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add WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT option for old code path

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This commit is contained in:
toddouska
2016-09-13 16:45:15 -07:00
parent b77c350153
commit 7b3fc558ec
2 changed files with 16 additions and 2 deletions
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11
wolfcrypt/src/ecc.c
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@ -1877,7 +1877,8 @@ int wc_ecc_mulmod(mp_int* k, ecc_point *G, ecc_point *R, mp_int* a,
#else /* ECC_TIMING_RESISTANT */
#if defined(TFM_TIMINING_RESISTANT) && defined(USE_FAST_MATH)
#ifndef WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT
#if defined(TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT) && defined(USE_FAST_MATH)
/* let's use the one we already have */
extern const wolfssl_word wc_off_on_addr[2];
#else
@ -1895,7 +1896,8 @@ int wc_ecc_mulmod(mp_int* k, ecc_point *G, ecc_point *R, mp_int* a,
0xffffffffU
#endif
};
#endif
#endif /* TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT && USE_FAST_MATH */
#endif /* WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT */
/**
Perform a point multiplication (timing resistant)
@ -2034,6 +2036,10 @@ int wc_ecc_mulmod_ex(mp_int* k, ecc_point *G, ecc_point *R,
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = ecc_projective_add_point(M[0], M[1], M[i^1], a, modulus,
mp);
#ifdef WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT
if (err == MP_OKAY)
err = ecc_projective_dbl_point(M[i], M[i], a, modulus, mp);
#else
/* instead of using M[i] for double, which leaks key bit to cache
* monitor, use M[2] as temp, make sure address calc is constant,
* keep &M[0] and &M[1] in cache */
@ -2072,6 +2078,7 @@ int wc_ecc_mulmod_ex(mp_int* k, ecc_point *G, ecc_point *R,
((wolfssl_word)&M[1]->z & wc_off_on_addr[i])) );
if (err != MP_OKAY)
break;
#endif /* WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT */
} /* end for */
}

7
wolfcrypt/src/tfm.c
View File

@ -1035,6 +1035,7 @@ int fp_addmod(fp_int *a, fp_int *b, fp_int *c, fp_int *d)
#ifdef TFM_TIMING_RESISTANT
#ifndef WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT
/* all off / all on pointer addresses for constant calculations */
/* ecc.c uses same table */
const wolfssl_word wc_off_on_addr[2] =
@ -1052,6 +1053,8 @@ const wolfssl_word wc_off_on_addr[2] =
#endif
};
#endif /* WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT */
/* timing resistant montgomery ladder based exptmod
Based on work by Marc Joye, Sung-Ming Yen, "The Montgomery Powering Ladder",
Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems, CHES 2002
@ -1111,6 +1114,9 @@ static int _fp_exptmod(fp_int * G, fp_int * X, fp_int * P, fp_int * Y)
/* do ops */
fp_mul(&R[0], &R[1], &R[y^1]); fp_montgomery_reduce(&R[y^1], P, mp);
#ifdef WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT
fp_sqr(&R[y], &R[y]); fp_montgomery_reduce(&R[y], P, mp);
#else
/* instead of using R[y] for sqr, which leaks key bit to cache monitor,
* use R[2] as temp, make sure address calc is constant, keep
* &R[0] and &R[1] in cache */
@ -1121,6 +1127,7 @@ static int _fp_exptmod(fp_int * G, fp_int * X, fp_int * P, fp_int * Y)
fp_copy(&R[2],
(fp_int*) ( ((wolfssl_word)&R[0] & wc_off_on_addr[y^1]) +
((wolfssl_word)&R[1] & wc_off_on_addr[y]) ) );
#endif /* WC_NO_CACHE_RESISTANT */
}
fp_montgomery_reduce(&R[0], P, mp);