The generic wc_AesEncrypt/wc_AesDecrypt (aes.c) reject an AES object
whose key schedule was never set (rounds outside 1..7 after halving)
with KEYUSAGE_E, and every mode inherits that through their int return.
The RISC-V port's block helpers are void, so nothing reported unkeyed
use: wc_AesEncryptDirect and wc_AesCcmEncrypt/Decrypt silently
processed with a garbage schedule, and wc_AesCtrEncrypt classified it
as BAD_FUNC_ARG instead of KEYUSAGE_E.
Align the port with the generic error contract:
* wc_AesEncryptDirect / wc_AesDecryptDirect: add the generic rounds
check (also fixes wc_CmacUpdate error reporting, which goes through
wc_AesEncryptDirect on this port)
* wc_AesCcmEncrypt / wc_AesCcmDecrypt: same check after the argument
sanity block
* wc_AesCtrEncrypt (both variants): the existing rounds switch now
returns KEYUSAGE_E instead of BAD_FUNC_ARG
Found by the ISO 26262 MC/DC campaign argument-matrix tests
(test_wc_AesSetKeyArgMcdc, test_wc_AesModesArgMcdc, test_wc_AesCcmArgMcdc,
test_wc_CmacArgMcdc) under qemu-riscv64.
Align the RISC-V AES port's argument validation with the generic aes.c
implementations (and with the port's own vector/scalar-crypto siblings):
* wc_AesSetKey (base assembly variant, i.e. neither
WOLFSSL_RISCV_VECTOR_CRYPTO_ASM nor WOLFSSL_RISCV_SCALAR_CRYPTO_ASM):
reject key == NULL. The vector and scalar-crypto variants of the same
function already check it; the base variant passed NULL through to the
key expansion and wc_AesGcmSetKey then dereferenced the uninitialized
schedule, crashing on e.g. wc_AesGcmSetKey(aes, NULL, 16).
* wc_AesCcmEncrypt / wc_AesCcmDecrypt: reject authIn == NULL when
authInSz > 0, as the generic implementation does. The port otherwise
walks the NULL authIn buffer while computing the CBC-MAC.
Found by the ISO 26262 per-module MC/DC campaign's argument-matrix tests
(test_wc_AesGcmSetKey, test_wc_AesCcmArgMcdc) running the RISC-V port
under qemu-riscv64: upstream CI only exercises this port with the KAT
suite, which never passes invalid arguments.
Server-side PKCS#7 encode improvements that let downstream EST/SCEP enrollment
code (wolfCert) drive the existing encoder through the public API rather than
hand-rolling DER. Everything is gated under the existing HAVE_PKCS7 — no new
build options and no new public functions; the convenience wrappers live
caller-side.
Allow degenerate (certs-only) SignedData encode
Relax the hashOID != 0 requirement in PKCS7_EncodeSigned() when
sidType == DEGENERATE_SID, so a caller can produce a certs-only bundle (no
signer, attributes, or eContent — the form used by EST /cacerts and SCEP
GetCACert) by selecting DEGENERATE_SID via wc_PKCS7_SetSignerIdentifierType()
and calling wc_PKCS7_EncodeSignedData(). The output round-trips through
wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData().
Size the signed-attribute array to the actual count
The SignerInfo attribute working array is now sized to the real attribute
count instead of a fixed [7] array. An inline buffer (sized
MAX_SIGNED_ATTRIBS_SZ, the historical footprint) covers the common
allocation-free case; a heap buffer is used only when the count exceeds it.
The default-attribute count comes from a single helper
(wc_PKCS7_GetDefaultSignedAttribCount) so the sizing matches the emission
logic exactly, and the canned-attribute write is bound-checked against the
array capacity. This also fixes a latent overflow where the backing array was
hardcoded [7] while the bound check used MAX_SIGNED_ATTRIBS_SZ. The macro is
retained for source compatibility but no longer caps the count.
Document the decoded-attribute value shape
Documented the stable shape of PKCS7DecodedAttrib.value (the contents of the
SET OF AttributeValue, outer SET tag stripped) so callers can rely on it. No
behavior change.
Fix multi-certificate decode in non-streaming builds
Bound the additional-certificate loop in wc_PKCS7_VerifySignedData against the
absolute end of the certificate set (idx + length) rather than the relative
length. In NO_PKCS7_STREAM builds the old bound dropped trailing certificates
(all but the first when a large eContent preceded the set), failing
verification when the signer cert was among those dropped. Streaming builds
were unaffected.
Tests
Added coverage in pkcs7signed_test: degenerate certs-only encode via the
public API, nine-attribute encode (beyond the inline capacity), decoded
attribute value shape for PrintableString and OCTET STRING, and a
multi-certificate decode regression with large content that triggers the
bound bug under NO_PKCS7_STREAM. Added a signed-attribute selection
round-trip covering a messageDigest-only subset and the no-attributes case
via wc_PKCS7_SetDefaultSignedAttribs/wc_PKCS7_NoDefaultSignedAttribs, a
WOLFSSL_NO_MALLOC over-capacity case that must return BUFFER_E instead of
overrunning the inline buffer, and a malformed certificate-set length that
exercises the certSetEnd clamp in the verifier. Config-sensitive cases are
guarded.
tests/api/api.h: always use FIPS 186-4 settings if defined(HAVE_SELFTEST).
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h: if defined(HAVE_SELFTEST), #define WC_FIPS_186_4.
* refactor rng_bank.refcount management using wolfSSL_RefInc_IfAtLeast() and wolfSSL_RefDec_IfEquals(), to mitigate deallocation races.
* in wc_rng_bank_init(), fail fast for non-retryable errors.
* in wc_rng_bank_init(), wc_rng_bank_checkout(), and wc_rng_bank_inst_reinit(), consistently treat timeout_secs==0 as dont-wait, and timeout_secs<0 as wait-forever if wc_rng_bank_init() or flags & WC_RNG_BANK_FLAG_CAN_WAIT.
* in wc_rng_bank_checkout(), fix affinity dynamics to recompute after possible sleep, or drop affinity attempts entirely if using WC_RNG_BANK_FLAG_CAN_FAIL_OVER_INST strategy.
* implement wolfSSL_RefInc_IfAtLeast() and wolfSSL_RefDec_IfEquals().
* implement wolfSSL_RefWithMutexInc_IfAtLeast() and wolfSSL_RefWithMutexDec_IfEquals().
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/wc_port.h: for old FIPS when __GNUC__ or __clang__, always map __FUNCTION__ to __func__ for pedantic conformance.
* set up WC_LINUXKM_HAVE_SELFTEST and WC_LINUXKM_HAVE_SELFTEST_FULL early.
* replace the forced-downgrade from FIPS 186-5 to 186-4 for SHA-1 support, with a #error if configuration is incompatible.
linuxkm/linuxkm_wc_port.h, linuxkm/lkcapi_glue.c, linuxkm/module_exports.c.template, linuxkm/module_hooks.c, wolfcrypt/src/random.c: consolidate into the warning-masked span of linuxkm_wc_port.h, the #includes for kernel headers linux/fips.h, linux/vmalloc.h, and linux/random.h.
* remove FIPS 186-5 sign-mode restrictions from WC_HASH_CUSTOM_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE.
* set up WC_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE_FOR_SIGN and WC_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE_FOR_VERIFY, derived from WC_HASH_CUSTOM_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE, but enforcing FIPS 186-5 sign-mode restrictions only for WC_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE_FOR_SIGN.
* replace all uses of WC_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE with WC_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE_FOR_SIGN or WC_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE_FOR_VERIFY as appropriate.
wolfcrypt/test/test.c: in cryptocb_test(), don't expect callback execution in FIPS builds.
wolfssl/wolfcrypt/settings.h: in WOLFSSL_LINUXKM section, if defined(NO_SHA) while registering ECDSA handlers, force WC_MIN_DIGEST_SIZE_FOR_VERIFY to 20 for SHA-1 verify support.
Sean Parkinson
Daniel Pouzzner
David Garske
JacobBarthelmeh
Daniele Lacamera
Tobias Frauenschläger
philljj
night1rider
Emma Stensland
Hideki Miyazaki