Files
wolfssl/wolfssl/wolfcrypt
Daniele Lacamera 50428d2d92 [TA-100] Address review feedback (Copilot + Fenrir)
Copilot fixes:
- atmel.c: ATCA_ENABLE_DEPRECATED I2C path now uses ATECC_I2C_ADDR
  instead of slave_address=1 (matches the non-deprecated path).
- atmel.c: capture and propagate atmel_createHandles() return value;
  abort init via WC_HW_E if handle creation fails.
- atmel.h: include calib_aes_gcm.h with the same <calib/...> form used
  for calib_command.h so a single -I (.../include or
  .../include/cryptoauthlib) resolves both.
- configure.ac: drop the duplicated AM_CONDITIONAL([BUILD_CRYPTOAUTHLIB])
  (kept only in the consolidated section near the end).
- settings.h: remove leftover commented-out '#ifdef WOLFSSL_ATECC508A'.
- benchmark.c: drop the broken TA100 wc_RsaSSL_Verify branch (it passed
  message/enc as if they were sig/out).
- test.c: stop calling atmel_ecc_free() with the slot-TYPE enum
  constants; wc_ecc_free(userA/userB) already releases the allocated
  slots.
- ecc.c (microchip_curve_id_for_key): switch on key->dp->id, not size,
  so SECP256K1 / BRAINPOOLP256R1 are not silently mapped to SECP256R1.
  Helper is now defined for ATECC508A/608A as well, fixing the
  TA100-only gating that broke ATECC builds.
- ecc.c (_ecc_make_key_ex): keep ATECC508A/608A's curve check at
  SECP256R1-only (hardware does not support the wider curve set);
  TA100 retains the multi-curve list.

Fenrir fixes:
- ecc.c (wc_ecc_init_ex): under TA100 + ALT_ECC_SIZE the pubkey x/y/z
  pointers must be aimed at key->pubkey.xyz[] (with alt_fp_init) before
  mp_init_multi - otherwise mp_init_multi dereferenced NULL.
- atmel.c (atmel_get_rev_info): check atcab_wakeup return and bail out
  via atmel_ecc_translate_err before calling atcab_info.
- atmel.c (atmel_ecc_create_pms, TA100+ECDH_ENC): pass
  MAP_TO_HANDLE(slotId) (the ephemeral private-key handle) into
  talib_ecdh_compat instead of MAP_TO_HANDLE(slotIdEnc).
- atmel.c (wc_Microchip_rsa_create_key): on any failure after the first
  talib_create_element succeeds, delete the previously created
  handle(s) and clear rKeyH/uKeyH so device elements are not leaked.
- aes.c (wc_AesGcmEncrypt / wc_AesGcmDecrypt TA100 fast paths): replace
  '(authInSz + sz) <= MAX' with bounds on each operand individually so
  word32 wraparound cannot bypass the 996-byte hardware limit.
- rsa.c (RsaPrivateDecryptEx): drop the TA100 RSA_PUBLIC_DECRYPT
  short-circuit. wc_Microchip_rsa_verify expects (digest, digestLen,
  sig, sigLen, ...) and the verified flag must be honored; the proper
  TA100 fast-path already lives in wc_RsaPSS_CheckPadding_ex2.
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