configure.ac: move enable_aesgcm_stream=yes clauses in enable-all and enable-all-crypto to the main section, from the !ENABLED_LINUXKM_DEFAULTS section, and in ENABLED_LINUXKM_LKCAPI_REGISTER setup, remove the !ENABLED_AESNI from the condition for forcing on ENABLED_AESGCM_STREAM.
linuxkm/lkcapi_glue.c:
* remove all special-casing for AES-GCM with AESNI.
* add support for a LINUXKM_LKCAPI_PRIORITY_ALLOW_MASKING macro.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/memory.h: add missing definition of SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS2() when DEBUG_VECTOR_REGISTER_ACCESS_FUZZING && !DEBUG_VECTOR_REGISTER_ACCESS.
wolfcrypt/src/memory.c:
* define SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS2_fuzzer() if DEBUG_VECTOR_REGISTER_ACCESS_FUZZING, regardless of DEBUG_VECTOR_REGISTER_ACCESS.
* add a DEBUG_VECTOR_REGISTER_ACCESS clause to the !HAVE_THREAD_LS version of SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS2_fuzzer().
wolfcrypt/test/test.c: remove several errant wc_AesFree()s in aes256_test().
* add support for DEBUG_LINUXKM_FORTIFY_OVERLAY to allow KASAN analysis of the overlay without actually enabling CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE (which is buggy in combination with KASAN).
* make SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS2 definition conditional on !defined(SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS2).
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/memory.h: fix the DEBUG_VECTOR_REGISTER_ACCESS definition for SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS to properly omit the on-success bookkeeping code even if the supplied fail_clause doesn't return.
wolfcrypt/src/rsa.c: in wc_MakeRsaKey() primality loop, invoke RESTORE_VECTOR_REGISTERS() SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS() to prevent lengthy kernel lockups.
wolfcrypt/src/dh.c: in wc_DhGenerateParams() primality loop, invoke RESTORE_VECTOR_REGISTERS() SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS() to prevent lengthy kernel lockups.
wolfcrypt/src/{curve25519.c,dh.c,dsa.c,ecc.c,eccsi.c,rsa.c,sakke.c,sp_int.c}: when WOLFSSL_LINUXKM, force {SAVE,RESTORE}_VECTOR_REGISTERS() to WC_DO_NOTHING if settings gate out applicable asm.
* add srtp to enable-all
* add srtp-kdf to enable-all-crypto
* fix typo in enable-all[-crypto] where ENABLED_FIPS was used when FIPS_VERSION was needed.
* in enable-all[-crypto], conditionalize aesxts on !FIPS || FIPS_VERSION == dev.
* move AES-XTS CFLAG setup after FIPS settings, to allow non-dev FIPS to force it off, and add clause to FIPS v5 setup to do that.
* in FIPS v5 setup, add AES-XTS to the list of modes that forces -DWOLFSSL_AES_DIRECT -DHAVE_AES_ECB.
wolfcrypt/src/kdf.c: fix several benign -Wconversions.
wolfcrypt/test/test.c: add aes_cfb_test() and aes_xts_test() as top-level tests with separate "pass" messages, for transparency that those modes have indeed been tested in builds that activate them.
- dtls: check that the cookie secret is not emtpy
- Dtls13DoDowngrade -> Dtls13ClientDoDowngrade
- dtls: generate both 1.2 and 1.3 cookie secrets in case we downgrade
- dtls: setup sequence numbers for downgrade
- add dtls downgrade sequence number check test
Fixes ZD17314
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Sean Parkinson
Daniel Pouzzner
suzuki toshiya
gojimmypi
Andras Fekete
Anthony Hu
kaleb-himes
Juliusz Sosinowicz
David Garske
Lealem Amedie
jordan