* implement legacy compatibility in settings.h and configure.ac (adds --enable-blake2b while retaining --enable-blake2);
* fix incorrect Blake2 gates in wolfcrypt/src/hash.c wc_HashGetDigestSize() and wc_HashGetBlockSize();
* in wolfcrypt/test/test.c hash_test(), backfill missing Blake2 test coverage and separate blake2b from blake2s in typesHashBad[];
* in tests/api/test_hash.c, separate blake2b from blake2s in notCompiledHash[], sizeSupportedHash[], and sizeNotCompiledHash[].
wc_ecc_import_x963_ex2 only checked whether an imported public point
lies on the intended curve when both USE_ECC_B_PARAM was compiled in
and the caller passed untrusted=1. In a default ./configure build,
USE_ECC_B_PARAM is not defined, so the check was compiled out entirely.
Additionally, the legacy wrapper wc_ecc_import_x963_ex unconditionally
passed untrusted=0, meaning ECIES (wc_ecc_decrypt), PKCS#7 KARI, and
the EVP ECDH layer never triggered the check even when the macro was
present. In the OpenSSL compatibility layer, wolfSSL_ECPoint_d2i
guarded its on-curve check behind !wolfSSL_BN_is_one(point->Z), but
wc_ecc_import_point_der_ex always sets Z=1 for uncompressed points,
making the check dead code.
An attacker who can supply an EC public key (e.g. via an ECIES
ciphertext, PKCS#7 enveloped-data, EVP_PKEY_derive, or
EC_POINT_oct2point + ECDH_compute_key) can choose a point on a twist
of the target curve with a smooth-order subgroup. Each ECDH query
leaks the victim's static private scalar modulo a small prime; CRT
reconstruction across enough queries recovers the full key
(Biehl-Meyer-Müller invalid-curve attack). Static-key ECIES and PKCS#7
KARI are directly affected; TLS is affected in default builds because
the USE_ECC_B_PARAM gate defeated the untrusted=1 flag that the
handshake does pass.
Four changes close the attack:
1. Remove the USE_ECC_B_PARAM gate completely in the code base so that
wc_ecc_point_is_on_curve() is compiled in all builds, not only
those with HAVE_COMP_KEY or OPENSSL_EXTRA (only set for legacy FIPS
builds in settings.h).
2. wc_ecc_import_x963_ex: pass untrusted=1 to wc_ecc_import_x963_ex2
so that ECIES, PKCS#7 KARI, and EVP callers that go through the
four-argument wrapper always validate the imported point.
3. wc_ecc_import_x963_ex2: use the lightweight sp_ecc_is_point_NNN
helpers (curve-equation check only) instead of sp_ecc_check_key_NNN
(which additionally performs a full point*order scalar multiply).
For prime-order curves (P-256, P-384, P-521, SM2) the on-curve
equation check y^2 = x^3 + ax + b is sufficient to defeat
invalid-curve attacks — every non-identity point on a prime-order
curve has the full group order, so the expensive order-multiply
check is unnecessary. This avoids the ~50% ECDH performance
regression caused by the redundant scalar multiplication.
4. wolfSSL_ECPoint_d2i (pk_ec.c): add unconditional on-curve
validation via wolfSSL_EC_POINT_is_on_curve after import. The
existing check was gated on !wolfSSL_BN_is_one(point->Z) and
therefore dead code for all uncompressed-point imports. This closes
the OpenSSL compat layer attack path (EC_POINT_oct2point followed
by ECDH_compute_key).
Non-SP curves fall back to wc_ecc_point_is_on_curve which performs the
same equation check using mp_int arithmetic.
Reported by: Nicholas Carlini (Anthropic) & Thai Duong (Calif.io)
* add WC_FIPS_186_4, WC_FIPS_186_4_PLUS, WC_FIPS_186_5, and WC_FIPS_186_5_PLUS feature macros.
* add support for WC_HASH_CUSTOM_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE, WC_HASH_CUSTOM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE, and
WC_HASH_CUSTOM_MAX_BLOCK_SIZE, for use with custom digest algorithms.
* add SigOidMatchesKeyOid() helper function and WC_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE macro.
* add additional size and OID agreement checks for sig gen and verify ops.
* update ecc_test_vector() with FIPS 186-5 vectors.
Co-authored-by: Tobias Frauenschläger <tobias@wolfssl.com>
When an untrusted issuer has CA:FALSE and no verify_cb is registered,
the !isCa branch now fails closed (ret=WOLFSSL_FAILURE, goto exit)
instead of falling through and skipping X509StoreVerifyCert for the
leaf. SetupStoreCtxError_ex is also hardened to never overwrite a
previously recorded error with success, preventing a later valid chain
link from clobbering ctx->error back to X509_V_OK. Tests added for
both the no-callback rejection and the error-preservation cases.
Reported by: Nicholas Carlini (Anthropic) & Thai Duong (Calif.io)
EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() called wc_ChaCha20Poly1305_Final() which only
computes the Poly1305 tag, writing it into ctx->authTag and
overwriting the expected tag stored there by EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG.
No comparison was ever performed, so any forged tag was accepted.
Fix: save the expected tag before calling Final(), then verify with
wc_ChaCha20Poly1305_CheckTag() on the decrypt path, mirroring the
existing AES-GCM branch. Add a regression test that asserts
EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() rejects an all-zero forged tag.
Reported-by: Nicholas Carlini (Anthropic) & Bronson Yen (Calif.io)
- wolfSSL_i2d_OCSP_REQUEST_bio: save/restore pointer before i2d call
that advances it, preventing BIO_write from wrong offset and heap
corruption on free
- wolfSSL_d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE: remove (unsigned char) cast that truncated
pointer advance to 8 bits, breaking responses larger than 255 bytes
- wolfSSL_OCSP_CERTID_dup: deep-copy CertStatus to prevent double-free
when both original and duplicate are freed
- wolfSSL_i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE: add NULL check on response parameter
- wolfSSL_i2d_OCSP_REQUEST: advance *data pointer per i2d convention
- FreeOCSP: NULL-check ocsp->cm before dereferencing for heap
- Fix WOLFSSL_LEAVE strings to match actual function names in
wc_CheckCertOcspResponse, GetOcspEntry, GetOcspStatus,
CheckOcspResponse, CheckOcspRequest
Add test for CERTID dup (double-free confirmed under ASAN without fix)
and pointer advancement assertions for d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE callers.
Reported in: ZD21469
.github/workflows/wolfCrypt-Wconversion.yml: Add -Wcast-qual to all scenarios.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/signature.h, wolfcrypt/src/signature.c, doc/dox_comments/header_files/signature.h:
Remove incorrect const qualifier on the key argument in
* wc_SignatureVerifyHash()
* wc_SignatureVerify()
* wc_SignatureGenerateHash()
* wc_SignatureGenerateHash_ex()
* wc_SignatureGenerate()
* wc_SignatureGenerate_ex()
This fixes UB code patterns throughout signature.c. key is inherently
accessed readwrite by the underlying low level crypto. Fortunately, wolfCrypt
has no APIs/methods to allow actual const MPI key objects, therefore these
seeming breaking API changes can't actually break any users.
globally:
* Add const qualifiers to all struct pointer members that are assigned values
computed from const pointers.
* Add const qualifiers to intermediate casts for accessors and read-only
dereference constructs, as needed for -Wcast-qual hygiene, e.g. for a macro
GET_U16(a), use (*(const word16*)(a)) rather than (*(word16*)(a)).
* Add const qualifiers to internal declarations, and remove illegal casts, as
needed for -Wcast-qual hygiene.
* Add missing const qualifiers to all casts for argument, operand, and
assignment type agreement, as needed for -Wcast-qual hygiene, e.g.
"*data = (const byte*)dataASN->data.ref.data" rather than
"*data = (byte*)dataASN->data.ref.data".
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/asn.h, wolfssl/wolfcrypt/asn_public.h, wolfcrypt/src/asn.c, wolfcrypt/src/asn_orig.c:
* Add additional lifecycle management for object members that are only sometimes locally allocated:
DNS_entry.nameStored
DNS_entry.ipStringStored
DNS_entry.ridStringStored
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/types.h: add WC_BARRIER() macro -- a portable construct that
prevents compiler optimizers from reordering operations across the barrier.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/blake2-impl.h, wolfcrypt/src/blake2s.c, wolfcrypt/src/blake2b.c:
* In blake2b_init(), blake2b_init_key(), blake2s_init(), and
blake2s_init_key(), refactor blake2b_param initialization using WC_BARRIER()
(fixes volatile abuse that triggered -Wcast-qual).
* Remove the residual and unused WOLFSSL_BLAKE2[BS]_INIT_EACH_FIELD code.
wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c and wolfssl/wolfcrypt/ecc.h:
Remove incorrect const qualifier on curve arg to wc_ecc_free_curve() (internal function).
dtls13.c:
- Fix wrong return value in Dtls13SendFragmentedInternal error path (return outputSz instead of recordLength)
- Fix incomplete bounds check in Dtls13SendFragmented to account for DTLS_HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SZ
- Fix wrong WOLFSSL_ENTER trace string in Dtls13EpochCopyKeys
tls13.c:
- Remove wrong (byte) cast on cookie->len passed to TlsCheckCookie
- Add missing bounds check on PSK identityLen in SetupPskKey before copying to client_identity
- Fix data race on static header array in ExpectedResumptionSecret
- Add defensive underflow check in EncryptTls13 for consistency with DecryptTls13
- Fix wrong return variable in DTLS 1.3 Finished send error path (return dtlsRet instead of ret)
- Add missing SM3 case and default in Tls13_Exporter hash switch to prevent NULL dereference
- Initialize *outSz to 0 in wolfSSL_write_early_data to match wolfSSL_read_early_data
- Add bounds check for bindersLen against helloSz in CheckPreSharedKeys
- Fix resource leak and hash state corruption in ExpectedResumptionSecret error paths
- Fix memory leak of rsaSigBuf in dual-alg RSA+RSA CertificateVerify
- Guard against word32 underflow in inputLength - HANDSHAKE_HEADER_SZ in DoTls13HandShakeMsg
- Fix swapped side parameter in DeriveFinishedSecret for server-side Finished processing
- Fix no_mac fall-through in ssl_handshake_md to return NULL instead of wrong digest
- Fix strict aliasing violation in FindPsk PSK key size check
- Remove duplicate !ssl->options.dtls check in TLS 1.3 middlebox compat condition
tests:
- Add regression tests for wolfSSL_write_early_data outSz initialization and DTLS 1.3 Finished send error propagation
Anthony Hu
Daniel Pouzzner
JacobBarthelmeh
Tobias Frauenschläger
jordan
Reda Chouk
Eric Blankenhorn
Juliusz Sosinowicz
Paul Adelsbach
Marco Oliverio
David Garske