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wolfssl/tests/api/test_x509.c
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Paul Adelsbach ec9b6cf469 Add test cases
2026-03-31 09:29:46 -07:00

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/* test_x509.c
*
* Copyright (C) 2006-2026 wolfSSL Inc.
*
* This file is part of wolfSSL.
*
* wolfSSL is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
* (at your option) any later version.
*
* wolfSSL is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
* but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
* Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1335, USA
*/
#include <tests/unit.h>
#ifdef NO_INLINE
#include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/misc.h>
#else
#define WOLFSSL_MISC_INCLUDED
#include <wolfcrypt/src/misc.c>
#endif
#include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/types.h>
#include <tests/api/api.h>
#include <tests/api/test_x509.h>
#include <tests/utils.h>
#include <wolfssl/openssl/ssl.h>
#include <wolfssl/openssl/x509.h>
#include <wolfssl/openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <wolfssl/internal.h>
#include <wolfssl/wolfcrypt/asn.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_ALL) && \
defined(HAVE_MANUAL_MEMIO_TESTS_DEPENDENCIES)
#define HAVE_TEST_X509_RFC2818_VERIFICATION_CALLBACK
/* callback taken and simplified from
* include/boost/asio/ssl/impl/rfc2818_verification.ipp
* version: boost-1.84.0 */
static int rfc2818_verification_callback(int preverify,
WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* store)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
int depth;
X509* cert;
GENERAL_NAMES* gens;
byte address_bytes[] = { 127, 0, 0, 1 };
X509_NAME* name;
int i;
ASN1_STRING* common_name = 0;
int matches = 0;
/* Don't bother looking at certificates that have
* failed pre-verification. */
if (!preverify)
return 0;
/* We're only interested in checking the certificate at
* the end of the chain. */
depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(store);
if (depth > 0)
return 1;
/* Try converting the host name to an address. If it is an address then we
* need to look for an IP address in the certificate rather than a
* host name. */
cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(store);
/* Go through the alternate names in the certificate looking for matching
* DNS or IP address entries. */
gens = (GENERAL_NAMES*)X509_get_ext_d2i(
cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); ++i) {
GENERAL_NAME* gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
if (gen->type == GEN_DNS) {
ASN1_IA5STRING* domain = gen->d.dNSName;
if (domain->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING && domain->data &&
domain->length &&
XSTRCMP(domain->data, "example.com") == 0)
matches++;
}
else if (gen->type == GEN_IPADD)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* ip_address = gen->d.iPAddress;
if (ip_address->type == V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING && ip_address->data &&
ip_address->length == sizeof(address_bytes) &&
XMEMCMP(address_bytes, ip_address->data, 4) == 0)
matches++;
}
}
GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens);
/* No match in the alternate names, so try the common names. We should only
* use the "most specific" common name, which is the last one in
* the list. */
name = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
i = -1;
while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i)) >= 0)
{
X509_NAME_ENTRY* name_entry = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i);
common_name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(name_entry);
}
if (common_name && common_name->data && common_name->length)
{
if (XSTRCMP(common_name->data, "www.wolfssl.com") == 0)
matches++;
}
ExpectIntEQ(matches, 3);
return matches == 3;
}
#endif
int test_x509_rfc2818_verification_callback(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#ifdef HAVE_TEST_X509_RFC2818_VERIFICATION_CALLBACK
struct test_memio_ctx test_ctx;
WOLFSSL_CTX *ctx_c = NULL, *ctx_s = NULL;
WOLFSSL *ssl_c = NULL, *ssl_s = NULL;
XMEMSET(&test_ctx, 0, sizeof(test_ctx));
ExpectIntEQ(test_memio_setup(&test_ctx, &ctx_c, &ctx_s, &ssl_c, &ssl_s,
wolfTLS_client_method, wolfTLS_server_method), 0);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_use_certificate_file(ssl_c, cliCertFile,
WOLFSSL_FILETYPE_PEM), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_use_PrivateKey_file(ssl_c, cliKeyFile,
WOLFSSL_FILETYPE_PEM), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx_s, cliCertFile, NULL), 1);
wolfSSL_set_verify(ssl_s, WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER,
rfc2818_verification_callback);
ExpectIntEQ(test_memio_do_handshake(ssl_c, ssl_s, 10, NULL), 0);
wolfSSL_free(ssl_s);
wolfSSL_free(ssl_c);
wolfSSL_CTX_free(ctx_s);
wolfSSL_CTX_free(ctx_c);
#endif
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}
/* Basic unit coverage for GetCAByAKID.
*
* These tests construct a minimal WOLFSSL_CERT_MANAGER and Signer objects in
* memory and then call GetCAByAKID directly, verifying that:
* - a NULL or incomplete input returns NULL,
* - a matching issuer/serial pair returns the expected Signer, and
* - a non-matching pair returns NULL.
*
* These tests are intended to check the behaviour of the lookup logic itself;
* they do not exercise certificate parsing or real CA loading.
*/
int test_x509_GetCAByAKID(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#ifdef WOLFSSL_AKID_NAME
WOLFSSL_CERT_MANAGER cm;
Signer signerA;
Signer signerB;
Signer* found;
byte issuerBuf[] = { 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04 };
byte serialBuf[] = { 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d };
byte wrongSerial[] = { 0x07, 0x07, 0x07, 0x07 };
byte issuerHash[SIGNER_DIGEST_SIZE];
byte serialHash[SIGNER_DIGEST_SIZE];
word32 row;
XMEMSET(&cm, 0, sizeof(cm));
XMEMSET(&signerA, 0, sizeof(signerA));
XMEMSET(&signerB, 0, sizeof(signerB));
XMEMSET(issuerHash, 0, sizeof(issuerHash));
XMEMSET(serialHash, 0, sizeof(serialHash));
/* Initialize CA mutex so GetCAByAKID can lock/unlock it. */
ExpectIntEQ(wc_InitMutex(&cm.caLock), 0);
/* Place both signers into the same CA table bucket. */
row = 0;
cm.caTable[row] = &signerA;
signerA.next = &signerB;
signerB.next = NULL;
/* Pre-compute the expected name and serial hashes using the same helper
* that GetCAByAKID uses internally. */
ExpectIntEQ(CalcHashId(issuerBuf, sizeof(issuerBuf), issuerHash), 0);
ExpectIntEQ(CalcHashId(serialBuf, sizeof(serialBuf), serialHash), 0);
/* Configure signerA as the matching signer. */
XMEMCPY(signerA.issuerNameHash, issuerHash, SIGNER_DIGEST_SIZE);
XMEMCPY(signerA.serialHash, serialHash, SIGNER_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* Configure signerB with different hashes so it should not match. */
XMEMSET(signerB.issuerNameHash, 0x11, SIGNER_DIGEST_SIZE);
XMEMSET(signerB.serialHash, 0x22, SIGNER_DIGEST_SIZE);
/* 1) NULL manager should yield NULL. */
found = GetCAByAKID(NULL, issuerBuf, (word32)sizeof(issuerBuf),
serialBuf, (word32)sizeof(serialBuf));
ExpectNull(found);
/* 2) NULL issuer should yield NULL. */
found = GetCAByAKID(&cm, NULL, (word32)sizeof(issuerBuf),
serialBuf, (word32)sizeof(serialBuf));
ExpectNull(found);
/* 3) NULL serial should yield NULL. */
found = GetCAByAKID(&cm, issuerBuf, (word32)sizeof(issuerBuf),
NULL, (word32)sizeof(serialBuf));
ExpectNull(found);
/* 4) Zero-length issuer/serial should yield NULL. */
found = GetCAByAKID(&cm, issuerBuf, 0, serialBuf, (word32)sizeof(serialBuf));
ExpectNull(found);
found = GetCAByAKID(&cm, issuerBuf, (word32)sizeof(issuerBuf),
serialBuf, 0);
ExpectNull(found);
/* 5) Non-matching serial should yield NULL. */
found = GetCAByAKID(&cm, issuerBuf, (word32)sizeof(issuerBuf),
wrongSerial, (word32)sizeof(wrongSerial));
ExpectNull(found);
/* 6) Matching issuer/serial should return signerA. */
found = GetCAByAKID(&cm, issuerBuf, (word32)sizeof(issuerBuf),
serialBuf, (word32)sizeof(serialBuf));
ExpectPtrEq(found, &signerA);
wc_FreeMutex(&cm.caLock);
#endif /* WOLFSSL_AKID_NAME */
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}
/* Regression test: wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert() must honour the hostname set via
* X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(). Before the fix the hostname was stored in
* ctx->param->hostName but never consulted, so any chain-valid certificate
* would pass regardless of hostname mismatch (RFC 6125 sec. 6.4.1 violation).
*
* Uses existing PEM fixtures:
* svrCertFile - CN=www.wolfssl.com, SAN DNS=example.com, SAN IP=127.0.0.1
* caCertFile - CA that signed svrCertFile
*/
int test_x509_verify_cert_hostname_check(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#if defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA) && !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM) && !defined(NO_RSA)
WOLFSSL_X509_STORE* store = NULL;
WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* ctx = NULL;
WOLFSSL_X509* ca = NULL;
WOLFSSL_X509* leaf = NULL;
WOLFSSL_X509_VERIFY_PARAM* param = NULL;
ExpectNotNull(store = wolfSSL_X509_STORE_new());
ExpectNotNull(ca = wolfSSL_X509_load_certificate_file(caCertFile,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM));
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_STORE_add_cert(store, ca), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectNotNull(leaf = wolfSSL_X509_load_certificate_file(svrCertFile,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM));
/* Case 1: no hostname constraint - must succeed. */
ExpectNotNull(ctx = wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(ctx), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
/* Case 2: hostname matches a SAN DNS entry - must succeed. */
ExpectNotNull(ctx = wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
param = wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx);
ExpectNotNull(param);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, "example.com",
XSTRLEN("example.com")), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(ctx), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
/* Case 3: hostname does not match - must FAIL with the right error code. */
ExpectNotNull(ctx = wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
param = wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx);
ExpectNotNull(param);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(param, "wrong.com",
XSTRLEN("wrong.com")), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntNE(wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(ctx), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx),
X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx), 0);
wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
#ifdef WOLFSSL_IP_ALT_NAME
/* Case 4: IP matches a SAN IP entry - must succeed. */
ExpectNotNull(ctx = wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
param = wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx);
ExpectNotNull(param);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(param, "127.0.0.1"),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(ctx), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
/* Case 5: IP does not match - must FAIL with the right error code. */
ExpectNotNull(ctx = wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
param = wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx);
ExpectNotNull(param);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_ip_asc(param, "192.168.1.1"),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntNE(wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(ctx), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx),
X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH);
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx), 0);
wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
#endif /* WOLFSSL_IP_ALT_NAME */
wolfSSL_X509_free(leaf);
wolfSSL_X509_free(ca);
wolfSSL_X509_STORE_free(store);
#endif /* OPENSSL_EXTRA && !NO_FILESYSTEM && !NO_RSA */
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}
int test_x509_set_serialNumber(void)
{
#if defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA) || defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA_X509_SMALL)
EXPECT_DECLS;
WOLFSSL_X509* x509 = NULL;
WOLFSSL_ASN1_INTEGER* s = NULL;
#if defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA_X509_SMALL)
WOLFSSL_ASN1_INTEGER asnInt;
#endif
ExpectNotNull(x509 = wolfSSL_X509_new());
#if defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA_X509_SMALL)
XMEMSET(&asnInt, 0, sizeof(asnInt));
asnInt.data = asnInt.intData;
asnInt.isDynamic = 0;
asnInt.dataMax = (unsigned int)sizeof(asnInt.intData);
s = &asnInt;
#else
ExpectNotNull(s = wolfSSL_ASN1_INTEGER_new());
#endif
/* --- invalid inputs that must be rejected --- */
/* NULL x509 */
ExpectIntEQ(X509_set_serialNumber(NULL, s), WOLFSSL_FAILURE);
/* NULL s */
ExpectIntEQ(X509_set_serialNumber(x509, NULL), WOLFSSL_FAILURE);
if (s != NULL) {
/* length == 0: too short */
s->length = 0;
s->data[0] = ASN_INTEGER;
s->data[1] = 0;
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_set_serialNumber(x509, s),
WOLFSSL_FAILURE);
/* length == 1: still too short */
s->length = 1;
s->data[0] = ASN_INTEGER;
s->data[1] = 0;
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_set_serialNumber(x509, s),
WOLFSSL_FAILURE);
/* length == 2: still rejected - the guard requires length >= 3 */
s->length = 2;
s->data[0] = ASN_INTEGER;
s->data[1] = 0;
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_set_serialNumber(x509, s),
WOLFSSL_FAILURE);
/* wrong type byte */
s->length = 4;
s->data[0] = 0x00; /* not ASN_INTEGER */
s->data[1] = 2; /* length field */
s->data[2] = 0x01;
s->data[3] = 0x02;
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_set_serialNumber(x509, s),
WOLFSSL_FAILURE);
/* mismatched length byte (data[1] != s->length - 2) */
s->length = 4;
s->data[0] = ASN_INTEGER;
s->data[1] = 99; /* claims 99 bytes but s->length - 2 == 2 */
s->data[2] = 0x01;
s->data[3] = 0x02;
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_set_serialNumber(x509, s),
WOLFSSL_FAILURE);
/* --- valid two-byte serial number --- */
s->length = 4;
s->data[0] = ASN_INTEGER;
s->data[1] = 2;
s->data[2] = 0x01;
s->data[3] = 0x02;
ExpectIntEQ(wolfSSL_X509_set_serialNumber(x509, s),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(x509->serialSz, 2);
/* NUL terminator must be placed right after the copied data */
ExpectIntEQ(x509->serial[x509->serialSz], 0);
ExpectIntEQ(x509->serial[0], 0x01);
ExpectIntEQ(x509->serial[1], 0x02);
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA_X509_SMALL)
wolfSSL_ASN1_INTEGER_free(s);
#endif
wolfSSL_X509_free(x509);
return EXPECT_RESULT();
#else
return TEST_SKIPPED;
#endif /* OPENSSL_EXTRA || OPENSSL_EXTRA_X509_SMALL */
}
/*
* Test: CopyDateToASN1_TIME clamps attacker-controlled time field length.
*
* Attack chain:
* 1. Attacker crafts a DER certificate with notBefore UTCTime length byte
* set to 0x1F (31) instead of 0x0D (13). The first 13 bytes are a valid
* "YYMMDDHHMMSSZ" string (passes ExtractDate 'Z'-at-position-12 check),
* followed by 18 sentinel bytes (0xDE). Parent SEQUENCE lengths are
* adjusted so the DER is structurally valid.
* 2. The malicious cert is presented as the server cert in a TLS handshake
* (via memio -- no sockets needed).
* 3. The client parses the cert. CopyDateToASN1_TIME() in internal.c must
* clamp the length to CTC_DATE_SIZE - 2 (30) so that downstream code
* in wolfSSL_X509_notBefore() can safely prepend type+length at offset
* 0-1 of the 32-byte notBeforeData without overflowing.
*
* The test verifies that notBefore.length <= CTC_DATE_SIZE - 2 (30),
* regardless of the attacker's wire value (31).
*/
#if defined(HAVE_MANUAL_MEMIO_TESTS_DEPENDENCIES) && \
(defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA) || defined(OPENSSL_ALL)) && \
!defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(NO_WOLFSSL_CLIENT) && \
!defined(NO_WOLFSSL_SERVER)
/* Verify callback that accepts all certificates regardless of errors. */
static int accept_all_verify_cb(int preverify, WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* store)
{
(void)preverify;
(void)store;
return 1;
}
/*
* Craft a malicious DER certificate by inflating the notBefore UTCTime length.
*
* Scans for the Validity SEQUENCE (pattern: 0x30 XX 0x17 0x0D), inflates the
* notBefore length by 'inflate' bytes, inserts sentinel bytes (0xDE), and
* adjusts all parent SEQUENCE lengths.
*
* out: caller-supplied buffer, must be at least origSz + inflate bytes.
* outSz: set to the new cert size on success.
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
static int craft_malicious_time_cert(const byte* orig, int origSz,
byte* out, int* outSz, int inflate)
{
int i;
int validityOff = -1;
int notBeforeLenOff; /* offset of the notBefore length byte */
int notBeforeDataEnd; /* offset just past the 13-byte time data */
word16 seqLen;
/* Scan for Validity SEQUENCE: 0x30 XX 0x17 0x0D */
for (i = 0; i < origSz - 3; i++) {
if (orig[i] == 0x30 && orig[i + 2] == 0x17 && orig[i + 3] == 0x0D) {
validityOff = i;
break;
}
}
if (validityOff < 0) {
return -1;
}
notBeforeLenOff = validityOff + 3; /* the 0x0D byte */
notBeforeDataEnd = notBeforeLenOff + 1 + 13; /* tag(1) was at +2, data starts at +4 */
/* Build the new buffer:
* [0 .. notBeforeLenOff-1] unchanged prefix
* [notBeforeLenOff] inflated length byte
* [notBeforeLenOff+1 .. notBeforeDataEnd-1] original 13 time bytes
* <insert 'inflate' sentinel bytes here>
* [notBeforeDataEnd .. origSz-1] remainder of cert
*/
/* Copy prefix including the length byte position */
XMEMCPY(out, orig, notBeforeDataEnd);
/* Patch the notBefore UTCTime length byte */
out[notBeforeLenOff] = (byte)(0x0D + inflate);
/* Insert sentinel bytes */
XMEMSET(out + notBeforeDataEnd, 0xDE, inflate);
/* Copy the rest of the cert (notAfter field onward) */
XMEMCPY(out + notBeforeDataEnd + inflate,
orig + notBeforeDataEnd,
origSz - notBeforeDataEnd);
/* Fix Validity SEQUENCE length (single-byte encoding at validityOff+1) */
out[validityOff + 1] = (byte)(orig[validityOff + 1] + inflate);
/* Fix TBSCertificate SEQUENCE length (2-byte big-endian at offset 6-7,
* format: 30 82 XX XX) */
seqLen = ((word16)orig[6] << 8) | orig[7];
seqLen += (word16)inflate;
out[6] = (byte)(seqLen >> 8);
out[7] = (byte)(seqLen & 0xFF);
/* Fix Certificate SEQUENCE length (2-byte big-endian at offset 2-3,
* format: 30 82 XX XX) */
seqLen = ((word16)orig[2] << 8) | orig[3];
seqLen += (word16)inflate;
out[2] = (byte)(seqLen >> 8);
out[3] = (byte)(seqLen & 0xFF);
*outSz = origSz + inflate;
return 0;
}
#endif /* HAVE_MANUAL_MEMIO_TESTS_DEPENDENCIES && ... */
int test_x509_time_field_overread_via_tls(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#if defined(HAVE_MANUAL_MEMIO_TESTS_DEPENDENCIES) && \
(defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA) || defined(OPENSSL_ALL)) && \
!defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(NO_WOLFSSL_CLIENT) && \
!defined(NO_WOLFSSL_SERVER)
struct test_memio_ctx test_ctx;
WOLFSSL_CTX* ctx_c = NULL;
WOLFSSL_CTX* ctx_s = NULL;
WOLFSSL* ssl_c = NULL;
WOLFSSL* ssl_s = NULL;
WOLFSSL_X509* peer = NULL;
WOLFSSL_ASN1_TIME* notBefore = NULL;
/*
* Inflate notBefore length by 18 bytes: 13 + 18 = 31.
* CopyDecodedToX509() sets notBefore.length = min(31, MAX_DATE_SZ) = 31
* because it trusts the raw ASN.1 length byte from the wire.
* A valid UTCTime is only 13 bytes.
*/
const int INFLATE = 18;
byte malicious_der[sizeof_server_cert_der_2048 + 18];
int malicious_der_sz = 0;
/* --- Step 1: Craft malicious certificate --- */
ExpectIntEQ(craft_malicious_time_cert(
server_cert_der_2048, (int)sizeof_server_cert_der_2048,
malicious_der, &malicious_der_sz, INFLATE), 0);
ExpectIntEQ(malicious_der_sz,
(int)sizeof_server_cert_der_2048 + INFLATE);
/* --- Step 2: Set up TLS via memio --- */
XMEMSET(&test_ctx, 0, sizeof(test_ctx));
ExpectIntEQ(test_memio_setup_ex(&test_ctx, &ctx_c, &ctx_s,
&ssl_c, &ssl_s,
wolfTLSv1_2_client_method, wolfTLSv1_2_server_method,
(byte*)ca_cert_der_2048, (int)sizeof_ca_cert_der_2048,
malicious_der, malicious_der_sz,
(byte*)server_key_der_2048, (int)sizeof_server_key_der_2048), 0);
/* Client verify callback accepts all errors (signature is broken
* because we modified the TBSCertificate without re-signing).
* Must be set on ssl_c (not ctx_c) because the SSL object was already
* created from ctx_c inside test_memio_setup_ex(). */
if (ssl_c != NULL) {
wolfSSL_set_verify(ssl_c, WOLFSSL_VERIFY_PEER,
accept_all_verify_cb);
}
/* --- Step 3: Perform TLS handshake --- */
ExpectIntEQ(test_memio_do_handshake(ssl_c, ssl_s, 10, NULL), 0);
/* --- Step 4: Verify CopyDecodedToX509 does not trust wire length --- */
#ifdef KEEP_PEER_CERT
ExpectNotNull(peer = wolfSSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl_c));
/*
* X509_get_notBefore returns &x509->notBefore directly (no copy).
* CopyDecodedToX509() set notBefore.length = min(wireLength, 32) = 31
* because it trusts the raw ASN.1 length byte from the attacker's cert.
*
* The data buffer is CTC_DATE_SIZE (32) bytes, and the notBeforeData
* encoding prepends type+length at offset 0-1, leaving 30 bytes for
* content. So the maximum safe length is CTC_DATE_SIZE - 2 = 30.
*
* This assertion FAILS on the buggy code (length > 30) and will PASS
* once CopyDateToASN1_TIME clamps to the buffer capacity.
*/
if (peer != NULL) {
notBefore = wolfSSL_X509_get_notBefore(peer);
}
ExpectNotNull(notBefore);
ExpectIntLE(notBefore->length, CTC_DATE_SIZE - 2); /* max: 30 */
wolfSSL_X509_free(peer);
#endif /* KEEP_PEER_CERT */
wolfSSL_free(ssl_s);
wolfSSL_free(ssl_c);
wolfSSL_CTX_free(ctx_s);
wolfSSL_CTX_free(ctx_c);
#endif /* compile guards */
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}
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