SSL_CIPHER_get_name returns the internal cipher name (PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256)
instead of the IANA name when WOLFSSL_CIPHER_INTERNALNAME, NO_ERROR_STRINGS or
WOLFSSL_QT is defined. user_settings_all.h with the compatibility layer enables
WOLFSSL_QT, so the test failed in the 'make user_setting.h (with sed)' job.
Match the expected name to the build configuration, mirroring the existing
pattern used elsewhere in tests/api.c.
RFC 9147 Section 8's 2^48-1 epoch ceiling is a sender-only rule; the same
paragraph says receiving implementations MUST NOT enforce it. The KeyUpdate
receive path was rejecting a peer epoch that crossed 2^48-1, violating that.
Guard only the genuine wrap-to-zero (Section 4.2.1) and let the receiving
epoch advance past 2^48-1. The sender-side gates are unchanged.
uclient-fetch intermittently returns 4 ("connection reset prematurely") instead of 5: with ML-KEM enabled by default the larger ClientHello is sometimes reset by the server before the cert is evaluated. Accept either on all four negative tests as a band-aid.
The TLS 1.2 client only compared the ServerHello suite against the
cached session suite for session-ID resumption; ticket resumption was
skipped on the assumption the suite is bound in the ticket. But the
ticket is opaque to the client, so it must enforce the match itself -
otherwise a server could resume a ticket under a different (weaker)
suite the client offered and the downgrade would go undetected
(RFC 5246 7.4.1.3).
The check is skipped only when the client retained no suite for the
session (cipherSuite0/cipherSuite both zero), so there is nothing to
compare against - as for EAP-FAST, whose PAC is a TLS ticket whose keys
come from the session-secret callback and which never populates the
cached suite. (0,0) is TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, never negotiated, so it
unambiguously means "no retained suite". The EMS check remains
ticket-gated.
Add memio regression tests: a ticket resumption under a different
(retained) suite is rejected with MATCH_SUITE_ERROR, and a resumption
whose cached suite was not retained still succeeds.
- ProcessUserChain: enforce MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH after a cert is parsed, so a
full-depth chain followed by trailing data still loads instead of failing
with MAX_CHAIN_ERROR.
- SendCertificateStatus: error on an over-long OCSP chain instead of silently
truncating the stapled response; keep the chainOcspRequest[] index bound.
- wc_PKCS7_DecodeAuthEnvelopedData: bounds-check the authTag tag read under
NO_PKCS7_STREAM.
- Tests: chain-depth test now pins the boundary (exactly MAX_CHAIN_DEPTH loads,
one more rejected).
wolfcrypt/src/wc_port.c: fix several missed refactors to WC_ATOMIC_[U]INT_ARG.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_port.h:
* harmonize the return type of WOLFSSL_ATOMIC_STORE() (always void).
* fix MSVC WOLFSSL_ATOMIC_LOAD() and _STORE() with correct atomic semantics, and add gating on USE_WINDOWS_API.
Extend test_tls13_apis with negative-count assertions for
wolfSSL_CTX_set_groups and wolfSSL_set_groups, and NULL-groups
assertions for wolfSSL_CTX_set1_groups and wolfSSL_set1_groups
(tests/api/test_tls13.c).
Add test_wolfSSL_get_shared_ciphers covering NULL ssl, NULL buf, and
zero-length inputs (tests/api/test_tls.c).
Add count < 0 validation to wolfSSL_CTX_set_groups and wolfSSL_set_groups
(src/tls.c) to prevent negative count from bypassing the upper-bound check
and corrupting numGroups via byte truncation.
Widen count == 0 to count <= 0 and add NULL groups check in
wolfSSL_CTX_set1_groups and wolfSSL_set1_groups (src/ssl.c).
Add NULL buf and NULL cipher checks in wolfSSL_get_shared_ciphers to
prevent NULL pointer dereference.
In the WOLFSSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION refusal path, WOLFSSL_LEAVE logged a
hard-coded 0 while the function actually returned SendAlert()'s result.
Capture the return value first so the trace reflects reality (e.g. when
SendAlert fails due to write backpressure) and return it.
The cipher property helpers (SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid / get_auth_nid /
get_cipher_nid / get_digest_nid / is_aead) parse the cipher name looked
up via cipher->offset in GetCipherSegment(). That offset is only
populated when the cipher is obtained through wolfSSL_get_ciphers_compat()
(SSL_get_ciphers()). When the cipher comes from SSL_get_current_cipher(),
offset is left at 0, so these helpers parsed cipher_names[0] (a TLS 1.3
suite) instead of the negotiated cipher - e.g. returning NID_kx_any for a
plain PSK suite while SSL_CIPHER_get_name() (which uses the suite bytes)
reported the correct name.
Resolve the cipher_names entry from the always-populated suite bytes in
GetCipherSegment(), falling back to cipher->offset when no match is found.
Also add the missing plain "PSK" -> NID_kx_psk entry to the kx lookup
table so PSK suites report NID_kx_psk instead of NID_undef.
Add a regression test that drives the SSL_get_current_cipher() path for
TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and checks all five property helpers.
Daniel Pouzzner
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Sean Parkinson
David Garske
Hideki Miyazaki
Ruby Martin
Eric Blankenhorn
Thomas Cook
jordan
Colton Willey
Josh Holtrop
Tobias Frauenschläger
Kareem