Refactor CMAC init to common function, add wc_AesNew_Id/Label API, do same for RSA new
functions, and add test init helpers for id[] support along with some test disable options
Add PKCS#11 integration for ML-KEM with key generation,
encapsulation and decapsulation support through the crypto
callback path.
Includes ML-KEM PKCS#11 constants/types, key store handling,
token object lifecycle management, and ML-KEM key init helpers
for private-key ID/label workflows.
Align implementation details with current upstream conventions
and review feedback:
- internal wolfCrypt ML-KEM path only for PKCS#11
- inline ML-KEM key-type/flag checks in PKCS#11 code
- proper key template formatting and enum placement
- ensure TLS ML-KEM object storage behavior is compatible with
PKCS#11 ephemeral-key decapsulation flow
* implement legacy compatibility in settings.h and configure.ac (adds --enable-blake2b while retaining --enable-blake2);
* fix incorrect Blake2 gates in wolfcrypt/src/hash.c wc_HashGetDigestSize() and wc_HashGetBlockSize();
* in wolfcrypt/test/test.c hash_test(), backfill missing Blake2 test coverage and separate blake2b from blake2s in typesHashBad[];
* in tests/api/test_hash.c, separate blake2b from blake2s in notCompiledHash[], sizeSupportedHash[], and sizeNotCompiledHash[].
wc_ecc_import_x963_ex2 only checked whether an imported public point
lies on the intended curve when both USE_ECC_B_PARAM was compiled in
and the caller passed untrusted=1. In a default ./configure build,
USE_ECC_B_PARAM is not defined, so the check was compiled out entirely.
Additionally, the legacy wrapper wc_ecc_import_x963_ex unconditionally
passed untrusted=0, meaning ECIES (wc_ecc_decrypt), PKCS#7 KARI, and
the EVP ECDH layer never triggered the check even when the macro was
present. In the OpenSSL compatibility layer, wolfSSL_ECPoint_d2i
guarded its on-curve check behind !wolfSSL_BN_is_one(point->Z), but
wc_ecc_import_point_der_ex always sets Z=1 for uncompressed points,
making the check dead code.
An attacker who can supply an EC public key (e.g. via an ECIES
ciphertext, PKCS#7 enveloped-data, EVP_PKEY_derive, or
EC_POINT_oct2point + ECDH_compute_key) can choose a point on a twist
of the target curve with a smooth-order subgroup. Each ECDH query
leaks the victim's static private scalar modulo a small prime; CRT
reconstruction across enough queries recovers the full key
(Biehl-Meyer-Müller invalid-curve attack). Static-key ECIES and PKCS#7
KARI are directly affected; TLS is affected in default builds because
the USE_ECC_B_PARAM gate defeated the untrusted=1 flag that the
handshake does pass.
Four changes close the attack:
1. Remove the USE_ECC_B_PARAM gate completely in the code base so that
wc_ecc_point_is_on_curve() is compiled in all builds, not only
those with HAVE_COMP_KEY or OPENSSL_EXTRA (only set for legacy FIPS
builds in settings.h).
2. wc_ecc_import_x963_ex: pass untrusted=1 to wc_ecc_import_x963_ex2
so that ECIES, PKCS#7 KARI, and EVP callers that go through the
four-argument wrapper always validate the imported point.
3. wc_ecc_import_x963_ex2: use the lightweight sp_ecc_is_point_NNN
helpers (curve-equation check only) instead of sp_ecc_check_key_NNN
(which additionally performs a full point*order scalar multiply).
For prime-order curves (P-256, P-384, P-521, SM2) the on-curve
equation check y^2 = x^3 + ax + b is sufficient to defeat
invalid-curve attacks — every non-identity point on a prime-order
curve has the full group order, so the expensive order-multiply
check is unnecessary. This avoids the ~50% ECDH performance
regression caused by the redundant scalar multiplication.
4. wolfSSL_ECPoint_d2i (pk_ec.c): add unconditional on-curve
validation via wolfSSL_EC_POINT_is_on_curve after import. The
existing check was gated on !wolfSSL_BN_is_one(point->Z) and
therefore dead code for all uncompressed-point imports. This closes
the OpenSSL compat layer attack path (EC_POINT_oct2point followed
by ECDH_compute_key).
Non-SP curves fall back to wc_ecc_point_is_on_curve which performs the
same equation check using mp_int arithmetic.
Reported by: Nicholas Carlini (Anthropic) & Thai Duong (Calif.io)
* wc_rng_bank_default_set()
* wc_rng_bank_default_checkout()
* wc_rng_bank_default_checkin()
* wc_rng_bank_default_clear()
* Added additional argument error checking to existing APIs, with a new
rng_inst_matches_bank() helper function.
* Implemented feature gates WC_RNG_BANK_DEFAULT_SUPPORT and
WC_RNG_BANK_NO_DEFAULT_SUPPORT. When WC_RNG_BANK_DEFAULT_SUPPORT, the new
APIs are available, and a NULL bank passed to APIs implicitly refers to the
default bank.
wolfcrypt/test/test.c: in random_bank_test() add comprehensive smoke test coverage of new APIs and argument checking.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_port.h and wolfcrypt/src/wc_port.c:
* Add wolfSSL_RefInc2(), wolfSSL_RefDec2(), wolfSSL_RefWithMutexInc2(), and
wolfSSL_RefWithMutexDec2(), returning the atomically determined new count in
the second arg;
* Fix type of second arg in the fallback definition of
wolfSSL_Atomic_Ptr_CompareExchange().
linuxkm/lkcapi_sha_glue.c:
Refactor the _REGISTER_HASH_DRBG / _REGISTER_HASH_DRBG_DEFAULT facility around
the new wc_rng_bank_default facility, eliminating post-init use of
kernel-native crypto_default_rng, crypto_get_default_rng(), and
crypto_put_default_rng(), and eliminating all use on kernel 7.1+ (where these
will become unexported kernel-native statics). With the refactor, the
LINUXKM_DRBG_GET_RANDOM_BYTES facility uses only direct native wolfCrypt
objects and calls to fulfill requests.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/error-crypt.h, wolfcrypt/src/error.c, wolfcrypt/test/test.c, tests/api.c: add WC_SUCCESS = 0 "wolfCrypt generic success".
* add WC_FIPS_186_4, WC_FIPS_186_4_PLUS, WC_FIPS_186_5, and WC_FIPS_186_5_PLUS feature macros.
* add support for WC_HASH_CUSTOM_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE, WC_HASH_CUSTOM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, and
WC_HASH_CUSTOM_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, for use with custom digest algorithms.
* add SigOidMatchesKeyOid() helper function and WC_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE macro.
* add additional size and OID agreement checks for sig gen and verify ops.
* update ecc_test_vector() with FIPS 186-5 vectors.
Co-authored-by: Tobias Frauenschläger <tobias@wolfssl.com>
wc_PKCS7_DecodeAuthEnvelopedData() accepted an attacker-controlled GCM tag
length from the mac OCTET STRING and did not validate it against the
parsed aes-ICVlen parameter. In parallel, wc_AesGcmDecrypt() accepted
very short tags on decrypt while encrypt enforced WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ.
This made short-tag verification reachable through CMS AuthEnvelopedData
and weakened integrity checks by allowing tag truncation.
Fixes:
- validate parsed macSz range in AuthEnvelopedData decode
- require authTagSz to match parsed macSz
- reject undersized GCM tags in PKCS7 decode
- enforce WOLFSSL_MIN_AUTH_TAG_SZ in wc_AesGcmDecrypt() and
wc_AesGcmDecryptFinal()
Also add a regression test in pkcs7authenveloped vectors that truncates
the final MAC OCTET STRING length from 16 to 1 and verifies decode fails.
Reported by: Nicholas Carlini (Anthropic) & Thai Duong (Calif.io)
fixes and workarounds for clang-tidy complaints:
* clang-diagnostic-unknown-warning-option
* bugprone-sizeof-expression
* clang-diagnostic-error "address argument to atomic operation must be a pointer to a trivially-copyable type"
* bugprone-macro-parentheses
* clang-diagnostic-unused-but-set-variable
* readability-redundant-declaration
Re-implemented wc_PKCS12_PBKDF() to not use MP. Added tests to
unit.test.
sp_int.c:
Fixes to comments.
Added more define build options documentation to top of file.
Fixes for builds with WOLFSSL_SP_INT_NEGATIVE defined.
Fixes for when a->used is 0 and no underflow - not actually a problem
but cleaner code.
sp_sub has different checks on a->used when values are only positive.
sp_dic_2d missing check for e less than zero.
sp_to_unsigned_bin_len_ct: remove redundant check of outSz. Change i
to int to handle a->used of 0 and make code tidier.
Configuration testing fixes.
Fix formatting in test.c.
Added 128-bit types word128 and sword128 for cleaner PKCS#12 code.
wolfcrypt/src/wc_slhdsa.c:
* refactor SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS2() in slhdsakey_fors_sign() as
CAN_SAVE_VECTOR_REGISTERS(), with local save-restore wrappers around the
rest of the vector calls deeper in the call stack, to avoid failing
GFP_ATOMIC allocations and long spans with interrupts disabled.
* fix numerous bugprone-macro-parentheses and bugprone-signed-char-misuses.
* use readUnalignedWord64() in SHAKE256_SET_SEED_HA_X4_*() and
slhdsakey_shake256_set_seed_ha_x4() to avoid benign unaligned access warnings
from sanitizers.
wolfcrypt/test/test.c:
* in TestDumpData(), use WOLFSSL_DEBUG_PRINTF(), not fprintf(stderr, ...), for
portability.
* in slhdsa_test_param() and slhdsa_test(), use WC_DECLARE_VAR() and friends
for SlhDsaKey allocations, and use ERROR_OUT() and single-return-point
refactors to fix error path memory leaks.
David Garske
Yosuke Shimizu
night1rider
Tobias Frauenschläger
Sean Parkinson
Daniel Pouzzner
philljj
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Josh Holtrop
Eric Blankenhorn
sebastian-carpenter
JacobBarthelmeh
Ruby Martin