David Garske a9f29dbb61 Adds strict checking of the ECDSA signature DER encoding length. With this change the total signature size should be (sequence + r int + s int) as ASN.1 encoded. While I could not find any "must" rules for the signature length I do think this is a good change. ...

If the old length checking method is desired `NO_STRICT_ECDSA_LEN` can be used. This would allow extra signature byes at the end (unused and not altering verification result). This is kept for possible backwards compatibility.

Per RFC6979: `How a signature is to be encoded is not covered by the DSA and ECDSA standards themselves; a common way is to use a DER-encoded ASN.1 structure (a SEQUENCE of two INTEGERs, for r and s, in that order).`

ANSI X9.62: ASN.1 Encoding of ECDSA:

```
ECDSA-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
  r INTEGER,
  s INTEGER
}
```

Fixes #2088

2019-02-14 12:05:34 -08:00

..

benchmark

Merge pull request #2061 from SparkiDev/x86_asm_not_in_c

2019-02-01 10:01:34 -08:00

src

Adds strict checking of the ECDSA signature DER encoding length. With this change the total signature size should be (sequence + r int + s int) as ASN.1 encoded. While I could not find any "must" rules for the signature length I do think this is a good change.

2019-02-14 12:05:34 -08:00

test

Minor fixes to CryptoCb wolfCrypt test for AES test and hash support for update/final in same callback.

2019-02-12 16:03:10 -08:00

user-crypto

Fix for unused variable in new fast-rsa function wc_RsaPublicKeyDecode_ex.

2018-10-25 11:12:33 -07:00