X509 validation fixes

2026-07-09 09:30:55 +02:00 · 2026-06-18 15:17:01 -07:00
parent 675d5df2cd
commit cc78d130c4
5 changed files with 407 additions and 0 deletions
@@ -13542,6 +13542,57 @@ static int PatternHasWildcardInALabel(const char* pattern, word32 patternLen)
    return 0;
 }

+/* Validate the placement of a wildcard ('*') in a presented identifier per
+ * RFC 6125 sec. 6.4.3 / RFC 9525 sec. 6.3 and CA/Browser Forum Baseline
+ * Requirements sec. 3.2.2.6:
+ *   - a wildcard may only appear in the left-most label of the pattern, and
+ *   - a left-most label consisting solely of the wildcard ("*") may match only
+ *     when at least two further labels (i.e. at least two dots) follow it.
+ *
+ * This rejects a bare "*" (matches any single-label name), "*.com" (wildcard
+ * immediately to the left of a registry/public suffix), and
+ * "foo.*.example.com" (wildcard not in the left-most label), while still
+ * accepting the legitimate "*.example.com" form. Partial left-most wildcards
+ * such as "a*" or "a*b*" retain their existing matching behavior - they are
+ * not bare wildcard labels and are not subject to the two-label requirement.
+ * pattern/patternLen must already have any single trailing FQDN dot stripped.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the pattern has no wildcard or its wildcard placement is
+ * acceptable, 0 otherwise. */
+static int WildcardPlacementOK(const char* pattern, word32 patternLen)
+{
+    word32 i;
+    int sawWildcard = 0;
+    int sawDot = 0;
+    int dots = 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < patternLen; i++) {
+        if (pattern[i] == '*') {
+            /* A wildcard is only permitted in the left-most label: reject any
+             * '*' that appears after a label separator. */
+            if (sawDot)
+                return 0;
+            sawWildcard = 1;
+        }
+        else if (pattern[i] == '.') {
+            sawDot = 1;
+            dots++;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!sawWildcard)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* A left-most label that is exactly "*" (a bare wildcard label) requires at
+     * least two further labels. This rejects a bare "*" (0 dots) and "*.tld"
+     * (1 dot) but still allows "*.example.com" (2 dots). */
+    if (pattern[0] == '*' && (patternLen == 1 || pattern[1] == '.') &&
+            dots < 2)
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
 /* Match names with wildcards, each wildcard can represent a single name
   component or fragment but not multiple names, i.e.,
   *.z.com matches y.z.com but not x.y.z.com
@@ -13598,6 +13649,13 @@ int MatchDomainName(const char* pattern, int patternLen, const char* str,
        }
    }

+    /* RFC 6125 sec. 6.4.3 / RFC 9525 sec. 6.3 + CA/Browser Forum BR
+     * sec. 3.2.2.6: reject a pattern whose wildcard is not confined to the
+     * left-most label, or that has fewer than two labels to the right of the
+     * wildcard (e.g. "*", "*.com", "foo.*.example.com"). */
+    if (!WildcardPlacementOK(pattern, (word32)patternLen))
+        return 0;
+
    while (patternLen > 0) {
        /* Get the next pattern char to evaluate */
        char p = (char)XTOLOWER((unsigned char)*pattern);
@@ -629,6 +629,99 @@ static int X509StoreCertIsTrusted(WOLFSSL_X509_STORE* store,
    return 0;
 }

+/* Enforce the BasicConstraints pathLenConstraint (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9 and
+ * the path validation rules in sec. 6.1.4 (l)/(m)) over the certification path
+ * assembled in ctx->chain.
+ *
+ * wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert() authenticates each certificate individually via
+ * the CertManager, which parses every certificate as CERT_TYPE.  The issuer
+ * pathLen check in ParseCertRelative() is gated on a non-CERT_TYPE certificate
+ * type (it is reached on the TLS handshake path via CHAIN_CERT_TYPE), so the
+ * OpenSSL-compatibility path never enforced it.  Re-create that check here over
+ * the completed path so that a CA asserting pathlen:N cannot issue more than N
+ * subordinate intermediate CAs.
+ *
+ * ctx->chain is ordered leaf first (index 0) up to the trust anchor (highest
+ * index).  Walk from the trust anchor down toward the leaf, tracking the
+ * remaining number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates permitted.
+ * WOLFSSL_MAX_PATH_LEN is used as the "no constraint" sentinel, mirroring
+ * InitDecodedCert_ex()/ParseCertRelative().  The leaf (index 0) issues nothing
+ * and is therefore not subject to the constraint.
+ *
+ * Returns WOLFSSL_SUCCESS if the path satisfies every pathLenConstraint, or
+ * WOLFSSL_FAILURE (with ctx->error set) on the first violation. */
+static int X509StoreCheckPathLen(WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
+{
+    int num;
+    int i;
+    word32 maxPathLen = WOLFSSL_MAX_PATH_LEN;
+    WOLFSSL_X509* anchor;
+
+    if (ctx == NULL || ctx->chain == NULL)
+        return WOLFSSL_SUCCESS;
+
+    num = wolfSSL_sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
+    /* A pathLen violation requires at least one intermediate between the leaf
+     * (index 0) and the trust anchor, i.e. a chain of three or more. */
+    if (num < 3)
+        return WOLFSSL_SUCCESS;
+
+    /* The trust anchor (top of chain) is not part of the prospective
+     * certification path (RFC 5280 sec. 6.1): it does not consume path-length
+     * budget. A self-signed anchor that asserts its own pathLenConstraint does
+     * still bound the path, matching ParseCertRelative()'s trust-anchor
+     * handling, so seed the budget from it. The partial-chain branch of
+     * wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert() pushes the terminal certificate twice, so the
+     * anchor pointer can also appear at num-2; it is skipped by pointer below
+     * to avoid double-counting. */
+    anchor = wolfSSL_sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
+    if (anchor != NULL && anchor->isCa && anchor->basicConstPlSet)
+        maxPathLen = (word32)anchor->pathLength;
+
+    for (i = num - 2; i >= 1; i--) {
+        WOLFSSL_X509* cert = wolfSSL_sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
+        int selfIssued;
+
+        if (cert == NULL || cert == anchor)
+            continue;
+
+        selfIssued =
+            (wolfSSL_X509_NAME_cmp(&cert->issuer, &cert->subject) == 0);
+
+        /* RFC 5280 sec. 6.1.4 (l): a non-self-issued certificate consumes one
+         * unit of the issuer's remaining path length budget. */
+        if (!selfIssued) {
+            if (maxPathLen == 0) {
+                SetupStoreCtxError_ex(ctx,
+                    WOLFSSL_X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, i);
+            #if defined(OPENSSL_ALL) || defined(WOLFSSL_QT)
+                /* Allow an application verify callback to override, matching
+                 * the INVALID_CA handling in wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(). */
+                if (ctx->store != NULL && ctx->store->verify_cb != NULL &&
+                        ctx->store->verify_cb(0, ctx) == 1) {
+                    /* Overridden: keep walking without decrementing (budget is
+                     * already exhausted). */
+                    continue;
+                }
+            #endif
+                return WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
+            }
+            else if (maxPathLen != WOLFSSL_MAX_PATH_LEN) {
+                maxPathLen--;
+            }
+        }
+
+        /* RFC 5280 sec. 6.1.4 (m): tighten the budget with this CA's own
+         * pathLenConstraint, if present. */
+        if (cert->isCa && cert->basicConstPlSet &&
+                (word32)cert->pathLength < maxPathLen) {
+            maxPathLen = (word32)cert->pathLength;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return WOLFSSL_SUCCESS;
+}
+
 /* Verifies certificate chain using WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX
 * returns 1 on success or <= 0 on failure.
 */
@@ -878,6 +971,13 @@ int wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert(WOLFSSL_X509_STORE_CTX* ctx)
        ret = WOLFSSL_FAILURE;
    }

+    /* RFC 5280 sec. 6.1.4: the per-certificate CertManager verification above
+     * does not enforce the issuer's BasicConstraints pathLenConstraint on this
+     * API path, so check it over the assembled path before reporting success. */
+    if (ret == WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
+        ret = X509StoreCheckPathLen(ctx);
+    }
+
 exit:
    /* Copy back failed certs. */
    numFailedCerts = wolfSSL_sk_X509_num(failedCerts);
@@ -1862,6 +1862,82 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_check_host_embedded_nul_san(void)
    return EXPECT_RESULT();
 }

+/* Verify that MatchDomainName() enforces RFC 6125 sec. 6.4.3 / RFC 9525
+ * sec. 6.3 and CA/Browser Forum BR sec. 3.2.2.6 wildcard placement rules:
+ * a wildcard is confined to the left-most label, and a bare wildcard label
+ * ("*") requires at least two further labels.  Regression test for the
+ * x509-limbo findings that "*", "*.com" and "foo.*.example.com" were matched.
+ *
+ * MatchDomainName() is exposed for testing via the visibility mechanism
+ * declared in wolfssl/internal.h. */
+int test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_wildcard(void)
+{
+    EXPECT_DECLS;
+#if !defined(NO_ASN) && !defined(WOLFCRYPT_ONLY) && !defined(NO_CERTS)
+    static const struct {
+        const char* pattern;
+        const char* host;
+        unsigned int flags;
+        int expected; /* 1 = match, 0 = no match */
+        const char* note;
+    } cases[] = {
+        /* --- The reported forbidden patterns must NOT match. --- */
+        /* Bare wildcard: matches any single-label name. */
+        { "*",                   "com",                 0, 0, "bare wildcard" },
+        { "*",                   "anything",            0, 0,
+          "bare wildcard 2" },
+        /* Wildcard not in the left-most label. */
+        { "foo.*.example.com",   "foo.bar.example.com", 0, 0,
+          "wildcard in middle label" },
+        { "foo.*.example.com",   "foo.x.example.com",   0, 0,
+          "wildcard in middle label 2" },
+        /* Bare wildcard immediately left of a public/registry suffix. */
+        { "*.com",               "example.com",         0, 0,
+          "public-suffix wildcard" },
+        { "*.com",               "evil.com",            0, 0,
+          "public-suffix wildcard 2" },
+        /* Two label-spanning wildcards: the second is not left-most. */
+        { "*.*.example.com",     "a.b.example.com",     0, 0,
+          "second wildcard not left-most" },
+
+        /* --- Legitimate wildcards must still match. --- */
+        { "*.example.com",       "foo.example.com",     0, 1,
+          "single left-most wildcard" },
+        { "*.example.com",       "bar.example.com",     0, 1,
+          "single left-most wildcard 2" },
+        /* Two labels after the wildcard is sufficient; no public-suffix list
+         * is consulted (matching OpenSSL). */
+        { "*.co.uk",             "foo.co.uk",           0, 1,
+          "two labels after wildcard" },
+        /* Partial left-most wildcards retain their existing behavior and are
+         * not subject to the bare-wildcard two-label requirement. */
+        { "a*.example.com",      "abc.example.com",     0, 1,
+          "partial left-most wildcard" },
+        /* A wildcard never spans a label separator. */
+        { "*.example.com",       "foo.bar.example.com", 0, 0,
+          "wildcard does not cross a dot" },
+    };
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
+        int got = MatchDomainName(
+                    cases[i].pattern, (int)XSTRLEN(cases[i].pattern),
+                    cases[i].host,    (word32)XSTRLEN(cases[i].host),
+                    cases[i].flags);
+        ExpectIntEQ(got, cases[i].expected);
+        if (! EXPECT_SUCCESS()) {
+            fprintf(stderr,
+                "MatchDomainName(\"%s\", \"%s\", flags=0x%x) = %d, "
+                "expected %d (%s)\n",
+                cases[i].pattern, cases[i].host, cases[i].flags,
+                got, cases[i].expected, cases[i].note);
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+#endif /* !NO_ASN && !WOLFCRYPT_ONLY && !NO_CERTS */
+    return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
 int test_wolfSSL_X509_max_altnames(void)
 {
    EXPECT_DECLS;
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_name_match3(void);
 int test_wolfssl_local_IsValidFQDN(void);
 int test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_idn(void);
 int test_wolfSSL_X509_check_host_embedded_nul_san(void);
+int test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_wildcard(void);
 int test_wolfSSL_X509_max_altnames(void);
 int test_wolfSSL_X509_max_name_constraints(void);
 int test_wolfSSL_X509_check_ca(void);
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_cmp(void);
    TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfssl_local_IsValidFQDN),              \
    TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_idn),            \
    TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_check_host_embedded_nul_san),\
+    TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_MatchDomainName_wildcard),       \
    TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_max_altnames),              \
    TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_max_name_constraints),      \
    TEST_DECL_GROUP("ossl_x509", test_wolfSSL_X509_check_ca),                  \
@@ -957,6 +957,173 @@ static int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex12(void)
 #endif
 #endif

+#if defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA) && !defined(NO_CERTS) && defined(HAVE_ECC)
+/* Regression test for the x509-limbo "pathlen" finding:
+ * wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert() must enforce the BasicConstraints
+ * pathLenConstraint (RFC 5280 sec. 4.2.1.9 / sec. 6.1.4).  A CA asserting
+ * pathlen:0 may only issue end-entity certificates; it must not be permitted
+ * to issue a further intermediate CA.
+ *
+ *   root  ->  ica0 (CA, pathlen:0)  ->  ica1 (CA, pathlen:0)  ->  leaf
+ *
+ * ica1 is an intermediate CA following ica0, which ica0's pathlen:0 forbids,
+ * so the chain must be rejected with X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED.  Before
+ * the fix this OpenSSL-compatibility path accepted the chain because each
+ * certificate was verified individually (as CERT_TYPE) without the issuer
+ * pathLen check the TLS handshake path performs. */
+static X509* pathlen_pem_to_x509(const char* pem)
+{
+    X509* x = NULL;
+    BIO* bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(pem, -1);
+    if (bio != NULL) {
+        x = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+        BIO_free(bio);
+    }
+    return x;
+}
+
+static int test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen(void)
+{
+    EXPECT_DECLS;
+    /* x509-limbo intermediate-pathlen-0 chain (NIST P-256). */
+    static const char* root_pem =
+        "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+        "MIIBjzCCATWgAwIBAgIUBr1M7Bi+lJsTuNKLX1Me8do6eaQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n"
+        "GjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPeDUwOS1saW1iby1yb290MCAXDTcwMDEwMTAwMDAwMVoYDzI5\n"
+        "NjkwNTAzMDAwMDAxWjAaMRgwFgYDVQQDDA94NTA5LWxpbWJvLXJvb3QwWTATBgcq\n"
+        "hkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAQbEiFksWbYAbT6XaE4bwPlfA9TBdDVohu/uCIL\n"
+        "xP51Zj39ZQijgxN9jxXyvCgo8Of/x5M0IHSUuc17eaBD+EEbo1cwVTAPBgNVHRMB\n"
+        "Af8EBTADAQH/MAsGA1UdDwQEAwIBBjAWBgNVHREEDzANggtleGFtcGxlLmNvbTAd\n"
+        "BgNVHQ4EFgQUonHZJ38dXr7snblbNqaxj6KZwOYwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIh\n"
+        "ANxM3gjJ/3FIvHLgFt9MlFXDUZs38+f+90xZ+UWEtg/sAiBwDNrH5LaFE+kGvHih\n"
+        "aXu0ueUy9q+2v7FMk1DqDF5QMA==\n"
+        "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+    static const char* ica0_pem =
+        "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+        "MIIB/zCCAaWgAwIBAgIUWQmq3hQYYc2aAeHbkAhBu2TswggwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n"
+        "GjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPeDUwOS1saW1iby1yb290MCAXDTcwMDEwMTAwMDAwMVoYDzI5\n"
+        "NjkwNTAzMDAwMDAxWjBmMTgwNgYDVQQLDC8zODQ3NTQ4NjM0MDcyNTc1NDQyNDQy\n"
+        "MTQxNDk1NTczNzU0OTc0NTAyNTYxMjE5NjEqMCgGA1UEAwwheDUwOS1saW1iby1p\n"
+        "bnRlcm1lZGlhdGUtcGF0aGxlbi0wMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE\n"
+        "htjb5R5OipW7n8rfvqA7yP/yxpdq9QzwSxC41RjoE//1SX16xsjOAIOYu/1L8iEq\n"
+        "1Y6x7yBnkoFFpWW0R2JN0aN7MHkwEgYDVR0TAQH/BAgwBgEB/wIBADALBgNVHQ8E\n"
+        "BAMCAgQwFgYDVR0RBA8wDYILZXhhbXBsZS5jb20wHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUonHZJ38d\n"
+        "Xr7snblbNqaxj6KZwOYwHQYDVR0OBBYEFI5psdjr2bzbP8AYzh747r3zKXjzMAoG\n"
+        "CCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIQChdmrAmCCIGBKdR31PSCKcBFkhqIg1rFH5n9ISC0XT\n"
+        "MwIgBpm/FQrFVRPNXUq3Pjp5nCCQNuusc/UF0WQtogoxMcs=\n"
+        "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+    static const char* ica1_pem =
+        "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+        "MIICTDCCAfKgAwIBAgIUUzHoF6QQi7Q1abKHM2OkqXAyhXAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n"
+        "ZjE4MDYGA1UECwwvMzg0NzU0ODYzNDA3MjU3NTQ0MjQ0MjE0MTQ5NTU3Mzc1NDk3\n"
+        "NDUwMjU2MTIxOTYxKjAoBgNVBAMMIXg1MDktbGltYm8taW50ZXJtZWRpYXRlLXBh\n"
+        "dGhsZW4tMDAgFw03MDAxMDEwMDAwMDFaGA8yOTY5MDUwMzAwMDAwMVowZzE5MDcG\n"
+        "A1UECwwwNTA4MzE1NzY5OTY4MTEzNTA3Njc4NzYzNDMxNDk4OTE0NTU3NTI4MDQ4\n"
+        "OTc2MzkyMSowKAYDVQQDDCF4NTA5LWxpbWJvLWludGVybWVkaWF0ZS1wYXRobGVu\n"
+        "LTAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAAQJAU5C0BQNKWv1lpCWYvrbguNZ\n"
+        "7Ru3850SYzxAHVdqoqpXQqz1rxMGkIIQzNk1GhUXbMUVbQD0jvaJcoGfkNO5o3sw\n"
+        "eTASBgNVHRMBAf8ECDAGAQH/AgEAMAsGA1UdDwQEAwICBDAWBgNVHREEDzANggtl\n"
+        "eGFtcGxlLmNvbTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBSOabHY69m82z/AGM4e+O698yl48zAdBgNV\n"
+        "HQ4EFgQUCRY9Zhvn1ujILJxVlXN6ngBEGUcwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIhAPWq\n"
+        "eItvUILeT5ZV1sA/2T2KXLmhO+lyaIJKbayTWTluAiBAnlFFqQhLRPC9aXnmvzld\n"
+        "4OQO4zOBVTRVR1fyTaGRLA==\n"
+        "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+    static const char* leaf_pem =
+        "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+        "MIIB/jCCAaOgAwIBAgIUUgfgeS9xej4Xq/a8Bg2Dzj3MedEwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n"
+        "ZzE5MDcGA1UECwwwNTA4MzE1NzY5OTY4MTEzNTA3Njc4NzYzNDMxNDk4OTE0NTU3\n"
+        "NTI4MDQ4OTc2MzkyMSowKAYDVQQDDCF4NTA5LWxpbWJvLWludGVybWVkaWF0ZS1w\n"
+        "YXRobGVuLTAwIBcNNzAwMTAxMDAwMDAxWhgPMjk2OTA1MDMwMDAwMDFaMBYxFDAS\n"
+        "BgNVBAMMC2V4YW1wbGUuY29tMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAERG/C\n"
+        "Q3diuQGNPeztXUpMthR9/695MnMj/tpF6NHkEBO91bBKFdjhnievo6XnpfEOer/z\n"
+        "nHvUEwH3UH7swoP3qKN8MHowHQYDVR0OBBYEFMorXKe6f7/o5tnf5iacR/PPM9F3\n"
+        "MB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFAkWPWYb59boyCycVZVzep4ARBlHMAsGA1UdDwQEAwIHgDAT\n"
+        "BgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATAWBgNVHREEDzANggtleGFtcGxlLmNvbTAKBggq\n"
+        "hkjOPQQDAgNJADBGAiEAjQovFZD9svq8vGyuCa82Cq3/YeoHkDyyRalhv4BV7X8C\n"
+        "IQDqXCv7h0gMIVsWOSef8zu4DubHxn7Icm7DwJg0O2lSuw==\n"
+        "-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+    X509* root = NULL;
+    X509* ica0 = NULL;
+    X509* ica1 = NULL;
+    X509* leaf = NULL;
+    X509_STORE* store = NULL;
+    X509_STORE_CTX* ctx = NULL;
+    STACK_OF(X509)* inter = NULL;
+
+    ExpectNotNull(root = pathlen_pem_to_x509(root_pem));
+    ExpectNotNull(ica0 = pathlen_pem_to_x509(ica0_pem));
+    ExpectNotNull(ica1 = pathlen_pem_to_x509(ica1_pem));
+    ExpectNotNull(leaf = pathlen_pem_to_x509(leaf_pem));
+
+    ExpectNotNull(store = X509_STORE_new());
+    ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, root), 1);
+    ExpectNotNull(inter = sk_X509_new_null());
+    ExpectIntGT(sk_X509_push(inter, ica0), 0);
+    ExpectIntGT(sk_X509_push(inter, ica1), 0);
+
+    ExpectNotNull(ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new());
+    ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, inter), 1);
+    /* Must be rejected: ica1 violates ica0's pathlen:0 constraint. */
+    ExpectIntNE(X509_verify_cert(ctx), 1);
+    ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx),
+        X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED);
+
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    sk_X509_free(inter);
+    X509_free(root);
+    X509_free(ica0);
+    X509_free(ica1);
+    X509_free(leaf);
+    return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+
+#if !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM) && !defined(NO_RSA)
+/* Positive control: a legitimate chain whose intermediates assert pathlen:1
+ * must still verify, guarding the pathLen enforcement against over-rejection.
+ *
+ *   ca-cert -> ca-int (pathlen:1) -> ca-int2 (pathlen:1) -> server-chain
+ *
+ * ca-int permits one following intermediate (ca-int2), so the chain is valid. */
+static int test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen_ok(void)
+{
+    EXPECT_DECLS;
+    X509* ca = NULL;
+    X509* caInt = NULL;
+    X509* caInt2 = NULL;
+    X509* leaf = NULL;
+    X509_STORE* store = NULL;
+    X509_STORE_CTX* ctx = NULL;
+
+    ExpectNotNull(ca = test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex_helper(
+        "./certs/ca-cert.pem"));
+    ExpectNotNull(caInt = test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex_helper(
+        "./certs/intermediate/ca-int-cert.pem"));
+    ExpectNotNull(caInt2 = test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex_helper(
+        "./certs/intermediate/ca-int2-cert.pem"));
+    ExpectNotNull(leaf = test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex_helper(
+        "./certs/intermediate/server-chain.pem"));
+
+    ExpectNotNull(store = X509_STORE_new());
+    ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, ca), 1);
+    ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, caInt), 1);
+    ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, caInt2), 1);
+    ExpectNotNull(ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new());
+    ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, store, leaf, NULL), 1);
+    ExpectIntEQ(X509_verify_cert(ctx), 1);
+    ExpectIntEQ(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx), X509_V_OK);
+
+    X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+    X509_STORE_free(store);
+    X509_free(ca);
+    X509_free(caInt);
+    X509_free(caInt2);
+    X509_free(leaf);
+    return EXPECT_RESULT();
+}
+#endif /* !NO_FILESYSTEM && !NO_RSA */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_EXTRA && !NO_CERTS && HAVE_ECC */
+
 int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex(void)
 {
    EXPECT_DECLS;
@@ -1002,6 +1169,10 @@ int test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex(void)
            &testData), 1);
 #ifdef HAVE_ECC
    ExpectIntEQ(test_wolfSSL_X509_STORE_CTX_ex12(), 1);
+    ExpectIntEQ(test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen(), 1);
+#if !defined(NO_FILESYSTEM) && !defined(NO_RSA)
+    ExpectIntEQ(test_wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert_pathlen_ok(), 1);
+#endif
 #endif

    if(testData.x509Ca) {