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wolfssl/.github/workflows
Tobias Frauenschläger 366000eec2 PKCS#7: support degenerate certs-only encode and harden signed-attribute handling
Server-side PKCS#7 encode improvements that let downstream EST/SCEP enrollment
code (wolfCert) drive the existing encoder through the public API rather than
hand-rolling DER. Everything is gated under the existing HAVE_PKCS7 — no new
build options and no new public functions; the convenience wrappers live
caller-side.

Allow degenerate (certs-only) SignedData encode
  Relax the hashOID != 0 requirement in PKCS7_EncodeSigned() when
  sidType == DEGENERATE_SID, so a caller can produce a certs-only bundle (no
  signer, attributes, or eContent — the form used by EST /cacerts and SCEP
  GetCACert) by selecting DEGENERATE_SID via wc_PKCS7_SetSignerIdentifierType()
  and calling wc_PKCS7_EncodeSignedData(). The output round-trips through
  wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData().

Size the signed-attribute array to the actual count
  The SignerInfo attribute working array is now sized to the real attribute
  count instead of a fixed [7] array. An inline buffer (sized
  MAX_SIGNED_ATTRIBS_SZ, the historical footprint) covers the common
  allocation-free case; a heap buffer is used only when the count exceeds it.
  The default-attribute count comes from a single helper
  (wc_PKCS7_GetDefaultSignedAttribCount) so the sizing matches the emission
  logic exactly, and the canned-attribute write is bound-checked against the
  array capacity. This also fixes a latent overflow where the backing array was
  hardcoded [7] while the bound check used MAX_SIGNED_ATTRIBS_SZ. The macro is
  retained for source compatibility but no longer caps the count.

Document the decoded-attribute value shape
  Documented the stable shape of PKCS7DecodedAttrib.value (the contents of the
  SET OF AttributeValue, outer SET tag stripped) so callers can rely on it. No
  behavior change.

Fix multi-certificate decode in non-streaming builds
  Bound the additional-certificate loop in wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData against the
  absolute end of the certificate set (idx + length) rather than the relative
  length. In NO_PKCS7_STREAM builds the old bound dropped trailing certificates
  (all but the first when a large eContent preceded the set), failing
  verification when the signer cert was among those dropped. Streaming builds
  were unaffected.

Tests
  Added coverage in pkcs7signed_test: degenerate certs-only encode via the
  public API, nine-attribute encode (beyond the inline capacity), decoded
  attribute value shape for PrintableString and OCTET STRING, and a
  multi-certificate decode regression with large content that triggers the
  bound bug under NO_PKCS7_STREAM. Added a signed-attribute selection
  round-trip covering a messageDigest-only subset and the no-attributes case
  via wc_PKCS7_SetDefaultSignedAttribs/wc_PKCS7_NoDefaultSignedAttribs, a
  WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC over-capacity case that must return BUFFER_E instead of
  overrunning the inline buffer, and a malformed certificate-set length that
  exercises the certSetEnd clamp in the verifier. Config-sensitive cases are
  guarded.
2026-07-08 12:33:38 +02:00
..
2026-04-24 17:07:37 +02:00
2026-05-21 13:19:29 -07:00
2024-12-09 13:38:07 +01:00
2024-12-09 12:42:32 +01:00
2026-05-21 13:19:29 -07:00