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tests: AES MC/DC white-box supplement + api decision/feature coverage
Add tests/unit-mcdc/, a standalone white-box program that compiles
wolfcrypt/src/aes.c directly to reach static/WOLFSSL_LOCAL helpers
(GHASH/GHASH_UPDATE ptr guards, _AesNew_common cross-arg checks) that
are structurally unreachable through the public API, closing 19 of the
AES MC/DC residuals. Extend tests/api/test_aes.{c,h} with the
decision/feature coverage cases these build on.
These are for the external ISO 26262 per-module MC/DC campaign; they do
not change library behaviour and are not part of the wolfSSL build.
This commit is contained in:
Daniele Lacamera
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+24
-2
@@ -60,6 +60,17 @@ int test_wc_AesKeyWrapVectors(void);
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int test_wc_AesKeyWrapDecisionCoverage(void);
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int test_wc_AesGcmDecisionCoverage(void);
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int test_wc_AesFeatureCoverage(void);
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int test_wc_AesSetKeyArgMcdc(void);
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int test_wc_AesModesArgMcdc(void);
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int test_wc_AesGcmArgMcdc(void);
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int test_wc_AesGmacArgMcdc(void);
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int test_wc_AesCcmArgMcdc(void);
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int test_wc_AesXtsArgMcdc(void);
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int test_wc_AesCmacArgMcdc(void);
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int test_wc_AesKeyExportArgMcdc(void);
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#if defined(WOLFSSL_AES_SIV) && defined(WOLFSSL_AES_128)
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int test_wc_AesSivArgMcdc(void);
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#endif
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int test_wc_AesCcmSetKey(void);
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int test_wc_AesCcmEncryptDecrypt(void);
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int test_wc_AesCcmEncryptDecrypt_InPlace(void);
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@@ -80,6 +91,7 @@ int test_wc_AesEaxVectors(void);
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int test_wc_AesEaxEncryptAuth(void);
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int test_wc_AesEaxDecryptAuth(void);
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int test_wc_AesEaxStream(void);
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int test_wc_AesEaxArgMcdc(void);
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#endif /* WOLFSSL_AES_EAX && WOLFSSL_AES_256*/
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#if defined(WOLFSSL_AES_SIV) && defined(WOLFSSL_AES_128)
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int test_wc_AesSivEncryptDecrypt(void);
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@@ -187,6 +199,14 @@ int test_wc_CryptoCb_Tls13_Key_No_Zero_Without_Offload(void);
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesKeyWrapDecisionCoverage), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesGcmDecisionCoverage), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesFeatureCoverage), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesSetKeyArgMcdc), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesModesArgMcdc), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesGcmArgMcdc), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesGmacArgMcdc), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesCcmArgMcdc), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesXtsArgMcdc), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesCmacArgMcdc), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesKeyExportArgMcdc), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesCcmSetKey), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesCcmEncryptDecrypt), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes", test_wc_AesCcmEncryptDecrypt_InPlace), \
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@@ -218,12 +238,14 @@ int test_wc_CryptoCb_Tls13_Key_No_Zero_Without_Offload(void);
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes-eax", test_wc_AesEaxVectors), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes-eax", test_wc_AesEaxEncryptAuth), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes-eax", test_wc_AesEaxDecryptAuth), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes-eax", test_wc_AesEaxStream)
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes-eax", test_wc_AesEaxStream), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes-eax", test_wc_AesEaxArgMcdc)
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#endif /* WOLFSSL_AES_EAX */
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#if defined(WOLFSSL_AES_SIV) && defined(WOLFSSL_AES_128)
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#define TEST_AES_SIV_DECLS \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes-siv", test_wc_AesSivEncryptDecrypt)
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes-siv", test_wc_AesSivEncryptDecrypt), \
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TEST_DECL_GROUP("aes-siv", test_wc_AesSivArgMcdc)
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#endif /* WOLFSSL_AES_SIV && WOLFSSL_AES_128 */
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#define TEST_GMAC_DECLS \
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@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
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# tests/unit-mcdc — white-box MC/DC supplements
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This directory holds small, standalone white-box programs that raise **MC/DC**
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(Modified Condition/Decision Coverage) on wolfcrypt/wolfssl source files by
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reaching decisions that are **structurally unreachable from the public API**.
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These are **not** part of the wolfSSL build and are **not** registered in
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`tests/api`. They exist for the external ISO 26262 per-module coverage campaign
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in `iso26262/mcdc-per-module/`. Nothing here changes library behaviour.
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## Why a separate module
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The `tests/api` suite drives each source file through its *public* API. A handful
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of decision conditions live in `WOLFSSL_LOCAL` (link-local) or file-`static`
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helpers whose "impossible" operand combinations every public caller rejects
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*before* the helper runs (e.g. a `size != 0` argument paired with a `NULL`
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pointer, which every `wc_*` entry point turns into `BAD_FUNC_ARG`). Such a
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condition's MC/DC independence pair can never be demonstrated from the API
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without editing library source.
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A white-box program compiles the `.c` file in directly (`#include`), so the
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static/local helpers are in scope, and calls them with **both halves of each
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MC/DC independence pair** in the same binary.
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## How coverage is combined
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llvm-cov computes MC/DC independence **per binary**. The campaign's
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`aggregate.sh` unions the "independence shown" bit **across binaries by source
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`line:col`**. So each pair must be completed *within the white-box binary
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itself* — it does not lean on the API tests to supply the other half. The
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white-box result is unioned in as an extra `"<variant>_wb"` ledger row, one per
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build variant, exactly like any other variant.
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## Build contract (driven by `run-mcdc.sh`)
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The campaign's `run-mcdc.sh` builds each file via `#include` with the **exact**
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compile flags the instrumented library used for that translation unit (captured
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from the real `libtool` command — struct layout and backend selection depend on
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`-DHAVE___UINT128_T`, `user_settings.h`, `-DWOLFSSL_TEST_STATIC_BUILD`, …), then
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links against that variant's `libwolfssl.a` **with the file's own object
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removed** (the white-box TU supplies the single, instrumented definition). The
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binary is run, exported with `llvm-cov export`, and its `aes.c` MC/DC is unioned
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by `line:col`. Any failure in this path is best-effort: it logs a skip and never
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affects the API variant's own coverage row.
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## Files
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| file | target source | reaches |
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|---|---|---|
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| `test_aes_whitebox.c` | `wolfcrypt/src/aes.c` | `GHASH` / `GHASH_UPDATE` internal `ptr != NULL` guards (Class 1, 13 conds) and `_AesNew_common` cross-argument `BAD_FUNC_ARG` checks (Class 2, 6 conds) |
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### `test_aes_whitebox.c` — what it deliberately does **not** cover
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Four aes.c union residuals remain structurally uncoverable even here and stay
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justified in `iso26262/mcdc-per-module/reports/aes/RESIDUALS.md`:
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- **13386:5**, **13836:5** — the two operands are exact logical **complements**
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of one parameter (`ivSz==0`/`ivSz>0`, `ivFixed==NULL`/`!=NULL`); unique-cause
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MC/DC is unsatisfiable by construction.
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- **14268:0** — `roll_auth`'s `ret==0` needs an internal AES op to fail
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mid-operation, not selectable without corrupting library state.
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- **15833:0** — a dead defensive branch on a loop index provably bounded to
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`[0,7)`.
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## Adding a new white-box module
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1. Create `test_<file>_whitebox.c` that `#include`s the target `.c` and, in
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`main()`, calls each unreachable helper with both halves of every targeted
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MC/DC pair. Keep every call memory-safe (short-circuits protect NULL derefs);
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surface setup failures as printed skips and **return 0** (a nonzero exit
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makes the campaign discard the variant).
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2. Point the campaign at it (a per-module white-box source path in
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`db/modules.json`); `run-mcdc.sh`'s white-box step handles build/link/export.
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3. Re-run `run-mcdc.sh <module>` then `aggregate.sh <module>`; confirm the
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targeted `line:col` keys leave `GAPS.md`.
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@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
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/* test_aes_whitebox.c
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*
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* White-box MC/DC supplement for wolfcrypt/src/aes.c.
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*
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* The tests/api AES suite drives aes.c through its *public* API. A handful of
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* decision conditions live in link-local (WOLFSSL_LOCAL) or file-static helpers
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* whose "impossible" operand combinations are rejected by every public caller
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* *before* the helper runs, so they can never be exercised from the API without
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* modifying library source. This translation unit reaches them by compiling
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* aes.c directly (#include) and calling the helpers with both halves of each
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* MC/DC independence pair.
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*
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* Coverage from this binary is unioned with the tests/api variant coverage by
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* source line:col in the per-module campaign (iso26262/mcdc-per-module):
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* llvm-cov computes MC/DC independence PER BINARY, and the campaign's
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* aggregate.sh ORs the "independence shown" bit across binaries by key. That is
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* why every pair below is completed *within this file* rather than relying on
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* the API tests to supply the other half.
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*
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* Build: compiled by run-mcdc.sh's white-box step with the SAME MC/DC CFLAGS,
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* -DHAVE_CONFIG_H and -I<workspace> as the instrumented library, then linked
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* against that variant's libwolfssl.a with its aes.o removed (this TU supplies
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* the instrumented aes.c). NOT part of the wolfSSL build; not registered in
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* tests/api. See tests/unit-mcdc/README.md.
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*
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* Targeted residuals (aes.c), by class:
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* Class 1 GHASH / GHASH_UPDATE internal ptr!=NULL guards ...... 13 conditions
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* Class 2 _AesNew_common cross-argument BAD_FUNC_ARG checks .... 6 conditions
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* The remaining 4 union residuals are structurally uncoverable even here
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* (2 complementary-operand decisions where unique-cause MC/DC is unsatisfiable,
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* 1 needs an internal AES failure not selectable without corrupting state,
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* 1 dead defensive branch on a provably-bounded loop index) and stay justified
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* in reports/aes/RESIDUALS.md.
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*/
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/* Pull aes.c in verbatim so the file-static and WOLFSSL_LOCAL helpers below are
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* in scope and instrumented in THIS binary. aes.c includes settings.h (which
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* picks up user_settings.h via -DWOLFSSL_USER_SETTINGS) and aes.h itself. */
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#include <wolfcrypt/src/aes.c>
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#include <stdio.h>
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#ifndef INVALID_DEVID
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#define INVALID_DEVID (-2)
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#endif
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static int wb_fail = 0;
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#define WB_NOTE(msg) do { printf(" [wb] %s\n", (msg)); } while (0)
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/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- *
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* Class 1a: classic GHASH() internal guards.
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*
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* if (aSz != 0 && a != NULL) -> cond idx1 (a != NULL)
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* if (cSz != 0 && c != NULL) -> cond idx1 (c != NULL)
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*
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* Every public wc_AesGcm* entry point returns BAD_FUNC_ARG for
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* "size != 0 with pointer == NULL", so GHASH never sees a!=NULL / c!=NULL
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* false. Only ONE GHASH backend compiles per build (GCM_SMALL / GCM_TABLE /
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* GCM_TABLE_4BIT / WORD64-default / GCM_WORD32); calling GHASH here covers
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* whichever line:col this build compiled. When a==NULL / c==NULL the guard
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* short-circuits before dereferencing, so the NULL calls are safe.
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* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
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#ifdef HAVE_AESGCM
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static void wb_ghash_classic(void)
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{
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Aes aes;
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byte key[16];
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byte buf[32];
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byte s[16];
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XMEMSET(key, 0, sizeof(key));
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XMEMSET(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
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if (wc_AesInit(&aes, NULL, INVALID_DEVID) != 0) {
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WB_NOTE("wc_AesInit failed (classic GHASH skipped)");
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wb_fail = 1;
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return;
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}
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if (wc_AesGcmSetKey(&aes, key, sizeof(key)) != 0) {
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WB_NOTE("wc_AesGcmSetKey failed (classic GHASH skipped)");
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wc_AesFree(&aes);
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wb_fail = 1;
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return;
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}
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/* TRUE half: aSz!=0 && a!=NULL, cSz!=0 && c!=NULL -> decisions true */
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GHASH(&aes.gcm, buf, (word32)sizeof(buf), buf, (word32)sizeof(buf),
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s, (word32)sizeof(s));
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/* FALSE half: aSz!=0 && a==NULL, cSz!=0 && c==NULL -> decisions false,
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* flipping the a!=NULL / c!=NULL operand while size!=0 is held true. */
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GHASH(&aes.gcm, NULL, (word32)sizeof(buf), NULL, (word32)sizeof(buf),
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s, (word32)sizeof(s));
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WB_NOTE("classic GHASH ptr-guard pairs exercised");
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wc_AesFree(&aes);
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}
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#else
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static void wb_ghash_classic(void) { WB_NOTE("HAVE_AESGCM off; classic GHASH skipped"); }
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#endif
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/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- *
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* Class 1b: streaming GHASH_UPDATE() internal guards (WOLFSSL_AESGCM_STREAM).
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*
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* if (aSz != 0 && a != NULL) -> cond idx1 (a != NULL)
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* if (aes->aOver > 0 && cSz > 0 && c != NULL) -> cond idx2 (c != NULL)
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* if (cSz != 0 && c != NULL) -> cond idx1 (c != NULL)
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*
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* GHASH_UPDATE is a single static helper (one line:col set regardless of GHASH
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* backend); one streaming build covers it. We set gcm->H via wc_AesGcmSetKey
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* and drive aes->aOver directly to reach the partial-AAD branch. Bodies use
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* AES_LASTGBLOCK(aes) and gcm->H (both valid) and never dereference a NULL a/c
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* because of the short-circuit, so every call is memory-safe.
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* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
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#if defined(HAVE_AESGCM) && defined(WOLFSSL_AESGCM_STREAM)
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static void wb_ghash_update(void)
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{
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Aes aes;
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byte key[16];
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byte iv[12];
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byte buf[32];
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XMEMSET(key, 0, sizeof(key));
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XMEMSET(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
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XMEMSET(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
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if (wc_AesInit(&aes, NULL, INVALID_DEVID) != 0) {
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WB_NOTE("wc_AesInit failed (GHASH_UPDATE skipped)");
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wb_fail = 1;
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return;
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}
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/* Public streaming init sets gcm->H, runs GHASH_INIT and (under
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* WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK) heap-allocates aes->streamData that AES_LASTGBLOCK
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* indexes into -- avoids a NULL scratch deref in the manual path below. */
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if (wc_AesGcmInit(&aes, key, sizeof(key), iv, sizeof(iv)) != 0) {
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WB_NOTE("wc_AesGcmInit failed (GHASH_UPDATE skipped)");
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wc_AesFree(&aes);
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wb_fail = 1;
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return;
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}
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aes.aOver = 0;
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aes.cOver = 0;
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/* line 10130: if (aSz != 0 && a != NULL) -- flip a!=NULL, hold aSz!=0 */
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aes.aOver = 0;
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GHASH_UPDATE(&aes, buf, (word32)WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NULL, 0); /* a!=NULL T */
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aes.aOver = 0;
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GHASH_UPDATE(&aes, NULL, (word32)WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NULL, 0);/* a!=NULL F */
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/* line 10168: if (aes->aOver > 0 && cSz > 0 && c != NULL)
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* hold aOver>0 and cSz>0, flip c!=NULL. The body zero-fills LASTGBLOCK and
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* does not read c, so c==NULL is safe. The TRUE path resets aOver to 0, so
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* re-arm aOver before each call. */
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aes.aOver = 4;
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GHASH_UPDATE(&aes, NULL, 0, NULL, (word32)WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* c!=NULL F */
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aes.aOver = 4;
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GHASH_UPDATE(&aes, NULL, 0, buf, (word32)WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* c!=NULL T */
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/* line 10180: if (cSz != 0 && c != NULL) -- aOver==0 so the block above is
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* skipped; hold cSz!=0, flip c!=NULL. */
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aes.aOver = 0;
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GHASH_UPDATE(&aes, NULL, 0, buf, (word32)WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* c!=NULL T */
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aes.aOver = 0;
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GHASH_UPDATE(&aes, NULL, 0, NULL, (word32)WC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE); /* c!=NULL F */
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WB_NOTE("streaming GHASH_UPDATE ptr-guard pairs exercised");
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wc_AesFree(&aes);
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}
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#else
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static void wb_ghash_update(void) { WB_NOTE("AESGCM stream off; GHASH_UPDATE skipped"); }
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#endif
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/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- *
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* Class 2: _AesNew_common() cross-argument BAD_FUNC_ARG checks.
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*
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* _AesNew_common(heap, devId, result_code, aesInitType, id, idLen, label)
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* validates that the id/idLen/label triple matches the init type. Each public
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* wrapper (wc_AesNew / wc_AesNew_Id / wc_AesNew_Label) hard-codes the arguments
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* it does not use, so the "wrong" combinations are unreachable through the API.
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* We call the static directly with each combination.
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*
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* AES_NEW_INIT_ID line 14766: if (id==NULL || idLen==0 || label!=NULL)
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* -> idx2 (label != NULL)
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* AES_NEW_INIT_LABEL line 14774: if (label==NULL || id!=NULL || idLen!=0)
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* -> idx1 (id != NULL), idx2 (idLen != 0)
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* default line 14783: if (id!=NULL || idLen!=0 || label!=NULL)
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* -> idx0 (id!=NULL), idx1 (idLen!=0), idx2 (label!=NULL)
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*
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* The BAD_FUNC_ARG branch frees nothing extra (no Aes init ran); the "all
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* false" branch runs a normal wc_AesInit* which we release with wc_AesDelete.
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* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
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static void wb_release(Aes* aes)
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{
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if (aes != NULL) {
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wc_AesFree(aes);
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XFREE(aes, NULL, DYNAMIC_TYPE_AES);
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}
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}
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static void wb_aesnew_common(void)
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{
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unsigned char id[4];
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const char* label = "wb-label";
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int rc = 0;
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Aes* aes;
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XMEMSET(id, 0x5A, sizeof(id));
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#ifdef WOLF_PRIVATE_KEY_ID
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/* line 14766, idx2 (label != NULL): id!=NULL,idLen!=0 held false-contrib,
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* flip label. TRUE -> BAD_FUNC_ARG (no init); FALSE -> real ID init. */
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aes = _AesNew_common(NULL, INVALID_DEVID, &rc, AES_NEW_INIT_ID,
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||||
id, (int)sizeof(id), label); /* label!=NULL -> true */
|
||||
wb_release(aes);
|
||||
aes = _AesNew_common(NULL, INVALID_DEVID, &rc, AES_NEW_INIT_ID,
|
||||
id, (int)sizeof(id), NULL); /* label==NULL -> false */
|
||||
wb_release(aes);
|
||||
|
||||
/* line 14774, idx1 (id!=NULL) and idx2 (idLen!=0): hold label!=NULL false,
|
||||
* flip id then idLen. */
|
||||
aes = _AesNew_common(NULL, INVALID_DEVID, &rc, AES_NEW_INIT_LABEL,
|
||||
id, 0, label); /* id!=NULL -> true */
|
||||
wb_release(aes);
|
||||
aes = _AesNew_common(NULL, INVALID_DEVID, &rc, AES_NEW_INIT_LABEL,
|
||||
NULL, 4, label); /* idLen!=0 -> true */
|
||||
wb_release(aes);
|
||||
aes = _AesNew_common(NULL, INVALID_DEVID, &rc, AES_NEW_INIT_LABEL,
|
||||
NULL, 0, label); /* both false -> real */
|
||||
wb_release(aes);
|
||||
WB_NOTE("_AesNew_common ID/LABEL cross-arg pairs exercised");
|
||||
#else
|
||||
(void)id; (void)label;
|
||||
WB_NOTE("WOLF_PRIVATE_KEY_ID off; ID/LABEL cases skipped");
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* line 14783 default case (always compiled), idx0/idx1/idx2: flip each of
|
||||
* id / idLen / label with the others held false. */
|
||||
aes = _AesNew_common(NULL, INVALID_DEVID, &rc, 0 /*plain*/,
|
||||
id, 0, NULL); /* id!=NULL -> true */
|
||||
wb_release(aes);
|
||||
aes = _AesNew_common(NULL, INVALID_DEVID, &rc, 0 /*plain*/,
|
||||
NULL, 4, NULL); /* idLen!=0 -> true */
|
||||
wb_release(aes);
|
||||
aes = _AesNew_common(NULL, INVALID_DEVID, &rc, 0 /*plain*/,
|
||||
NULL, 0, label); /* label!=NULL -> true */
|
||||
wb_release(aes);
|
||||
aes = _AesNew_common(NULL, INVALID_DEVID, &rc, 0 /*plain*/,
|
||||
NULL, 0, NULL); /* all false -> real */
|
||||
wb_release(aes);
|
||||
WB_NOTE("_AesNew_common default cross-arg pairs exercised");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int main(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
printf("aes.c white-box MC/DC supplement\n");
|
||||
#ifdef NO_AES
|
||||
printf(" NO_AES defined; nothing to exercise\n");
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
wb_ghash_classic();
|
||||
wb_ghash_update();
|
||||
wb_aesnew_common();
|
||||
printf("done (%s)\n", wb_fail ? "with skips" : "ok");
|
||||
/* Setup failures are surfaced as skips, not test failures: the campaign
|
||||
* treats a nonzero exit as a failed variant and discards its coverage. */
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user