- x509_str: require CA:TRUE unconditionally in wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert;
verify leaf signature even when verify_cb overrides INVALID_CA
- x509_str: align WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA with OpenSSL value (79)
so OPENSSL_COEXIST builds compile; bump WC_OSSL_V509_V_ERR_MAX to 80
and extend error_test() missing-value table for the new gaps
- asn: reject embedded NUL in dNSName / rfc822Name / URI SAN entries
- internal: re-verify restored ticket peer cert against trust store with
CRL/OCSP checks; clear stale state from session cache on verification
failure
- ticket: bind SNI and ALPN into session ticket via compile-time selected
hash (TICKET_BINDING_HASH_TYPE); reject resumption on mismatch in both
TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2 paths
- ticket: defer SNI/ALPN binding check until after extensions are parsed
by consolidating into VerifyTicketBinding(), called once after
ALPN_Select in DoTls13ClientHello and DoClientHello; the early
per-call sites ran before extensions were parsed and rejected valid
resumptions in nginx, haproxy, grpc, and CPython integration tests
- ssl_sess: free previous session in wolfSSL_d2i_SSL_SESSION before
overwrite
- examples/client: increase SESSION_TICKET_LEN fallback from 256 to 2048
to support larger tickets
- tests: update SAN NUL fixtures and add parse-time rejection coverage;
add test_tls13_ticket_peer_cert_reverify for CA-removal scenario; skip
it under WOLFSSL_NO_DEF_TICKET_ENC_CB
Add full RSA-PSS (RSASSA-PSS) support to PKCS#7 SignedData
encoding and verification.
This change enables SignerInfo.signatureAlgorithm to use
id-RSASSA-PSS with explicit RSASSA-PSS-params (hash, MGF1,
salt length), as required by RFC 4055 and CMS profiles.
Key changes:
- Add RSA-PSS encode and verify paths for PKCS7 SignedData
- Encode full RSASSA-PSS AlgorithmIdentifier parameters
- Decode RSA-PSS parameters from SignerInfo for verification
- Treat RSA-PSS like ECDSA (sign raw digest, not DigestInfo)
- Fix certificate signatureAlgorithm parameter length handling
- Add API test coverage for RSA-PSS SignedData
This resolves failures when using RSA-PSS signer certificates
(e.g. -173 invalid signature algorithm) and maintains backward
compatibility with RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 and ECDSA.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
Sean Parkinson
David Garske
jordan
Chris Conlon
Juliusz Sosinowicz
jackctj117
Eric Blankenhorn
Sameeh Jubran
JacobBarthelmeh
Marco Oliverio
Josh Holtrop
Koji Takeda