netns needs bwrap; without it commands silently share the host network
namespace and parallel network tests collide on ports. Skip the check for
--list (it inspects configs, runs nothing), hard-fail on CI so a missing-
bubblewrap misconfig can't silently degrade, and locally just warn and fall
back to the shared namespace.
The socat suite is sleep-bound and slow run serially. Drive it through
parallel-make-check.py as ~6 shards per CPU, 2 running per CPU at once: each
shard runs a round-robin slice of the tests in its own bwrap network
namespace (so parallel shards don't collide on ports) and its own build-dir
copy. The work is almost all waiting, so the oversubscription just overlaps
the waits.
Install bubblewrap so the netns isolation actually happens (without it the
runner silently shares one namespace and the shards collide). Each fresh
netns is IPv4-loopback only, so re-create IPv6 loopback (CAP_NET_ADMIN) for
the ::1 / dual-stack tests, and add non-loopback placeholders (fc00::1,
192.0.2.1) so glibc's AI_ADDRCONFIG still returns both families - without
them socat's getaddrinfo fails on numeric non-loopback addresses, e.g. the
multicast tests. Relax the AppArmor unprivileged-userns restriction so the
bwrap netns + CAP_NET_ADMIN work on ubuntu-24.04.
Let any command ride the build/check pool, not just wolfSSL builds:
build false skips configure/make/check (config is just prepare+run)
netns true runs each command under 'bwrap --unshare-net --cap-add
CAP_NET_ADMIN' (its own network namespace) so parallel network
tests can't collide on ports and can configure that namespace
shards fan a config out into N instances, each with $SHARD (1..N) and
$SHARDS=N in its env and its own build-<name>-<k> dir, so a
command can split its work N ways (the pool load-balances them)
Error out, rather than silently degrade, on two misconfigurations that
otherwise surface as confusing test failures: netns requested but bwrap
missing (commands would share the host namespace and collide on ports),
and config-name collisions after shard fan-out (two jobs would share a
build dir and race).
use target native int for WC_ATOMIC_INT_ARG, add user overrideability, and
adjust WC_INIT_STATE_COUNT_BITS to depend on sizeof(WC_ATOMIC_UINT_ARG). add
a wc_static_assert to sanity-check WC_INIT_STATE_STATE_BITS, and use CHAR_BIT
opportunistically in the other wc_static_assert to sanity check that CHAR_BIT
is at least 8.
* in USE_WINDOWS_API wc_GenerateSeed(), recognize HAVE_AMD_RDSEED, and properly enforce FORCE_FAILURE_RDSEED when CPU support is missing;
* in WOLFSSL_LINUXKM wc_GenerateSeed(), initialize ret to RNG_FAILURE_E, and properly enforce FORCE_FAILURE_RDSEED when CPU support is missing;
* in WOLFSSL_BSDKM wc_GenerateSeed(), properly enforce FORCE_FAILURE_RDSEED when CPU support is missing;
The draft guard skips the job on draft PRs, but the pull_request
trigger used the default types (no ready_for_review), so marking a
draft ready did not re-run the job and it stayed skipped. Add the
standard types, matching the other workflows, so it re-runs when the
PR becomes ready.
With the cache save restricted to master, a cold-cache PR or release
run can no longer restore in the test job what the build job just built
(the per-PR cache scope is gone), so mbedtls/nss were compiled twice.
Upload the build as an artifact on a cache miss and download it in the
test job instead of recompiling, matching the handoff hostap-vm already
uses. master still restores from the shared cache, so it never uses the
artifact.
The v6.4.3_rel version was repeated in the cache path, cache key,
download URL and extract command. Define it once as a workflow-level
env var and reference it everywhere.
GitHub Actions caches are branch-scoped: an entry written by a
pull_request run lives under refs/pull/<N>/merge and is invisible to
other PRs. The haproxy, mbedtls, nss, ntp, threadx and hostap-vm
workflows used combined actions/cache with fixed keys, so every PR
re-saved its own copy of the same dependency, yielding one duplicate
cache entry per PR.
Split each into actions/cache/restore (always) plus actions/cache/save
gated to refs/heads/master, and add a daily schedule so a master run
reseeds the single shared entry that all PRs restore. mbedtls/nss save
in their build job only; the test jobs restore-only.
Disable the setup-msys2 package cache: the action only toggles caching
on/off and cannot save on master while restoring on PRs.
A single stalled apt mirror connection hung the ubuntu-24.04-full /
ubuntu-22.04-full download for ~20 min (they normally finish in a few),
tripping the 20-min job timeout and leaving those tags stale. The per-package
retry() only re-runs on a non-zero exit, so a hang never tripped it.
- apt drops a stalled connection after 30s and retries it
(Acquire::http/https::Timeout, Acquire::Retries).
- each apt-get is wrapped in `timeout` so a wedged process is hard-killed and
retry() re-runs it from scratch.
- raise the build job timeout 20 -> 60 min as a final backstop.
wolfcrypt/test/test.c: add missing !HAVE_SELFTEST gate around AES-CCM counter overflow test in aesccm_128_badarg_test();
wolfcrypt/src/error.c and wolfssl/wolfcrypt/error-crypt.h: update messages for AES_{GCM,CCM}_OVERFLOW_E.
DecodeExtensionType() guarded the certificatePolicies duplicate check
(VERIFY_AND_SET_OID) under WOLFSSL_SEP only, because the extCertPolicySet
tracking bit was SEP-only. In a WOLFSSL_CERT_EXT-without-WOLFSSL_SEP build a
cert with two certificatePolicies extensions was accepted and the second
silently overwrote the first (RFC 5280 4.2 forbids repeats). Make the bit and
the guard available under WOLFSSL_CERT_EXT too, matching every other
non-repeatable extension.
Add test_DecodeCertExtensions_dup_certpol (DecodeExtensionType now
WOLFSSL_TEST_VIS).
ParseCipherList() only cleared the InitSuites mask for "!aNULL"/"!eNULL",
which governs generated defaults, so an explicitly listed ADH or NULL-cipher
suite survived (e.g. "ADH-AES128-SHA:!aNULL" still offered an unauthenticated
suite). Scrub the explicit suites after parsing; exclusions are order-
independent and sticky (a later "ALL" cannot re-enable them).
Add test_wolfSSL_set_cipher_list_exclusions.
arduino.yml's per-core actions/cache layer stored the installed cores and
toolchains (~/.arduino15) - several GB, dominated by the esp32 and mbed
cores - in the 10 GB Actions cache. For esp32 it was also ineffective: the
disk-cleanup step deletes the esp32 toolchain before actions/cache saves it,
so esp32 re-downloaded every run anyway.
- New arduino-cores-image workflow resolves each of the 9 distinct cores and
publishes a tar of ~/.arduino15 + ~/Arduino/libraries to
ghcr.io/<owner>/wolfssl-ci-arduino:<core>. It runs monthly: esp32, the
fastest-moving core, releases ~monthly and the rest far less often.
- New install-arduino-core composite action restores that bundle offline and
verifies the core is present, falling back to `arduino-cli core install`
when the bundle is unavailable - so nothing breaks until the image is first
published and made public.
- arduino.yml calls the action in place of the inline core install and the
actions/cache step.
This takes the flaky espressif / esp8266.com / pjrc.com downloads off the PR
critical path and frees the Actions cache of the largest binaries it held.
setup-alire@v5 caches the gnat_native+gprbuild toolchain via actions/cache
(key alr[1][2.1.0][...]), holding ~1.26 GiB - 3x the 428 MiB toolchain, one
copy per ref - against the repo's 10 GiB cache cap. On a miss the toolchain
is only a ~17s pull from github.com (alire-project releases), so the cache
saved ~20-30s on a ~6.5min Ada job (dominated by gnatprove). Not worth the
space; install it fresh each run.
Regenerate the SP backends so the ECDH secret generators check the caller's
buffer against the number of bytes actually written. Adds a P-384/P-521
buffer-size regression test.
Only exempt the missing-certificate check during the initial handshake; once a
post-handshake CertificateRequest is outstanding the server again requires the
client certificate (and its CertificateVerify). Adds a post-handshake auth
test.
Ensure a peer's certificate form (X.509 vs raw public key) matches the
negotiated certificate type, defaulting to X.509 when none was negotiated,
on both the client and server. Adds RPK regression tests covering both
directions.