Monte Carlo testing is randomized test data.
These new tests have random keys, IVs, nonce, etc and random data to
encrypt.
100 sets of random test data are encrypted and decrypted with a check to
ensure the input to encrypt is the same as the output of decrypt.
Tags are generated and checked in the calls to encrypt and decrypt.
Fixed wc_AesEaxAuthDataUpdate to check eax for NULL before
dereferencing.
Fix AesSivCipher to delete/free AES if new/initialization succeeded.
Memsetting to 0 doesn't work when WC_DEBUG_CIPHER_LIFECYCLE is defined.
Added tests for:
- AES-EAX streaming
- AES-SIV
- Poly1305
- DES-CBC
* simplify wolfSSL_BIO_set_conn_hostname, fixing OOB read
* restructure wolfSSL_BIO_ctrl_pending, fixing inverted check and
* ctrlCB checking
* return WOLFSSL_FAILURE in wolfSSL_BIO_up_ref when refInc fails,
updated test to reflect this
* check arguments for NULL in wolfSSL_BIO_ADDR_size
* replace non-portable type long usigned int with size_t
* wolfSSL_BIO_MEMORY_write: return WOLFSSL_BIO_ERROR on failure instead
of WOLFSSL_FAILURE, return 0 when len is 0
* wolfSSL_BIO_get_fp: fix type mismatch comparing XFILE* pointer against
XBADFILE
* wolfSSL_BIO_ctrl: add NULL check on bio before switch
* wolfSSL_BIO_pop: clear bio prev and next pointers after unlinking
* wolfSSL_BIO_gets: place null terminator after actual bytes read from
BIO_BIO nread
* implement legacy compatibility in settings.h and configure.ac (adds --enable-blake2b while retaining --enable-blake2);
* fix incorrect Blake2 gates in wolfcrypt/src/hash.c wc_HashGetDigestSize() and wc_HashGetBlockSize();
* in wolfcrypt/test/test.c hash_test(), backfill missing Blake2 test coverage and separate blake2b from blake2s in typesHashBad[];
* in tests/api/test_hash.c, separate blake2b from blake2s in notCompiledHash[], sizeSupportedHash[], and sizeNotCompiledHash[].
wc_ecc_import_x963_ex2 only checked whether an imported public point
lies on the intended curve when both USE_ECC_B_PARAM was compiled in
and the caller passed untrusted=1. In a default ./configure build,
USE_ECC_B_PARAM is not defined, so the check was compiled out entirely.
Additionally, the legacy wrapper wc_ecc_import_x963_ex unconditionally
passed untrusted=0, meaning ECIES (wc_ecc_decrypt), PKCS#7 KARI, and
the EVP ECDH layer never triggered the check even when the macro was
present. In the OpenSSL compatibility layer, wolfSSL_ECPoint_d2i
guarded its on-curve check behind !wolfSSL_BN_is_one(point->Z), but
wc_ecc_import_point_der_ex always sets Z=1 for uncompressed points,
making the check dead code.
An attacker who can supply an EC public key (e.g. via an ECIES
ciphertext, PKCS#7 enveloped-data, EVP_PKEY_derive, or
EC_POINT_oct2point + ECDH_compute_key) can choose a point on a twist
of the target curve with a smooth-order subgroup. Each ECDH query
leaks the victim's static private scalar modulo a small prime; CRT
reconstruction across enough queries recovers the full key
(Biehl-Meyer-Müller invalid-curve attack). Static-key ECIES and PKCS#7
KARI are directly affected; TLS is affected in default builds because
the USE_ECC_B_PARAM gate defeated the untrusted=1 flag that the
handshake does pass.
Four changes close the attack:
1. Remove the USE_ECC_B_PARAM gate completely in the code base so that
wc_ecc_point_is_on_curve() is compiled in all builds, not only
those with HAVE_COMP_KEY or OPENSSL_EXTRA (only set for legacy FIPS
builds in settings.h).
2. wc_ecc_import_x963_ex: pass untrusted=1 to wc_ecc_import_x963_ex2
so that ECIES, PKCS#7 KARI, and EVP callers that go through the
four-argument wrapper always validate the imported point.
3. wc_ecc_import_x963_ex2: use the lightweight sp_ecc_is_point_NNN
helpers (curve-equation check only) instead of sp_ecc_check_key_NNN
(which additionally performs a full point*order scalar multiply).
For prime-order curves (P-256, P-384, P-521, SM2) the on-curve
equation check y^2 = x^3 + ax + b is sufficient to defeat
invalid-curve attacks — every non-identity point on a prime-order
curve has the full group order, so the expensive order-multiply
check is unnecessary. This avoids the ~50% ECDH performance
regression caused by the redundant scalar multiplication.
4. wolfSSL_ECPoint_d2i (pk_ec.c): add unconditional on-curve
validation via wolfSSL_EC_POINT_is_on_curve after import. The
existing check was gated on !wolfSSL_BN_is_one(point->Z) and
therefore dead code for all uncompressed-point imports. This closes
the OpenSSL compat layer attack path (EC_POINT_oct2point followed
by ECDH_compute_key).
Non-SP curves fall back to wc_ecc_point_is_on_curve which performs the
same equation check using mp_int arithmetic.
Reported by: Nicholas Carlini (Anthropic) & Thai Duong (Calif.io)
night1rider
Mattia Moffa
Sean Parkinson
David Garske
Eric Blankenhorn
Daniel Pouzzner
Paul Adelsbach
Tobias Frauenschläger
Marco Oliverio
Hideki Miyazaki
JacobBarthelmeh
jordan