EAP peer: Clear keying material on deinit

Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.

Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This commit is contained in:
Jouni Malinen
2014-06-29 21:16:30 +03:00
committed by Sarvesh Bodakhe
parent bb16734aa9
commit f4d7329ae6
5 changed files with 49 additions and 13 deletions

View File

@@ -316,6 +316,15 @@ int eap_peer_register_methods(void)
return ret;
}
static void eap_sm_free_key(struct eap_sm *sm)
{
if (sm->eapKeyData) {
bin_clear_free(sm->eapKeyData, sm->eapKeyDataLen);
sm->eapKeyData = NULL;
}
}
void eap_deinit_prev_method(struct eap_sm *sm, const char *txt)
{
if (sm->m == NULL || sm->eap_method_priv == NULL)
@@ -826,6 +835,7 @@ void eap_sm_abort(struct eap_sm *sm)
{
wpabuf_free(sm->lastRespData);
sm->lastRespData = NULL;
eap_sm_free_key(sm);
}
/**

View File

@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ eap_mschapv2_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
os_free(data->peer_challenge);
os_free(data->auth_challenge);
wpabuf_free(data->prev_challenge);
os_free(data);
bin_clear_free(data, sizeof(*data));
}
static void *
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ eap_mschapv2_password_changed(struct eap_sm *sm,
WPA_EVENT_PASSWORD_CHANGED
"EAP-MSCHAPV2: Password changed successfully");
data->prev_error = 0;
os_free(config->password);
bin_clear_free(config->password, config->password_len);
if (config->flags & EAP_CONFIG_FLAGS_EXT_PASSWORD) {
/* TODO: update external storage */
} else if (config->flags & EAP_CONFIG_FLAGS_PASSWORD_NTHASH) {
@@ -296,7 +296,8 @@ eap_mschapv2_password_changed(struct eap_sm *sm,
config->new_password_len,
config->password);
}
os_free(config->new_password);
bin_clear_free(config->new_password,
config->new_password_len);
} else {
config->password = config->new_password;
config->password_len = config->new_password_len;

View File

@@ -71,6 +71,15 @@ struct eap_peap_data {
};
static void eap_peap_free_key(struct eap_peap_data *data)
{
if (data->key_data) {
bin_clear_free(data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
data->key_data = NULL;
}
}
static int
eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data,
const char *phase1)
@@ -198,7 +207,7 @@ eap_peap_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
data->phase2_method->deinit(sm, data->phase2_priv);
os_free(data->phase2_types);
eap_peer_tls_ssl_deinit(sm, &data->ssl);
os_free(data->key_data);
eap_peap_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
wpabuf_free(data->pending_phase2_req);
wpabuf_free(data->pending_resp);
@@ -1178,7 +1187,7 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
if (tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn)) {
char label[24] = {0};
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: TLS done, proceed to Phase 2");
os_free(data->key_data);
eap_peap_free_key(data);
/* draft-josefsson-ppext-eap-tls-eap-05.txt
* specifies that PEAPv1 would use "client PEAP
* encryption" as the label. However, most existing
@@ -1294,8 +1303,7 @@ static void *
eap_peap_init_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_peap_data *data = priv;
os_free(data->key_data);
data->key_data = NULL;
eap_peap_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
data->session_id = NULL;
if (eap_peer_tls_reauth_init(sm, &data->ssl)) {

View File

@@ -60,13 +60,22 @@ static void * eap_tls_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
}
static void eap_tls_free_key(struct eap_tls_data *data)
{
if (data->key_data) {
bin_clear_free(data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN + EAP_EMSK_LEN);
data->key_data = NULL;
}
}
static void eap_tls_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_tls_data *data = priv;
if (data == NULL)
return;
eap_peer_tls_ssl_deinit(sm, &data->ssl);
os_free(data->key_data);
eap_tls_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
wpabuf_free(data->pending_resp);
os_free(data);
@@ -135,7 +144,7 @@ static void eap_tls_success(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_tls_data *data,
ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
}
os_free(data->key_data);
eap_tls_free_key(data);
data->key_data = eap_peer_tls_derive_key(sm, &data->ssl, label,
EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN +
EAP_EMSK_LEN);

View File

@@ -127,6 +127,15 @@ static void eap_ttls_phase2_eap_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm,
}
static void eap_ttls_free_key(struct eap_ttls_data *data)
{
if (data->key_data) {
bin_clear_free(data->key_data, EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
data->key_data = NULL;
}
}
static void eap_ttls_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
@@ -135,7 +144,7 @@ static void eap_ttls_deinit(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
eap_ttls_phase2_eap_deinit(sm, data);
os_free(data->phase2_eap_types);
eap_peer_tls_ssl_deinit(sm, &data->ssl);
os_free(data->key_data);
eap_ttls_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
wpabuf_free(data->pending_phase2_req);
wpabuf_free(data->pending_resp);
@@ -208,7 +217,7 @@ static int eap_ttls_avp_encapsulate(struct wpabuf **resp, u32 avp_code,
static int eap_ttls_v0_derive_key(struct eap_sm *sm,
struct eap_ttls_data *data)
{
os_free(data->key_data);
eap_ttls_free_key(data);
data->key_data = eap_peer_tls_derive_key(sm, &data->ssl,
"ttls keying material",
EAP_TLS_KEY_LEN);
@@ -1607,8 +1616,7 @@ static void eap_ttls_deinit_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
static void * eap_ttls_init_for_reauth(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
{
struct eap_ttls_data *data = priv;
os_free(data->key_data);
data->key_data = NULL;
eap_ttls_free_key(data);
os_free(data->session_id);
data->session_id = NULL;
if (eap_peer_tls_reauth_init(sm, &data->ssl)) {