Address PR comments + other cleanup
Addressing PR comments
Minor change
Make sure the last line gets output as well
Add in ARIA SHA256 session to internal structure
Add in ARIA SHA384 session to internal structure
Add necessary function for ARIA to extract key
Fix unit tests
Rename HAVE_ARIAGCM to HAVE_ARIA
Move aria.* to wolfcrypt/port/aria
Separate out aria-crypt init functions
Adding in ECC+SHA callbacks
Avoid using AC_CHECK_FILE
Rename Aria to wc_Aria
Don't need special cases
Addressing PR comments
Code cleanup
C89 support
Remove TODO
Add documentation about buffer size
Clean up header files
Use ARIA_DEVID by default if available
Dummy update call to make MagicCrypto happy
Fix for detecting what algo type to use
Documentation
Use the appropriate sign/verify
Collect MagicCrypto functions together (and avoid leaks)
Fall back on other implementations on failure
Fix issue when compiling without CRYPTOCB
Addressing PR comments
Better cleanup
Addressing PR comments
Cleaner exit in case of error
Add support for:
- SM2 elliptic curve and SM2 sign/verify
- SM3 digest
- SM4 cipher with modes ECB/CBC/CTR/GCM/CCM
Add APIs for SM3 and SM4.
Add SM2 sign and verify APIs.
Add support for SM3 in wc_Hash and wc_Hmac API.
Add support for SM3 and SM4 through EVP layer.
Add support for SM2-SM3 certificates. Support key ID and name hash being
with SHA-1/256 or SM3.
Add support for TLS 1.3 cipher suites: TLS-SM4-GCM-SM3, TLS-SM4-CCM-SM3
Add support for TLS 1.2 SM cipher suite: ECDHE-ECDSA-SM4-CBC-SM3
Add support for SM3 in wc_PRF_TLS.
Add SM2-SM3 certificates and keys. Generated with GmSSL-3.0.0 and
OpenSSL.
Fix checking of negative with unsigned variables.
Check digestSz for 0 in wc_SSH_KDF() so that no possibility of dividing
by zero.
Change XMEMCPY to XMEMSET in renesas_sce_util.c.
Fix test.c to free prvTmp and pubTmp on read error.
Remove unused variables.
XFREE checks for NULL so don't check before call.
Move variable declarations to reduce scope.
We have users who need to debug errors coming out of libwolfssl in production,
where --enable-debug isn't an option. Our error queue implementation is the
solution, but our usage of WOLFSSL_ERROR isn't consistent. This commit greatly
expands our usage of WOLFSSL_ERROR. There are too many error cases to tackle
all at once, and not all error cases are particularly meaningful or likely to be
hit in regular operation of the library. I've tried to focus on errors that
users are likely to hit, and I've chosen to ignore things like the mountain of
BUFFER_E and BAD_FUNC_ARG cases (for the most part). I've also tried to expand
WOLFSSL_ERROR usage in files where we haven't been using it historically
(e.g. aes.c), so the pattern is now there for other developers to follow. In
order to prevent these additions from exploding the size of libwolfssl, they're
all behind a new macro, WOLFSSL_ERROR_VERBOSE. If WOLFSSL_VERBOSE_ERRORS is
defined, WOLFSSL_ERROR_VERBOSE just maps to WOLFSSL_ERROR.
Add a define WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO to turn on code that checks that
memory that must be zeroized before going out of use is zero.
Everytime sensitive data is put into a allocated buffer or stack buffer;
the address, its length and a name is stored to be checked later.
Where the stack buffer is about to go out of use, a call is added to
check that the required parts are zero.
wc_MemZero_Add() adds an address with length and name to a table of
addressed to be checked later.
wc_MemZero_Check() checks that the memory associated with the address is
zeroized where required.
mp_memzero_add() adds mp_int's data pointer with length and name to
table.
mp_memzero_check() checks that the data pointer is zeroized where
required.
Freeing memory will check the address. The length was prepended on
allocation.
Realloction was changed for WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO to perform an
allocate, check, copy, free.
This commit implements the core of the header parsing, building, and the sending
and receiving routines that handle fragmentation and defragmentation.
* In DTLSv1.3 the header used for protected messages is a variable-length header,
and it is described RFC9147 Section 4.
* Fragmentation happens after building the full message, if necessary. If the
underlying I/O can't send a fragment because of a WANT_WRITE error, the sending
of fragments will continue in the next invocation of
wolfSSL_connect/wolfSSL_accept/wolfSSL_write. In this case the message is saved
in a buffer inside the WolfSSL object.
* Defragmentation works like DTLSv1.2 defragmentation, and re-use
most of the same code.
* The Dtls13AddHeaders() function does not add the record layer header, but it
lefts space for it. It is eventually placed by BuildTls13Message() to allow
easier management of sequence numbers.
Testing:
./autogen.sh
./configure --enable-psk
make all check
$ ./examples/server/server -j -l ECDHE-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
SSL version is TLSv1.2
SSL cipher suite is TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
SSL curve name is SECP256R1
Client message: hello wolfssl!
$ ./examples/client/client -s -l ECDHE-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
SSL version is TLSv1.2
SSL cipher suite is TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
SSL curve name is SECP256R1
I hear you fa shizzle!
- Define `OPENSSL_COMPATIBLE_DEFAULTS` and `WOLFSSL_NO_OCSP_ISSUER_CHECK` for Apache config
- Fix `SSL_set_timeout` to match OpenSSL signature
- Implement `pkey` in `X509_INFO`
- Detect attempt to connect with plain HTTP
- Implement `wolfSSL_OCSP_request_add1_nonce`
- Set `ssl->cipher.bits` when calling `wolfSSL_get_current_cipher`
- Use custom flush method in `wolfSSL_BIO_flush` when set in BIO method
- Set the TLS version options in the `ssl->options` at the end of ClientHello parsing
- Don't modify the `ssl->version` when in a handshake (`ssl->msgsReceived.got_client_hello` is set)
- `wolfSSL_get_shutdown` returns a full bidirectional return when the SSL object is cleared. `wolfSSL_get_shutdown` calls `wolfSSL_clear` on a successful shutdown so if we detect a cleared SSL object, assume full shutdown was performed.
* Remove NTRU and OQS
* Keep the DTLS serialization format backwards compatible.
* Remove n from mygetopt_long() call.
* Fix over-zealous deletion.
* Resolve problems found by @SparkiDev
- Hash of fragmented certificate was not calculated as a single message and instead we were hashing individual fragments which produced the wrong digest, shared secret, etc...
- Reset handshake number after server Finished packet is sent or received (depending on side)
- Reserve space in buffer for cipher stuff
- Take `DTLS_RECORD_EXTRA` and `DTLS_HANDSHAKE_EXTRA` into size and offset calculations for DTLS path
- Fix renegotiation in DTLS with AES128-SHA
- Fix renegotiation in DTLS with AES-GCM
- Support HelloVerify request during secure renegotiation
- Save renegotiation handshake messages for retransmission in timeout
- Handle cipher parameters from different epochs. DTLS may need to resend and receive messages from previous epochs so handling different sets of encryption and decryption parameters is crucial.
Added PRIVATE_D version of rsa private key operation for SP
implementation for specific platforms.
WC_NO_RNG results in warnings when RNG calls don't do anything.
Added ifdef checks for variables not used otherwise.
Remove superfluous if statements like when checking ret == 0.
Change names of globals that are generic and are used locally before
global definition.
Remove definition of variable len that isn't used except as a
replacement for sz which is parameter.
Don't subtract two variables when one has just been assigned the value
of the other.
Fix shifting of signed value.
Fix parameter checking in aes.c and des3.c for platform specific code.
Hideki Miyazaki
Andras Fekete
Sean Parkinson
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Jacob Barthelmeh
Anthony Hu
Stefan Eissing
Hayden Roche
David Garske
Eric Blankenhorn
Marco Oliverio
Daniel Pouzzner
TakayukiMatsuo
Anthony Hu
toddouska
Tesfa Mael
Chris Conlon