead, it sets an initial buffer of `MAX_X509_SIZE` and dynamically grows (doubling) up to `MAX_BIO_READ_BUFFER` (`MAX_X509_SIZE * 16`) as data is read byte-by-byte.
- **Alternate footer detection**: For `TRUSTED_CERT_TYPE`, the PEM reader also checks for the regular `CERT_TYPE` footer (`-----END CERTIFICATE-----`) in addition to the trusted cert footer (`-----END TRUSTED CERTIFICATE-----`), so it can parse either format.
- Removed two lines that set `cert->srcIdx` to `SIGALGO_SEQ` offset. This makes `cert->srcIdx` reflect the end of parsed certificate data. This is used by `loadX509orX509REQFromBuffer` to detect where auxiliary trust data begins in trusted certificates.
---
### `src/ssl_sk.c`
- Added a `STACK_TYPE_X509_CRL` case to `wolfssl_sk_dup_data` that calls `wolfSSL_X509_CRL_dup` for deep-copying CRL stack elements. Previously, `STACK_TYPE_X509_CRL` fell through to the unsupported default case.
---
### `wolfssl/openssl/ssl.h`
- `sk_X509_dup` now maps to `wolfSSL_shallow_sk_dup` (was `wolfSSL_sk_dup`/deep copy). This matches OpenSSL's behavior where `sk_X509_dup` does a shallow copy.
- `sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup` similarly changed to `wolfSSL_shallow_sk_dup`.
---
### `src/ssl_api_cert.c`
- When `ssl->ourCert` is `NULL` and the SSL owns its cert, the function now checks if `ssl->ctx->ourCert` points to the same certificate (by comparing DER buffers). If so, it returns the ctx's `X509` pointer directly. This maintains pointer compatibility for applications (like nginx OCSP stapling) that use the `X509*` from `SSL_CTX_use_certificate` as a lookup key.
### `src/bio.c`
- When `wolfssl_file_len` returns `WOLFSSL_BAD_FILETYPE` (now returned for pipes/FIFOs), `wolfSSL_BIO_get_len` treats it as length 0 instead of propagating the error.
---
### `tests/test-maxfrag.conf` and `tests/test-maxfrag-dtls.conf`
- Removed `DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384` test entries because the ClientKeyExchange doesn't fit in the selected max fragment length.
Add full RSA-PSS (RSASSA-PSS) support to PKCS#7 SignedData
encoding and verification.
This change enables SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm to use
id-RSASSA-PSS with explicit RSASSA-PSS-params (hash, MGF1,
salt length), as required by RFC 4055 and CMS profiles.
Key changes:
- Add RSA-PSS encode and verify paths for PKCS7 SignedData
- Encode full RSASSA-PSS AlgorithmIdentifier parameters
- Decode RSA-PSS parameters from SignerInfo for verification
- Treat RSA-PSS like ECDSA (sign raw digest, not DigestInfo)
- Fix certificate signatureAlgorithm parameter length handling
- Add API test coverage for RSA-PSS SignedData
This resolves failures when using RSA-PSS signer certificates
(e.g. -173 invalid signature algorithm) and maintains backward
compatibility with RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and ECDSA.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
* add prefetch_ptr flag argument to AesEncrypt_C() and AesDecrypt_C(), and call PreFetchTe() and PreFetchSBox() only if *prefetch_ptr is zero, whereupon it is set to 1;
* when C implementations are available, add prefetch_ptr arg to wc_AesEncrypt() and wc_AesDecrypt(), and pass it through;
* in functions that directly call the AES block encryption methods, opportunistically inhibit prefetch on all but the first call;
* move AES-specific code in wc_CmacUpdate() in cmac.c to wc_local_CmacUpdateAes() in aes.c to let it use conditional prefetching;
* add WC_ARG_NOT_NULL(), WC_ARGS_NOT_NULL(), and WC_ALL_ARGS_NOT_NULL attribute abstractions.
Decapsulation needs H, hash of public key, and it is not present if you
have a new key made from a seed.
Code changed to check for and create H in decapsulate.
linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.c:
* fix straddle check in wc_reloc_normalize_text();
* fix seg_map bounds checks in wc_fips_generate_hash();
linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.h: fix initializer for wc_reloc_table_segments.bss_end;
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h: add WC_BITS_TO_BYTES() and WC_BITS_FULL_BYTES() and deploy opportunistically to wolfssl/internal.h, wolfssl/wolfcrypt/{asn.h,dh.h,rsa.h,types.h}, wolfcrypt/src/sakke.c, and wolfcrypt/test/test.c.
Add:
* linuxkm/linuxkm-fips-hash.c
* linuxkm/linuxkm-fips-hash-wrapper.sh
* linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.h
Move from linuxkm/module_hooks.c to linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.c:
* reloc_layouts[]
* find_reloc_tab_offset()
* the body of wc_linuxkm_normalize_relocations() as wc_reloc_normalize_text()
* most of updateFipsHash() as wc_fips_generate_hash()
Move from linuxkm/linuxkm_wc_port.h to linuxkm/linuxkm_memory.h:
* struct wc_linuxkm_pie_reloc_tab_ent
* enum wc_reloc_dest_segment
* enum wc_reloc_type
linuxkm/Makefile:
* Update GENERATE_RELOC_TAB recipe to populate new fields in struct wc_reloc_table_ent.
* Add targets:
* libwolfssl-user-build/src/.libs/libwolfssl.so
* linuxkm-fips-hash
* module-with-matching-fips-hash
* module-with-matching-fips-hash-no-sign
* Add support for alternate target module name, via LIBWOLFSSL_NAME make variable.
linuxkm/linuxkm_wc_port.h and linuxkm/module_hooks.c:
* Fixes to make linuxkm-pie work with CONFIG_KASAN.
* Implement WC_LINUXKM_STACK_DEBUG:
* wc_linuxkm_stack_bottom()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_top()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_current()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_left()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_hwm_prepare()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_hwm_measure_rel()
* wc_linuxkm_stack_hwm_measure_total()
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h:
* When WOLFSSL_KERNEL_MODE, make sure WOLFSSL_GENERAL_ALIGNMENT is at least SIZEOF_LONG.
* When WOLFCRYPT_FIPS_CORE_DYNAMIC_HASH_VALUE, make sure WOLFSSL_BASE16 is defined.
configure.ac and wolfcrypt/benchmark/benchmark.c: Disable scrypt when KERNEL_MODE_DEFAULTS, due to excessive memory requirements.
Eric Blankenhorn
Daniel Pouzzner
night1rider
Sameeh Jubran
Ruby Martin
Sean Parkinson
David Garske
jackctj117
JacobBarthelmeh
Juliusz Sosinowicz
aidan garske