Add "any" value for TLS 1.3 cipher suites.
Fix key size comparison for enc bits.
Output AEAD as MAC if cipher suite is using it, otherwise output hash MAC.
which force on BUILDING_WOLFSSL and do boilerplate includes, and update library
sources to include them at the top.
wolfssl_sources.h includes types.h, error-crypt.h, and logging.h, and
conditionally, config.h. settings.h and wc_port.h are unconditionally
included at the top of types.h.
wolfssl_sources_asm.h includes settings.h, and conditionally, config.h.
Add wolfssl_sources*.h to wolfcrypt/src/include.am, and to several IDE/ project
files.
Also added a TEST_WOLFSSL_SOURCES_INCLUSION_SEQUENCE clause in
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h to allow coverage testing.
In wolfcrypt/src/misc.c, retain existing ad hoc boilerplate includes, and use
them if WOLFSSL_VIS_FOR_TESTS, otherwise include the new wolfssl_sources.h.
Define WOLFSSL_VIS_FOR_TESTS at top of wolfcrypt/test/test.c.
Also renamed WOLFSSL_NEED_LINUX_CURRENT to WOLFSSL_LINUXKM_NEED_LINUX_CURRENT,
for clarity.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/aes.h: add Aes.streamData_sz;
src/tls13.c: fix devId passed to wc_HmacInit() in CreateCookieExt() and TlsCheckCookie();
src/keys.c: in SetKeys(), call wc_HmacInit() on hmacs only if newly allocated;
wolfcrypt/src/aes.c:
* in wc_Gmac(), wc_GmacVerify(), and AesSivCipher(), use wc_AesNew() and wc_AesDelete();
* in wc_AesInit(), zero the object on entry, and remove superseded piecemeal initializations to zero;
* in wc_AesFree(), zero aes->streamData, and zero the entire object as final cleanup;
wolfcrypt/src/curve25519.c: in wc_curve25519_free(), zero the entire object rather than zeroing piecemeal;
wolfcrypt/test/test.c:
* add fallback implementations (for old FIPS) of wc_HashNew(), wc_HashDelete(), wc_curve25519_new(), wc_curve25519_delete(), wc_ed25519_new(), and wc_ed25519_delete();
* update constructor calls throughout for new semantics;
* refactor ed25519_test() for proper cleanup and error encoding.
Address PR comments + other cleanup
Addressing PR comments
Minor change
Make sure the last line gets output as well
Add in ARIA SHA256 session to internal structure
Add in ARIA SHA384 session to internal structure
Add necessary function for ARIA to extract key
Fix unit tests
Rename HAVE_ARIAGCM to HAVE_ARIA
Move aria.* to wolfcrypt/port/aria
Separate out aria-crypt init functions
Adding in ECC+SHA callbacks
Avoid using AC_CHECK_FILE
Rename Aria to wc_Aria
Don't need special cases
Addressing PR comments
Code cleanup
C89 support
Remove TODO
Add documentation about buffer size
Clean up header files
Use ARIA_DEVID by default if available
Dummy update call to make MagicCrypto happy
Fix for detecting what algo type to use
Documentation
Use the appropriate sign/verify
Collect MagicCrypto functions together (and avoid leaks)
Fall back on other implementations on failure
Fix issue when compiling without CRYPTOCB
Addressing PR comments
Better cleanup
Addressing PR comments
Cleaner exit in case of error
Add support for:
- SM2 elliptic curve and SM2 sign/verify
- SM3 digest
- SM4 cipher with modes ECB/CBC/CTR/GCM/CCM
Add APIs for SM3 and SM4.
Add SM2 sign and verify APIs.
Add support for SM3 in wc_Hash and wc_Hmac API.
Add support for SM3 and SM4 through EVP layer.
Add support for SM2-SM3 certificates. Support key ID and name hash being
with SHA-1/256 or SM3.
Add support for TLS 1.3 cipher suites: TLS-SM4-GCM-SM3, TLS-SM4-CCM-SM3
Add support for TLS 1.2 SM cipher suite: ECDHE-ECDSA-SM4-CBC-SM3
Add support for SM3 in wc_PRF_TLS.
Add SM2-SM3 certificates and keys. Generated with GmSSL-3.0.0 and
OpenSSL.
Fix checking of negative with unsigned variables.
Check digestSz for 0 in wc_SSH_KDF() so that no possibility of dividing
by zero.
Change XMEMCPY to XMEMSET in renesas_sce_util.c.
Fix test.c to free prvTmp and pubTmp on read error.
Remove unused variables.
XFREE checks for NULL so don't check before call.
Move variable declarations to reduce scope.
We have users who need to debug errors coming out of libwolfssl in production,
where --enable-debug isn't an option. Our error queue implementation is the
solution, but our usage of WOLFSSL_ERROR isn't consistent. This commit greatly
expands our usage of WOLFSSL_ERROR. There are too many error cases to tackle
all at once, and not all error cases are particularly meaningful or likely to be
hit in regular operation of the library. I've tried to focus on errors that
users are likely to hit, and I've chosen to ignore things like the mountain of
BUFFER_E and BAD_FUNC_ARG cases (for the most part). I've also tried to expand
WOLFSSL_ERROR usage in files where we haven't been using it historically
(e.g. aes.c), so the pattern is now there for other developers to follow. In
order to prevent these additions from exploding the size of libwolfssl, they're
all behind a new macro, WOLFSSL_ERROR_VERBOSE. If WOLFSSL_VERBOSE_ERRORS is
defined, WOLFSSL_ERROR_VERBOSE just maps to WOLFSSL_ERROR.
Add a define WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO to turn on code that checks that
memory that must be zeroized before going out of use is zero.
Everytime sensitive data is put into a allocated buffer or stack buffer;
the address, its length and a name is stored to be checked later.
Where the stack buffer is about to go out of use, a call is added to
check that the required parts are zero.
wc_MemZero_Add() adds an address with length and name to a table of
addressed to be checked later.
wc_MemZero_Check() checks that the memory associated with the address is
zeroized where required.
mp_memzero_add() adds mp_int's data pointer with length and name to
table.
mp_memzero_check() checks that the data pointer is zeroized where
required.
Freeing memory will check the address. The length was prepended on
allocation.
Realloction was changed for WOLFSSL_CHECK_MEM_ZERO to perform an
allocate, check, copy, free.
This commit implements the core of the header parsing, building, and the sending
and receiving routines that handle fragmentation and defragmentation.
* In DTLSv1.3 the header used for protected messages is a variable-length header,
and it is described RFC9147 Section 4.
* Fragmentation happens after building the full message, if necessary. If the
underlying I/O can't send a fragment because of a WANT_WRITE error, the sending
of fragments will continue in the next invocation of
wolfSSL_connect/wolfSSL_accept/wolfSSL_write. In this case the message is saved
in a buffer inside the WolfSSL object.
* Defragmentation works like DTLSv1.2 defragmentation, and re-use
most of the same code.
* The Dtls13AddHeaders() function does not add the record layer header, but it
lefts space for it. It is eventually placed by BuildTls13Message() to allow
easier management of sequence numbers.
Testing:
./autogen.sh
./configure --enable-psk
make all check
$ ./examples/server/server -j -l ECDHE-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
SSL version is TLSv1.2
SSL cipher suite is TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
SSL curve name is SECP256R1
Client message: hello wolfssl!
$ ./examples/client/client -s -l ECDHE-PSK-AES128-GCM-SHA256
SSL version is TLSv1.2
SSL cipher suite is TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
SSL curve name is SECP256R1
I hear you fa shizzle!
Tobias Frauenschläger
David Garske
JacobBarthelmeh
Josh Holtrop
sebastian-carpenter
effbiae
Kareem
Sean Parkinson
Hideki Miyazaki
Eric Blankenhorn
Daniel Pouzzner
Reda Chouk
Andras Fekete
kaleb-himes
Anthony Hu
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Stefan Eissing
Hayden Roche
Marco Oliverio