wolfssl/ssl.h, wolfssl/error-ssl.h, wolfssl/wolfcrypt/error-crypt.h, wolfcrypt/src/error.c, and src/internal.c:
* fix values of WOLFSSL_ERROR_SSL and WOLFSSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP to match OpenSSL values;
* move legacy CyaSSL compat layer error codes from ssl.h to error-ssl.h and renumber them to conform to existing sequence;
* move enum IOerrors from ssl.h to error-ssl.h to get picked up by support/gen-debug-trace-error-codes.sh;
* add to enum wolfSSL_ErrorCodes negative counterparts for several positive error return constants;
* include error-ssl.h from ssl.h;
* add label (wolfCrypt_ErrorCodes) to error-crypt.h enum, and in wc_GetErrorString(), use switch ((enum wolfCrypt_ErrorCodes)error) to activate switch warnings for missing enums;
* in wolfSSL_ERR_reason_error_string(), use switch((enum wolfSSL_ErrorCodes)error) to activate switch warnings for missing enums;
* in ssl.h, add special-case WOLFSSL_DEBUG_TRACE_ERROR_CODES macros for WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
* in error-crypt.h, add missing WOLFSSL_API attribute to wc_backtrace_render(); and
* harmonize gating of error codes, ssl.h / error-ssl.h / internal.c:wolfSSL_ERR_reason_error_string() / api.c:error_test().
tests/api.c:
* add error_test() adapted from wolfcrypt/test/test.c, checking all error strings for expected presence/absence and length, called from existing test_wolfSSL_ERR_strings().
* in post_auth_version_client_cb(), add missing !NO_ERROR_STRINGS gating.
add numerous WC_NO_ERR_TRACE()s to operand error code uses, cleaning up error traces in general, and particularly when WOLFSSL_DEBUG_TRACE_ERROR_CODES_ALWAYS.
* crypto lib (36),
* crypto test&benchmark (20),
* TLS lib (179),
* examples (122),
* linuxkm (3),
* tests/api.c (2272).
tests/api.c: add error_test() adapted from wolfcrypt/test/test.c, checking all error strings for expected presence/absence and length, called from existing test_wolfSSL_ERR_strings().
wolfssl/ssl.h, wolfssl/error-ssl.h, and wolfssl/wolfcrypt/error-crypt.h:
* move several negative error return codes from ssl.h to error-ssl.h,
* renumber them to conform to existing sequence, and
* include error-ssl.h from ssl.h;
* add special-case WOLFSSL_DEBUG_TRACE_ERROR_CODES macros for WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
* add missing WOLFSSL_API attribute to wc_backtrace_render().
add numerous WC_NO_ERR_TRACE()s to operand error code uses, cleaning up error traces in general, and particularly when WOLFSSL_DEBUG_TRACE_ERROR_CODES_ALWAYS.
* crypto lib (36),
* crypto test&benchmark (20),
* TLS lib (179),
* examples (122),
* linuxkm (3),
* tests/api.c (2272).
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/error-crypt.h: add WC_FIRST_E.
wolfcrypt/src/error.c: add MP error code strings.
wolfssl/error-ssl.h: add WOLFSSL_FIRST_E and WOLFSSL_LAST_E.
wolfcrypt/test/test.c: update error_test() for new error code layout, refactoring the "missing" check.
src/internal.c: use WC_FIRST_E and WC_LAST_E in wolfSSL_ERR_reason_error_string().
src/ssl.c: fix wolfSSL_ERR_GET_REASON() to identify in-range error codes using WC_FIRST_E, WC_LAST_E, WOLFSSL_FIRST_E, and WOLFSSL_LAST_E.
sp_int.h: provide for WOLFSSL_DEBUG_TRACE_ERROR_CODES, and refactor MP error codes as enums, for consistency with other error codes.
wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c: fix 2 identicalInnerCondition's.
With --enable-dtlscid, a client sending a Client Hello to a DLTS1.2
server that supports CID, the server provides the appropriate CID and
assumes that CID has been negotiated.
However, in the case of MbedTLS, it then rejects packets that do not
match its expected CID from the client - as wolfSSL no longer sends
the CID as it is not DTLS1.2.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9147#section-4
If a Connection ID is negotiated, then it MUST be contained in all datagrams.
This fix drops the CID if a Hello Verify Request is received, so the
second Client Hello does not include the CID.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6347#section-4.2.1
When responding to a HelloVerifyRequest, the client MUST use the same
parameter values (version, random, session_id, cipher_suites,
compression_method) as it did in the original ClientHello.
Dropping the CID extension does not violate this.
If the server sends Server Hello, Server Key Exchange and Server Hello Done
in a single DTLS packet, but for DTLS1.2 in response to a client DTLS1.3
request, then FIRST_REPLAY state does not occur until the server re-sends
the packet. At this point wolfSSLconnect() gets used and all bursts into
life.
When processing handshakes in wolfSSL_connect_TLSv13() for case
HELLO_AGAIN_REPLY, downgrade to using wolfSSLconnect() to continue
processing the remaining handshakes in the packet.
Found when using Mbed TLS for the server.
