When resuming a session wolfSSL_SetSession unconditionally
overwrote ssl->version with the version stored in the cached
session, even if that version was below the WOLFSSL's configured
minDowngrade. The overwritten version then fed straight into
SendClientHello, so a client configured to require TLS 1.2 or
higher could still emit a ClientHello advertising e.g. TLS 1.0
when resuming an old cached session. The ServerHello path catches
the actual downgrade, but the ClientHello version is already a
protocol-conformance issue and can confuse middleboxes.
Reject the session if its stored minor version is below
ssl->options.minDowngrade. The check is DTLS-aware: DTLS minor
versions decrease as the protocol version increases, so the
direction of the comparison is flipped for DTLS.
F-2105
Mostly combinations of NO_WOLFSSL_CLIENT, NO_WOLFSSL_SERVER and
WOLFSSL_NO_CLIENT_AUTH were failing.
Added configurations to CI loop.
wc_AesGcmDecryptFinal: use WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE to satisfy compiler.
The signature algorithm specified in CertificateVerify must have been in
the CertificateRequest. Add check.
The cipher suite test cases, when client auth and RSA are built-in and
use the default client certificate and use the *-ECDSA-* cipher
suites, no longer work. The client certificate must be ECC when the
cipher suite has ECDSA. Don't run them for that build.
Server only uses curves that are supported by both the client and the server. If no common groups are found, the connection will fail in TLS 1.2 and below. In TLS 1.3, HRR may still be used to resolve the group mismatch.
David Garske
JacobBarthelmeh
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Sean Parkinson
Jeremiah Mackey
Eric Blankenhorn
JeremiahM37