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Rework added test

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Kareem
2026-05-27 18:20:20 -07:00
parent 903fd97dbe
commit a1b71a6f34
1 changed files with 27 additions and 7 deletions
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tests/api/test_rsa.c
+27 -7
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@@ -1214,33 +1214,43 @@ int test_wc_RsaDecrypt_BoundsCheck(void)
/*
* Oversized RSA modulus (mp_bitsused(n) > RSA_MAX_SIZE) must not overflow the
* static stack buffer used by RsaFunctionCheckIn (DECL_MP_INT_SIZE_DYN).
*
* The buffer is sized for RSA_MAX_SIZE digits, and NEW_MP_INT_SIZE would zero
* mp_bitsused(&key->n) digits of it -- so an oversized modulus must be
* caught by MP_BITS_OVER_MAX *before* NEW_MP_INT_SIZE is reached. We feed
* wc_RsaDirect() an input/output buffer matching the oversized modulus byte
* size so we get past wc_RsaDirect()'s inLen sanity check and reach the
* RsaFunctionCheckIn() guard inside wc_RsaFunction_ex().
*/
int test_wc_RsaFunctionCheckIn_OversizedModulus(void)
{
EXPECT_DECLS;
#if !defined(NO_RSA) && defined(WC_RSA_NO_PADDING) && defined(WC_RSA_DIRECT) && \
defined(WOLFSSL_PUBLIC_MP) && !defined(NO_RSA_BOUNDS_CHECK) && \
!defined(WOLFSSL_RSA_VERIFY_ONLY) && !defined(TEST_UNPAD_CONSTANT_TIME) && \
(defined(WOLFSSL_SP_MATH) || defined(WOLFSSL_SP_MATH_ALL)) && \
!defined(WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK) && \
(defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_1024) || defined(USE_CERT_BUFFERS_2048))
/* Setting bit RSA_MAX_SIZE makes the modulus RSA_MAX_SIZE+1 bits, i.e.
* (RSA_MAX_SIZE/8 + 1) bytes -- size buffers accordingly with slack. */
#define WC_RSA_OVERSIZED_BUF_LEN ((RSA_MAX_SIZE / 8) + 8)
WC_RNG rng;
RsaKey key;
const byte* derKey;
word32 derKeySz;
word32 idx = 0;
byte flatC[256];
byte flatC[WC_RSA_OVERSIZED_BUF_LEN];
word32 flatCSz;
byte out[256];
byte out[WC_RSA_OVERSIZED_BUF_LEN];
word32 outSz = sizeof(out);
int encSz;
#ifdef USE_CERT_BUFFERS_1024
derKey = server_key_der_1024;
derKeySz = (word32)sizeof_server_key_der_1024;
flatCSz = 128;
#else
derKey = server_key_der_2048;
derKeySz = (word32)sizeof_server_key_der_2048;
flatCSz = 256;
#endif
XMEMSET(&key, 0, sizeof(RsaKey));
@@ -1251,12 +1261,22 @@ int test_wc_RsaFunctionCheckIn_OversizedModulus(void)
ExpectIntEQ(wc_RsaPrivateKeyDecode(derKey, &idx, &key, derKeySz), 0);
/* Force modulus bit count above RSA_MAX_SIZE. */
ExpectIntEQ(mp_set_bit(&key.n, RSA_MAX_SIZE), 0);
XMEMSET(flatC, 0, flatCSz);
ExpectIntEQ(wc_RsaDirect(flatC, flatCSz, out, &outSz, &key,
RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, &rng), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_KEY_SIZE_E));
/* Match wc_RsaDirect()'s inLen check so we actually reach
* RsaFunctionCheckIn() (where the MP_BITS_OVER_MAX guard lives). */
encSz = wc_RsaEncryptSize(&key);
ExpectIntGT(encSz, 0);
ExpectIntLE(encSz, (int)sizeof(flatC));
if (encSz > 0 && (size_t)encSz <= sizeof(flatC)) {
flatCSz = (word32)encSz;
XMEMSET(flatC, 0, flatCSz);
ExpectIntEQ(wc_RsaDirect(flatC, flatCSz, out, &outSz, &key,
RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, &rng), WC_NO_ERR_TRACE(WC_KEY_SIZE_E));
}
DoExpectIntEQ(wc_FreeRsaKey(&key), 0);
DoExpectIntEQ(wc_FreeRng(&rng), 0);
#undef WC_RSA_OVERSIZED_BUF_LEN
#endif
return EXPECT_RESULT();
} /* END test_wc_RsaFunctionCheckIn_OversizedModulus */