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Prime Number Testing

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1. Fixed variable name typo in DH for the FFDHE 8192-bit q value.
2. Updated some error strings in wolfSSL_BN_is_prime_ex().
3. Changed the calls to mp_prime_is_prime_ex() in fp_randprime() and
mp_randprime() so they go back to the 8 rounds of MR, which is more than
adequate in this situation.
This commit is contained in:
John Safranek
2018-07-11 16:24:41 -07:00
parent 0e06f6413d
commit 5908230d20
4 changed files with 13 additions and 9 deletions
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4
src/ssl.c
View File

@ -22566,7 +22566,7 @@ int wolfSSL_BN_is_prime_ex(const WOLFSSL_BIGNUM *bn, int nbchecks,
if (rng) {
if (mp_prime_is_prime_ex((mp_int*)bn->internal,
nbchecks, &res, rng) != MP_OKAY) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("mp_prime_is_prime error");
WOLFSSL_MSG("mp_prime_is_prime_ex error");
res = MP_NO;
}
}
@ -22579,7 +22579,7 @@ int wolfSSL_BN_is_prime_ex(const WOLFSSL_BIGNUM *bn, int nbchecks,
#endif
if (res != MP_YES) {
WOLFSSL_MSG("mp_prime_is_prime not prime");
WOLFSSL_MSG("mp_prime_is_prime_ex not prime");
return WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
}

2
wolfcrypt/src/dh.c
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@ -765,7 +765,7 @@ static const byte dh_ffdhe8192_p[] = {
};
static const byte dh_ffdhe8192_g[] = { 0x02 };
#ifdef HAVE_FFDHE_Q
static const byte dh_ffdhe8192_g[] = {
static const byte dh_ffdhe8192_q[] = {
0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF,
0xD6, 0xFC, 0x2A, 0x2C, 0x51, 0x5D, 0xA5, 0x4D,
0x57, 0xEE, 0x2B, 0x10, 0x13, 0x9E, 0x9E, 0x78,

8
wolfcrypt/src/integer.c
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@ -4529,9 +4529,11 @@ int mp_rand_prime(mp_int* N, int len, WC_RNG* rng, void* heap)
}
/* test */
/* Running Miller-Rabin up to 40 times gives us a 2^{-80} chance
* of a candidate being a false positive. */
if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime_ex(N, 40, &res, rng)) != MP_OKAY) {
/* Running Miller-Rabin up to 3 times gives us a 2^{-80} chance
* of a 1024-bit candidate being a false positive, when it is our
* prime candidate. (Note 4.49 of Handbook of Applied Cryptography.)
* Using 8 because we've always used 8. */
if ((err = mp_prime_is_prime_ex(N, 8, &res, rng)) != MP_OKAY) {
XFREE(buf, heap, DYNAMIC_TYPE_RSA);
return err;
}

8
wolfcrypt/src/tfm.c
View File

@ -3067,9 +3067,11 @@ int fp_randprime(fp_int* N, int len, WC_RNG* rng, void* heap)
fp_read_unsigned_bin(N, buf, len);
/* test */
/* Running Miller-Rabin up to 40 times gives us a 2^{-80} chance
* of a candidate being a false positive. */
mp_prime_is_prime_ex(N, 40, &isPrime, rng);
/* Running Miller-Rabin up to 3 times gives us a 2^{-80} chance
* of a 1024-bit candidate being a false positive, when it is our
* prime candidate. (Note 4.49 of Handbook of Applied Cryptography.)
* Using 8 because we've always used 8 */
mp_prime_is_prime_ex(N, 8, &isPrime, rng);
} while (isPrime == FP_NO);
XMEMSET(buf, 0, len);