wolfSSL/wolfssl
1
0
Fork 1
mirror of https://github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl.git synced 2026-07-06 13:30:50 +02:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Merge pull request #10102 from Frauschi/zd21460

Browse Source 
Various fixes
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Pouzzner
2026-04-06 18:41:31 -05:00
committed by GitHub
parent 995092362f 2ae20723db
commit 32502e9963
12 changed files with 252 additions and 31 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/tls.c
+25 -12
View File
@@ -16086,11 +16086,18 @@ static int TLSX_EchChangeSNI(WOLFSSL* ssl, TLSX** pEchX,
if (serverNameX == NULL && ssl->ctx && ssl->ctx->extensions) {
serverNameX = TLSX_Find(ssl->ctx->extensions, TLSX_SERVER_NAME);
extensions = &ssl->ctx->extensions;
if (serverNameX != NULL)
extensions = &ssl->ctx->extensions;
}
/* ECH requires an inner SNI to be present for ClientHelloInner.
* Without it, fail instead of mutating extension lists. */
if (serverNameX == NULL) {
ret = BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
/* store the inner server name */
if (serverNameX != NULL) {
if (ret == 0 && serverNameX != NULL) {
char* hostName = ((SNI*)serverNameX->data)->data.host_name;
word32 hostNameSz = (word32)XSTRLEN(hostName) + 1;
@@ -16101,15 +16108,19 @@ static int TLSX_EchChangeSNI(WOLFSSL* ssl, TLSX** pEchX,
XMEMCPY(serverName, hostName, hostNameSz);
}
/* remove the inner server name */
TLSX_Remove(extensions, TLSX_SERVER_NAME, ssl->heap);
/* only swap the SNI if one was found; extensions is non-NULL if an
* SNI entry was found on ssl->extensions or ctx->extensions */
if (ret == 0 && extensions != NULL) {
/* remove the inner server name */
TLSX_Remove(extensions, TLSX_SERVER_NAME, ssl->heap);
/* set the public name as the server name */
if ((ret = TLSX_UseSNI(extensions, WOLFSSL_SNI_HOST_NAME,
((WOLFSSL_ECH*)echX->data)->echConfig->publicName,
XSTRLEN(((WOLFSSL_ECH*)echX->data)->echConfig->publicName),
ssl->heap)) == WOLFSSL_SUCCESS)
ret = 0;
/* set the public name as the server name */
if ((ret = TLSX_UseSNI(extensions, WOLFSSL_SNI_HOST_NAME,
((WOLFSSL_ECH*)echX->data)->echConfig->publicName,
XSTRLEN(((WOLFSSL_ECH*)echX->data)->echConfig->publicName),
ssl->heap)) == WOLFSSL_SUCCESS)
ret = 0;
}
}
*pServerNameX = serverNameX;
*pExtensions = extensions;
@@ -16122,10 +16133,12 @@ static int TLSX_EchRestoreSNI(WOLFSSL* ssl, char* serverName,
{
int ret = 0;
if (serverNameX != NULL) {
/* remove the public name SNI */
/* always remove the publicName SNI we injected, regardless of whether
* there was a prior inner SNI to restore */
if (extensions != NULL)
TLSX_Remove(extensions, TLSX_SERVER_NAME, ssl->heap);
if (serverNameX != NULL) {
/* restore the inner server name */
ret = TLSX_UseSNI(extensions, WOLFSSL_SNI_HOST_NAME,
serverName, XSTRLEN(serverName), ssl->heap);
src/x509_str.c
+10 -1
View File
@@ -318,6 +318,11 @@ static void SetupStoreCtxError_ex(WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* ctx, int ret,
{
int error = GetX509Error(ret);
/* Do not overwrite a previously recorded error with success; preserve
* the worst-seen error across the chain walk. */
if (error == 0 && ctx->error != 0)
return;
wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, error);
wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(ctx, depth);
}
@@ -635,9 +640,14 @@ int wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
if (ctx->store->verify_cb) {
ret = ctx->store->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (ret != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
ret = WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
goto exit;
}
}
else {
ret = WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
goto exit;
}
} else
#endif
{
@@ -2174,4 +2184,3 @@ int wolfSSL_X509_STORE_set1_param(WOLFSSL_X509_STORE *ctx,
#endif /* !WOLFCRYPT_ONLY */
#endif /* !WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_INCLUDED */
tests/api/test_evp_cipher.c
+23
View File
@@ -1915,6 +1915,7 @@ int test_wolfssl_EVP_chacha20_poly1305(void)
byte cipherText[sizeof(plainText)];
byte decryptedText[sizeof(plainText)];
byte tag[CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_AUTHTAG_SIZE];
byte badTag[CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_AUTHTAG_SIZE];
EVP_CIPHER_CTX* ctx = NULL;
int outSz;
@@ -1979,6 +1980,28 @@ int test_wolfssl_EVP_chacha20_poly1305(void)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
/* Negative test: forged (all-zero) tag must be rejected. */
XMEMSET(badTag, 0, sizeof(badTag));
ExpectNotNull((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()));
ExpectIntEQ(EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_chacha20_poly1305(), NULL,
NULL, NULL), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN,
CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_IV_SIZE, NULL), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_AUTHTAG_SIZE, badTag),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outSz, aad, sizeof(aad)),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, decryptedText, &outSz, cipherText,
sizeof(cipherText)), WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
/* EVP_DecryptFinal_ex MUST return failure on tag mismatch */
ExpectIntNE(EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, decryptedText, &outSz),
WOLFSSL_SUCCESS);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
/* Test partial Inits. CipherInit() allow setting of key and iv
* in separate calls. */
ExpectNotNull((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()));
tests/api/test_ossl_x509_str.c
+50 -1
View File
@@ -1074,6 +1074,56 @@ int test_X509_STORE_InvalidCa(void)
ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, str, cert, untrusted), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(X509_verify_cert(ctx), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(last_errcode, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
/* Defense in depth: ctx->error must not be clobbered back to X509_V_OK
* by the later successful verification of the intermediate against the
* trusted root. The worst-seen error must persist. */
ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx), X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
X509_free(cert);
X509_STORE_free(str);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted, NULL);
#endif
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}
int test_X509_STORE_InvalidCa_NoCallback(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#if defined(OPENSSL_ALL) && !defined(NO_RSA) && !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM)
const char* filename = "./certs/intermediate/ca_false_intermediate/"
"test_int_not_cacert.pem";
const char* srvfile = "./certs/intermediate/ca_false_intermediate/"
"test_sign_bynoca_srv.pem";
X509_STORE_CTX* ctx = NULL;
X509_STORE* str = NULL;
XFILE fp = XBADFILE;
X509* cert = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509)* untrusted = NULL;
ExpectTrue((fp = XFOPEN(srvfile, "rb"))
!= XBADFILE);
ExpectNotNull(cert = PEM_read_X509(fp, 0, 0, 0 ));
if (fp != XBADFILE) {
XFCLOSE(fp);
fp = XBADFILE;
}
ExpectNotNull(str = X509_STORE_new());
ExpectNotNull(ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new());
ExpectNotNull(untrusted = sk_X509_new_null());
/* Create cert chain stack with an intermediate that is CA:FALSE. */
ExpectIntEQ(test_X509_STORE_untrusted_load_cert_to_stack(filename,
untrusted), TEST_SUCCESS);
ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_load_locations(str,
"./certs/intermediate/ca_false_intermediate/test_ca.pem",
NULL), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, str, cert, untrusted), 1);
/* No verify callback: verification must fail on CA:FALSE issuer. */
ExpectIntNE(X509_verify_cert(ctx), 1);
ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx), X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA);
X509_free(cert);
X509_STORE_free(str);
@@ -1793,4 +1843,3 @@ int test_X509_STORE_No_SSL_CTX(void)
#endif
return EXPECT_RESULT();
}
tests/api/test_ossl_x509_str.h
+2
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX(void);
int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex(void);
int test_X509_STORE_untrusted(void);
int test_X509_STORE_InvalidCa(void);
int test_X509_STORE_InvalidCa_NoCallback(void);
int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack_cleanup(void);
int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer(void);
int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_set_flags(void);
@@ -51,6 +52,7 @@ int test_X509_STORE_No_SSL_CTX(void);
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509_store", test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509_store", test_X509_STORE_untrusted), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509_store", test_X509_STORE_InvalidCa), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509_store", test_X509_STORE_InvalidCa_NoCallback), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509_store", \
test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack_cleanup), \
TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509_store", \
wolfcrypt/src/aes.c
+7 -8
View File
@@ -10217,8 +10217,9 @@ int wc_AesGcmDecrypt(Aes* aes, byte* out, const byte* in, word32 sz,
/* If the sz is non-zero, both in and out must be set. If sz is 0,
* in and out are don't cares, as this is is the GMAC case. */
if (aes == NULL || iv == NULL || (sz != 0 && (in == NULL || out == NULL)) ||
authTag == NULL || authTagSz > WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE || authTagSz == 0 ||
ivSz == 0 || ((authInSz > 0) && (authIn == NULL)))
authTag == NULL || authTagSz > WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ||
authTagSz < WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ || ivSz == 0 ||
((authInSz > 0) && (authIn == NULL)))
{
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
@@ -10781,8 +10782,8 @@ int wc_AesGcmDecrypt(Aes* aes, byte* out, const byte* in, word32 sz,
/* If the sz is non-zero, both in and out must be set. If sz is 0,
* in and out are don't cares, as this is is the GMAC case. */
if (aes == NULL || iv == NULL || (sz != 0 && (in == NULL || out == NULL)) ||
authTag == NULL || authTagSz > WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE || authTagSz == 0 ||
ivSz == 0) {
authTag == NULL || authTagSz > WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE ||
authTagSz < WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ || ivSz == 0) {
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
@@ -12473,7 +12474,7 @@ int wc_AesGcmEncryptFinal(Aes* aes, byte* authTag, word32 authTagSz)
/* Check validity of parameters. */
if ((aes == NULL) || (authTag == NULL) || (authTagSz > WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) ||
(authTagSz == 0)) {
(authTagSz < WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ)) {
ret = BAD_FUNC_ARG;
}
@@ -16377,9 +16378,7 @@ int wc_local_CmacUpdateAes(struct Cmac *cmac, const byte* in, word32 inSz) {
in += add;
if (cmac->bufferSz == WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE && inSz != 0) {
if (cmac->totalSz != 0) {
xorbuf(cmac->buffer, cmac->digest, WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
xorbuf(cmac->buffer, cmac->digest, WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
ret = AesEncrypt_preFetchOpt(aes, cmac->buffer,
cmac->digest, &did_prefetches);
if (ret == 0) {
wolfcrypt/src/cmac.c
+1 -3
View File
@@ -238,9 +238,7 @@ int wc_CmacUpdate(Cmac* cmac, const byte* in, word32 inSz)
inSz -= add;
if (cmac->bufferSz == WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE && inSz != 0) {
if (cmac->totalSz != 0) {
xorbuf(cmac->buffer, cmac->digest, WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
xorbuf(cmac->buffer, cmac->digest, WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
wc_AesEncryptDirect(&cmac->aes, cmac->digest,
cmac->buffer);
cmac->totalSz += WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
wolfcrypt/src/eccsi.c
+35
View File
@@ -2159,6 +2159,18 @@ static int eccsi_calc_j(EccsiKey* key, const mp_int* hem, const byte* sig,
if (err == 0) {
err = eccsi_decode_sig_s(key, sig, sigSz, s);
}
/* Validate s is in [1, q-1]: reject zero or out-of-range second signature
* component. With s=0, [s](...) yields the point at infinity whose
* affine x-coordinate is 0, making the final mp_cmp(0,0) accept any
* forged signature. */
if (err == 0) {
if (mp_iszero(s)) {
err = MP_ZERO_E;
}
else if (mp_cmp(s, &key->params.order) != MP_LT) {
err = ECC_OUT_OF_RANGE_E;
}
}
/* [s]( [HE]G + [r]Y ) */
if (err == 0) {
err = eccsi_mulmod_point(key, s, j, j, 1);
@@ -2238,6 +2250,19 @@ int wc_VerifyEccsiHash(EccsiKey* key, enum wc_HashType hashType,
err = mp_montgomery_setup(&params->prime, &mp);
}
/* Validate r is in [1, q-1]: reject zero or out-of-range first signature
* component before any scalar multiplication takes place.
* Without this check, r=0 causes J_x=0 and the final mp_cmp(0,0)==MP_EQ
* comparison accepts the forged signature unconditionally. */
if (err == 0) {
if (mp_iszero(r)) {
err = MP_ZERO_E;
}
else if (mp_cmp(r, &params->order) != MP_LT) {
err = ECC_OUT_OF_RANGE_E;
}
}
/* Step 1: Validate PVT is on curve */
if (err == 0) {
err = wc_ecc_is_point(pvt, &params->a, &params->b, &params->prime);
@@ -2273,6 +2298,16 @@ int wc_VerifyEccsiHash(EccsiKey* key, enum wc_HashType hashType,
key->params.haveBase = 0;
}
/* Defense-in-depth: reject J = point at infinity before the final
* comparison. Catches any future path that might reach this point
* with a neutral-element result (e.g. s = 0 mod q for a non-zero
* encoded s). */
if (err == 0) {
if (wc_ecc_point_is_at_infinity(j)) {
err = ECC_INF_E;
}
}
/* Step 6: Jx fitting, compare with r */
if (err == 0) {
jx = &key->tmp;
wolfcrypt/src/evp.c
+36 -5
View File
@@ -1505,16 +1505,33 @@ int wolfSSL_EVP_CipherFinal(WOLFSSL_EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
* HAVE_FIPS_VERSION >= 2 */
#if defined(HAVE_CHACHA) && defined(HAVE_POLY1305)
case WC_CHACHA20_POLY1305_TYPE:
{
byte computedTag[CHACHA20_POLY1305_AEAD_AUTHTAG_SIZE];
if (!ctx->enc) {
/* Save the expected tag before _Final() overwrites
* ctx->authTag */
XMEMCPY(computedTag, ctx->authTag, sizeof(computedTag));
}
if (wc_ChaCha20Poly1305_Final(&ctx->cipher.chachaPoly,
ctx->authTag) != 0) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("wc_ChaCha20Poly1305_Final failed");
return WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
}
else {
*outl = 0;
return WOLFSSL_SUCCESS;
if (!ctx->enc) {
/* ctx->authTag now holds computed tag; computedTag holds
* expected */
int tagErr = wc_ChaCha20Poly1305_CheckTag(computedTag,
ctx->authTag);
ForceZero(computedTag, sizeof(computedTag));
if (tagErr != 0) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("ChaCha20-Poly1305 tag mismatch");
return WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
}
}
break;
*outl = 0;
return WOLFSSL_SUCCESS;
}
break;
#endif
#ifdef WOLFSSL_SM4_GCM
case WC_SM4_GCM_TYPE:
@@ -3704,6 +3721,10 @@ int wolfSSL_EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(WOLFSSL_EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
return WOLFSSL_SUCCESS;
}
#ifdef HAVE_ECC
static int ECC_populate_EVP_PKEY(WOLFSSL_EVP_PKEY* pkey, WOLFSSL_EC_KEY *key);
#endif
int wolfSSL_EVP_PKEY_keygen(WOLFSSL_EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
WOLFSSL_EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
@@ -3758,6 +3779,8 @@ int wolfSSL_EVP_PKEY_keygen(WOLFSSL_EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
ret = wolfSSL_EC_KEY_generate_key(pkey->ecc);
if (ret == WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
pkey->ownEcc = 1;
if (ECC_populate_EVP_PKEY(pkey, pkey->ecc) != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS)
ret = WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
}
}
break;
@@ -9516,7 +9539,15 @@ static int ECC_populate_EVP_PKEY(WOLFSSL_EVP_PKEY* pkey, WOLFSSL_EC_KEY *key)
else
#endif /* HAVE_PKCS8 */
{
if (ecc->type == ECC_PRIVATEKEY_ONLY) {
if (ecc->type == ECC_PRIVATEKEY_ONLY ||
(ecc->type == ECC_PRIVATEKEY &&
mp_iszero(ecc->pubkey.x))) {
/* Reconstruct public key from private scalar. This covers
* both ECC_PRIVATEKEY_ONLY keys and ECC_PRIVATEKEY keys whose
* public-key point was never populated (e.g. when only
* EC_KEY_set_private_key was called, SetECKeyInternal copies
* the zero-initialized pub_key point and marks the type as
* ECC_PRIVATEKEY, leaving pubkey.x == 0). */
if (wc_ecc_make_pub(ecc, NULL) != MP_OKAY) {
return WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
}
wolfcrypt/src/pkcs7.c
+19 -1
View File
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@ struct PKCS7State {
word32 nonceSz; /* size of nonce stored */
word32 aadSz; /* size of additional AEAD data */
word32 tagSz; /* size of tag for AEAD */
word32 icvSz; /* expected ICV/MAC size from AlgoID parameter */
word32 contentSz;
word32 currContIdx; /* index of current content */
word32 currContSz; /* size of current content */
@@ -14241,6 +14242,10 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeAuthEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
if (ret == 0 && GetMyVersion(pkiMsg, &idx, &macSz, pkiMsgSz) < 0) {
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
}
if (ret == 0 && (macSz <= 0 || macSz > WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("AuthEnvelopedData invalid MAC length");
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
}
if (ret == 0) {
explicitOctet = 0;
@@ -14286,7 +14291,8 @@ int wc_PKCS7_DecodeAuthEnvelopedData(wc_PKCS7* pkcs7, byte* in,
break;
}
/* store nonce for later */
/* store nonce and macSz for later */
pkcs7->stream->icvSz = (word32)macSz;
if (nonceSz > 0) {
pkcs7->stream->nonceSz = (word32)nonceSz;
pkcs7->stream->nonce = (byte*)XMALLOC((word32)nonceSz,
@@ -14477,6 +14483,7 @@ authenv_atrbend:
encodedAttribSz = pkcs7->stream->aadSz;
encodedAttribs = pkcs7->stream->aad;
}
macSz = (int)pkcs7->stream->icvSz;
#endif
@@ -14493,6 +14500,17 @@ authenv_atrbend:
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
}
authTagSz = (word32)length;
if (ret == 0 && authTagSz != (word32)macSz) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("AuthEnvelopedData authTag size mismatch");
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
}
if (ret == 0 &&
(encOID == AES128GCMb || encOID == AES192GCMb ||
encOID == AES256GCMb) &&
authTagSz < WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("AuthEnvelopedData GCM authTag too small");
ret = ASN_PARSE_E;
}
#ifndef NO_PKCS7_STREAM
/* there might not be enough data for the auth tag too */
wolfcrypt/test/test.c
+42
View File
@@ -57846,6 +57846,9 @@ static wc_test_ret_t pkcs7authenveloped_run_vectors(byte* rsaCert, word32 rsaCer
wc_test_ret_t ret = 0;
int testSz = 0, i;
int envelopedSz, decodedSz;
#ifdef HAVE_AESGCM
int tagTruncationChecked = 0;
#endif
byte *enveloped = NULL;
byte *decoded = NULL;
@@ -58357,6 +58360,45 @@ static wc_test_ret_t pkcs7authenveloped_run_vectors(byte* rsaCert, word32 rsaCer
ERROR_OUT(WC_TEST_RET_ENC_NC, out);
}
#ifdef HAVE_AESGCM
if (tagTruncationChecked == 0 &&
(testVectors[i].encryptOID == AES128GCMb ||
testVectors[i].encryptOID == AES192GCMb ||
testVectors[i].encryptOID == AES256GCMb) &&
testVectors[i].authAttribsSz == 0 &&
testVectors[i].unauthAttribsSz == 0 &&
envelopedSz > (WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2)) {
int macIdx = envelopedSz - (WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 2);
byte* tampered = NULL;
/* For plain DER output without unauthenticated attributes, the
* MAC OCTET STRING is the final field. */
if (enveloped[macIdx] == ASN_OCTET_STRING &&
enveloped[macIdx + 1] == WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
tampered = (byte*)XMALLOC((word32)envelopedSz, HEAP_HINT,
DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
if (tampered == NULL) {
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
ERROR_OUT(WC_TEST_RET_ENC_ERRNO, out);
}
XMEMCPY(tampered, enveloped, (word32)envelopedSz);
tampered[macIdx + 1] = 1;
decodedSz = wc_PKCS7_DecodeAuthEnvelopedData(pkcs7, tampered,
(word32)envelopedSz, decoded, PKCS7_BUF_SIZE);
XFREE(tampered, HEAP_HINT, DYNAMIC_TYPE_TMP_BUFFER);
tampered = NULL;
if (decodedSz > 0) {
wc_PKCS7_Free(pkcs7);
ERROR_OUT(WC_TEST_RET_ENC_NC, out);
}
tagTruncationChecked = 1;
}
}
#endif
#ifdef PKCS7_OUTPUT_TEST_BUNDLES
/* output pkcs7 envelopedData for external testing */
pkcs7File = XFOPEN(testVectors[i].outFileName, "wb");
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h
+2
View File
@@ -3452,6 +3452,8 @@ extern void uITRON4_free(void *p) ;
/* Default AES minimum auth tag sz, allow user to override */
#ifndef WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ
#define WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ 12
#elif WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ < 1
#error WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ must be at least 1
#endif