The client's resumed-session EMS (F-5807) and cipher-suite (F-5811) checks
were enforced in CompleteServerHello at ServerHello-parse time. For stateless
ticket resumption the client sends an empty session ID and cannot yet tell
whether the server accepted the ticket (RFC 5077 3.4): a server that declines
the ticket falls back to a full handshake under a freshly negotiated
suite/EMS state, which these checks wrongly aborted with MATCH_SUITE_ERROR,
breaking the RFC 5077 ticket-decline fallback to a full handshake.
Move both checks into CheckResumptionConsistency and run it only once
resumption is confirmed - from whichever the server sends first in the
abbreviated flight: a renewed NewSessionTicket (before SetupSession refreshes
the cached suite/EMS to the current values) or its ChangeCipherSpec. By then
the "Not resuming as thought" path has cleared 'resuming' for any ticket
decline, so the full-handshake fallback proceeds.
Add test_tls12_resume_ticket_decline_fallback (ticket declined by a fresh
server CTX, full handshake under a different suite must succeed) and gate
test_tls12_resume_ticket_wrong_suite on WOLFSSL_NO_DEF_TICKET_ENC_CB so it
skips rather than fails in builds without the default ticket encryption
callback.
Address review on PR #10582:
- The client-side extended_master_secret consistency check skipped all
session-ticket resumptions, leaving a generic ticket resumption open to
an undetected EMS downgrade by a malicious server or MITM. The client
retains the EMS state for ticket sessions too (SetupSession), so the
check now applies to ticket resumption as well, mirroring the adjacent
cipher-suite check. Only EAP-FAST style resumption - where the
session-secret callback supplies the master secret for an opaque PAC
ticket - is exempt, matched precisely via ssl->sessionSecretCb just as
the callback invocation in DoServerHello does.
- Add test_tls_ems_resumption_server_downgrade, exercising the
client-direction downgrade (server resumes but omits EMS from its
ServerHello) for both session-ID and session-ticket resumption. This
client-side branch previously had no test coverage.
The TLS 1.2 client only compared the ServerHello suite against the
cached session suite for session-ID resumption; ticket resumption was
skipped on the assumption the suite is bound in the ticket. But the
ticket is opaque to the client, so it must enforce the match itself -
otherwise a server could resume a ticket under a different (weaker)
suite the client offered and the downgrade would go undetected
(RFC 5246 7.4.1.3).
The check is skipped only when the client retained no suite for the
session (cipherSuite0/cipherSuite both zero), so there is nothing to
compare against - as for EAP-FAST, whose PAC is a TLS ticket whose keys
come from the session-secret callback and which never populates the
cached suite. (0,0) is TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL, never negotiated, so it
unambiguously means "no retained suite". The EMS check remains
ticket-gated.
Add memio regression tests: a ticket resumption under a different
(retained) suite is rejected with MATCH_SUITE_ERROR, and a resumption
whose cached suite was not retained still succeeds.
The documented 'reject peer-initiated renegotiation' option was accepted and
stored but never consulted. Now DoHelloRequest replies with a no_renegotiation
warning instead of starting SCR when the bit is set (client side), and the
server refuses a renegotiation ClientHello with a no_renegotiation warning
instead of resetting handshake state.
Extend test_wolfSSL_RSA_verify and test_wolfSSL_RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS
with negative cases that flip a byte in the signature/encoding and in the
hash, asserting verification fails. This guards the XMEMCMP-based signature
acceptance decision in wolfSSL_RSA_verify_mgf against regressions that would
let any decryption result of matching length pass as valid.
Change to ignore plaintext alerts when
WOLFSSL_TLS13_IGNORE_PT_ALERT_ON_ENC is defined only until first
encrypted message from peer is seen.
Negative testing added.
Leak fixes: free existing ssl->buffers.key before overwriting in SetSSL_CTX() (internal.c) and wolfSSL_set_SSL_CTX() (ssl.c)
UAF fix: wc_CheckRsaKey() — mp_memzero_check(tmp) moved before the free (rsa.c)
Build guards: #ifndef NO_ED25519/ED448_VERIFY around forged-sig test data (test_ed25519/ed448.c); guard equal()/cmov() for verify-only builds (ge_operations.c); guard unused pointers under WOLFSSL_MLDSA_SIGN_SMALL_MEM_PRECALC (wc_mldsa.c)
Test cleanups (test.c): fix UB from out-of-range enum in hash_test(), always free AES dec object, fix der buffer declaration under small-stack builds
Removed WOLFSSL_PSK_ID_PROTECTION from use as it is now on by default.
Always check whether the server has a certificate (not a CA chain).
If there is a certificate then continue, otherwise, report a binder
error.
Added test to ensure binder error returned and alert sent when no
NO_CERT. test_tls13_bad_psk_binder already tested no certificate.
Allowed memio test harness to be built when NO_CERT is defined.
F-1379
Better handling of the lazy mutex initialization to use atomics where
available.
Improved atomic code when no system support:
- add types
- used types in functions
Add --no-ec to unit.test to not run wolfCrypt tests.
1. Side-aware ML-KEM in TLS (tls.c, tls13.c, ssl.c, internal.h):
TLSX_IsGroupSupported/TLSX_UseSupportedCurve take a `side` arg; new
TLSX_IsMlKemGroupSupported + client/server support macros. A build only
capable of one ML-KEM op no longer advertises groups it can't use for
its role.
2. NO_ASN_TIME support (ssl_asn1.c, ssl.h, settings.h): data-only
ASN1_TIME APIs now compile without system time; OCSP responder
auto-disabled under NO_ASN_TIME.
3. SP ECC (sp_*.c, sp_x86_64_asm.asm): curve `b` constants and
sp_ecc_is_point_* always compiled (point-check available in more
configs); asm movsxd -> movsx.
4. configure.ac: BUILD_MEMUSE fixed to trigger on != "xno".
5. Test fixes: HRR-aware TLS 1.3 memio tests (new
test_memio_msg_is_hello_retry_request); tightened build guards
(Ed25519/Ed448 key-import, AES decrypt, XMSS heights, SP sizes,
static-PSK).
WOLFSSL_FAILURE is 0, which equals X509_V_OK, so a NULL ssl was
indistinguishable from successful verification under the standard
"SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) \!= X509_V_OK" idiom. Return
WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION (50, matching the OpenSSL
compat value) instead, and add it to the X509 verify-error enum.
* don't disable URI validation when defined(WOLFSSL_FPKI).
* return immediately with ASN_ALT_NAME_E when URI contains an unexpected '/', as in asn_orig.c DecodeAltNames(), fixing OOB read defect.
wolfcrypt/src/asn_orig.c: fix URI validation gating (ignore WOLFSSL_FPKI) in DecodeAltNames().
tests/api/test_certman.c: fix uriSan in test_wolfSSL_X509_check_host_URI_SAN_not_DNS_match() (make it a URI).
tests/api.c: align gating in test_wolfSSL_URI() with new dynamics (URIs validated regardless of defined(WOLFSSL_FPKI)).
authorized any responder issued by an ancestor of the target's issuer;
RFC 6960 4.2.2.2 requires direct issuance by the CA identified in the
request.
- Remove CheckOcspResponderChain() and WOLFSSL_NO_OCSP_ISSUER_CHAIN_CHECK.
- Drop now-unused vp parameter from CheckOcspResponder() and the
OcspRespCheck() helper; cascade through template and non-template
paths.
OCSP test blobs:
- Re-sign resp_server1_cert with intermediate1-ca (CA-direct path).
- Add resp_server1_cert_ancestor_responder for the negative test.
- Embed server1_cert_pem[] in test_ocsp_test_blobs.h so the new test
runs under NO_FILESYSTEM; matching entry added to
create_ocsp_test_blobs.py.
- Regenerate response[] in test_certman.c with intermediate1-ca as
signer; recipe switched from Wireshark export to openssl -respout
+ xxd -i for reproducibility.
- Fix self-XOR in test_wolfSSL_CertManagerCheckOCSPResponse so the
serial byte actually flips (^= 0xFF).
Live OCSP coverage:
- Add ocsp-responder-int1 (delegated responder issued directly by
intermediate1-ca, with id-kp-OCSPSigning EKU) for the
responder->intermediate->root chain.
- scripts/ocsp-stapling.test: intermediate1 responder switched to
ocsp-responder-int1 (delegated path).
- scripts/ocsp-stapling2.test, scripts/ocsp-stapling_tls13multi.test:
intermediate2 and intermediate3 sign their OCSP responses with
their own CA keys (CA-direct path); root block unchanged
(ocsp-responder-cert is still RFC-compliant for root-issued certs).
- .github/workflows/ocsp.yml: server1 OCSP responder switched to
ocsp-responder-int1 to match the cert chain.
- New test_ocsp_ancestor_responder_rejected confirms the
ancestor-issued response is rejected with OCSP_LOOKUP_FAIL.
1. BasicConstraints pathLenConstraint absent vs. 0 —
get_ext_d2i/set_ext/V3_EXT_d2i now distinguish "no constraint" from 0
per RFC 5280 §4.2.1.9, using the existing basicConstPlSet flag.
2. GENERAL_NAME_print GEN_DIRNAME — added missing return-value
normalization so the directory name is actually printed (was emitting
only DirName:).
3. GENERAL_NAME_print GEN_DNS — use ASN1_STRING_print like the EMAIL/URI
cases, avoiding NULL-strData deref and NUL-truncation.
4. X509_print BasicConstraints — print , pathlen:N to match OpenSSL.
5. X509_print Extended Key Usage — print Any Extended Key Usage (was
omitted).
6. get_ext_d2i CRL_DIST_OID double-free — null gn immediately after
ownership transfers to dp, so an error from the next push doesn't free
it twice.
7. X509V3_EXT_print SAN truncation/failure — match XSNPRINTF size cap to
the allocation; was truncating at indent==1 and failing at indent>=2.
8. X509V3_EXT_print AUTH_KEY/SUBJ_KEY NULL deref — NULL-check
i2s_ASN1_STRING return before passing to %s.
9. X509_add_ext SAN type confusion — reject DIRNAME/RID/X400/EDIPARTY;
only the ASN1_STRING*-backed types are read via gn->d.ia5. Was
performing a wild-pointer XMEMCPY in add_altname_ex.
Also: extracted the SAN and WOLFSSL_CUSTOM_OID arms of X509_add_ext into
static helpers (behavior-preserving).
Regression tests added for #1–5 and #9; existing GENERAL_NAME_print test
hardened (gives GEN_DIRNAME a real directoryName, eliminating an OOB
read that the print fix would otherwise expose).