Replace the liboqs-based pre-standardization SPHINCS+ implementation
with the native FIPS 205 SLH-DSA implementation across the
certificate / ASN.1 / X.509 layers, and add SLH-DSA-rooted test
certificates plus TLS 1.3 .conf scenarios that exercise the new
verification path. All liboqs SPHINCS+ code is removed.
This enables SLH-DSA for certificate chain authentication: CA
certificates signed with SLH-DSA, certificate signature verification
against an SLH-DSA root. TLS 1.3 entity authentication via
CertificateVerify with SLH-DSA will be added in a follow-up PR.
Follows RFC 9909 (X.509 Algorithm Identifiers for SLH-DSA) and
NIST FIPS 205. Supports both SHAKE and SHA-2 parameter families
across all twelve standardized variants.
DER codec:
- New PrivateKeyDecode, PublicKeyDecode, KeyToDer, PrivateKeyToDer,
PublicKeyToDer with RFC 9909 encoding (bare OCTET STRING containing
4*n raw bytes = SK.seed || SK.prf || PK.seed || PK.root, no nested
wrapper). OID auto-detection across all twelve SHAKE / SHA-2 variants.
- PublicKeyDecode raw-bytes fast path mirrors wc_Falcon_PublicKeyDecode
and wc_Dilithium_PublicKeyDecode so callers (notably
wolfssl_x509_make_der and ConfirmSignature, which pass the raw
BIT STRING contents stashed by StoreKey) decode correctly. Honours
the caller's *inOutIdx start offset.
- Error paths in Private/PublicKeyDecode preserve params/flags/
inOutIdx and only ForceZero the buffer half each helper actually
writes; skip the wipe entirely on BAD_LENGTH_E (no bytes touched).
- ImportPublic uses |= on flags so a Private-then-Public import
sequence retains FLAG_PRIVATE.
OID dispatch:
- 12 standardized NIST OIDs (6 SHAKE + 6 SHA-2) per RFC 9909. The
pre-standardization OID-collision mechanism is removed since NIST
OIDs do not collide.
- wc_SlhDsaOidToParam / wc_SlhDsaOidToCertType return NOT_COMPILED_IN
(rather than -1) for recognised SLH-DSA OIDs whose parameter set
isn't built; wc_IsSlhDsaOid recognises both. The x509 dispatch
surfaces this as a precise diagnostic instead of the generic
"No public key found".
- wc_GetKeyOID picks a placeholder parameter from whatever variant is
compiled in and #errors at compile time if none is.
- asn_orig.c EncodeCert / EncodeCertReq accept SHA-2 SLH-DSA keyTypes
alongside SHAKE.
Tests and fixtures:
- Test cert chain in certs/slhdsa/: SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128s and
SLH-DSA-SHA2-128s self-signed roots that sign reused ML-DSA-44
entity keys (server + client), plus the gen script
(gen-slhdsa-mldsa-certs.sh, OpenSSL >= 3.5).
- New TLS 1.3 .conf scenarios under tests/suites.c dispatch:
test-tls13-slhdsa-shake.conf, test-tls13-slhdsa-sha2.conf, and a
wrong-CA negative test test-tls13-slhdsa-fail.conf.
- DER round-trip and on-disk decode tests; bench_slhdsa_*_key.der
fixtures regenerated with wolfSSL's own encoder so the codec is
pinned to RFC 9909.
- New unit test test_wc_slhdsa_x509_i2d_roundtrip exercises the raw
PublicKeyDecode entry point that wolfssl_x509_make_der relies on.
- test_wc_slhdsa_check_key now tests both Public-then-Private and
Private-then-Public import orderings.
Build / ABI:
- DYNAMIC_TYPE_SPHINCS = 98 kept as RESERVED with a tombstone comment
for ABI stability; new code should use DYNAMIC_TYPE_SLHDSA (107).
- All build system / IDE project files updated; SPHINCS+ sources,
headers, and test data removed.
- Dead bench_slhdsa_*_key arrays removed from gencertbuf.pl and
certs_test.h; the .der files on disk drive the decode tests.
.github/workflows/pq-all.yml: for the --enable-sp-math scenario, --disable-quic (QUIC unit tests fail on that combo);
wolfcrypt/test/test.c: add WC_MAYBE_UNUSED to ecdsa_test_deterministic_k_rs(), to fix armel sp-math build.
Add SRAM PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) support to wolfCrypt. Derives device-unique cryptographic keys from the power-on state of SRAM memory using a BCH(127,64,t=10) fuzzy extractor with HKDF key derivation.
- **wolfCrypt PUF API** (`wolfcrypt/src/puf.c`, `wolfssl/wolfcrypt/puf.h`)
- `wc_PufInit`, `wc_PufReadSram`, `wc_PufEnroll`, `wc_PufReconstruct`
- `wc_PufDeriveKey` (HKDF-SHA256), `wc_PufGetIdentity` (SHA-256 device fingerprint)
- `wc_PufZeroize` (secure context cleanup)
- `wc_PufSetTestData` (synthetic SRAM for testing without hardware)
- **BCH(127,64,t=10) error-correcting codec** - corrects up to 10 bit flips per 127-bit codeword across 16 codewords
- **`WC_PUF_SHA3` build option** - select SHA3-256 instead of SHA-256 for identity hash and HKDF (default: SHA-256)
- **Precomputed GF(2^7) tables** - `const` arrays in `.rodata` (no runtime init, thread-safe, flash-resident on embedded)
- `./configure --enable-puf` (auto-enables HKDF dependency)
- CMake: `WOLFSSL_PUF=yes`
- `WOLFSSL_USER_SETTINGS`: define `WOLFSSL_PUF` and `WOLFSSL_PUF_SRAM`
- See wolfssl-examples/puf for example implementation on STM32 NUCLEO-H563ZI (Cortex-M33, STM32H563ZI)
- Supports test mode (synthetic SRAM)
- Builds to ~13KB `.elf`
- Tested on NUCLEO-H563ZI: enrollment, noisy reconstruction, key derivation all pass
- `.github/workflows/puf.yml`: host build + test workflow for PUF feature
- Doxygen API docs for all 8 public functions
- PUF group added to `doxygen_groups.h`
Follow-up to #7731 ("Changes needed for default TLS support in zephyr
kernel"). Zephyr 4.3's TLS socket integration uses three additional
wolfSSL features that were not needed by the 3.7 integration, plus an
extension to the native_sim time-source gates introduced in #7731.
native_sim timer gates (src/internal.c, wolfcrypt/src/wc_port.c):
Extend the !CONFIG_BOARD_NATIVE_POSIX gate in LowResTimer() and the
CONFIG_BOARD_NATIVE_POSIX RTC path in z_time() to also cover
CONFIG_BOARD_NATIVE_SIM. Zephyr 4.3 renamed the simulator board from
native_posix to native_sim; without this, k_cpu_idle() on native_sim
advances simulated time during DTLS retransmit loops and the RTC path
falls through to uptime-since-boot. Behavior on native_posix is
unchanged.
New Kconfig options (zephyr/Kconfig, zephyr/user_settings.h):
CONFIG_WOLFSSL_SESSION_EXPORT -> HAVE_EXT_CACHE
Required by consumers that serialize TLS session state across
connections via wolfSSL_i2d_SSL_SESSION / wolfSSL_d2i_SSL_SESSION.
CONFIG_WOLFSSL_KEEP_PEER_CERT -> KEEP_PEER_CERT
Retain the peer certificate after handshake so the application
layer can inspect it via wolfSSL_get_peer_certificate.
CONFIG_WOLFSSL_ALWAYS_VERIFY_CB -> WOLFSSL_ALWAYS_VERIFY_CB
Invoke an application-set verify callback on successful chain
validation in addition to validation failures.
All three are default-off; customers opt in the same way they do for
the existing CONFIG_WOLFSSL_DTLS / ALPN / PSK feature options.
.wolfssl_known_macro_extras: register HAVE_EXT_CACHE.
Two follow-ups raised by Copilot review on PR #10247:
src/pk_rsa.c: Make derAllocSz a word32 instead of int and only assign
it after a successful XMALLOC, so the cleanup path can never call
ForceZero with a wrapped-around size derived from a negative derSz.
src/pk.c: Capture allocSz at the XMALLOC call site (and clear it back
to 0 on allocation failure) so the relationship between the buffer
allocation and the recorded size is explicit and cannot drift if the
surrounding control flow changes.
When WOLF_CRYPTO_CB_AES_SETKEY is enabled and a CryptoCB callback
imports the AES key into a Secure Element (aes->devCtx != NULL), the
TLS-layer copy in keys->{client,server}_write_key has no further
consumer: the software key schedule is not populated on offload.
ForceZero it in SetKeysSide() per provisioned side.
The static IVs (keys->{client,server}_write_IV and
keys->aead_{enc,dec}_imp_IV) are left intact because BuildTls13Nonce()
reads aead_{enc,dec}_imp_IV on every record (RFC 8446 Section 5.3).
Scope: TLS 1.3, non-DTLS, non-QUIC. DTLS 1.3 needs the write keys
in Dtls13EpochCopyKeys; TLS 1.2 needs them for rehandshake; QUIC is
untouched pending audit.
Add two memio tests (test_wc_CryptoCb_Tls13_Key_{Zero_After_Offload,
No_Zero_Without_Offload}) that pin AES-GCM and check key / IV state
after the handshake and a KeyUpdate round.
Signed-off-by: Sameeh Jubran <sameeh@wolfssl.com>
F-2148
The prior fix zeroed the computed DER staging area, but PEM output from
wc_DerToPemEx fills most of the buffer and overlaps that region,
corrupting the valid PEM. Preserve the allocation size and zero only
the bytes beyond the actual PEM length, or the whole buffer on failure.
F-2148
pem_write_mem_pkcs8privatekey stages the PKCS#8 DER encoded private key
at the tail of the PEM buffer, then writes the shorter PEM output at
the head of the same buffer. The DER tail is not overwritten, leaking
the plaintext private key to heap memory after the callers free. Zero
the DER staging area before returning.
Daniel Pouzzner
JacobBarthelmeh
Tobias Frauenschläger
David Garske
Eric Blankenhorn
kaleb-himes
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Sean Parkinson
Kareem
Roy Carter
Mattia Moffa
Colton Willey
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Lealem Amedie
Sameeh Jubran
Anthony Hu