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tests/unit-mcdc: white-box the AES-NI internal pointer guards

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Adds a wb_aesni() supplement covering the AES-NI-only file-static helpers that
the aesni build variant instruments: AES_set_{en,de}crypt_key_AESNI's
!userKey/!aes guard and the AesGcm{AadUpdate,EncryptUpdate,DecryptUpdate}_aesni
NULL/size guards, using the same "call the static with both halves of the pair"
idiom as the classic GHASH/GHASH_UPDATE supplements.

Closes 6 of the 8 AES-NI null-guard residuals (aesni_wb 14->20, union
384->390/397). The remaining pair is AES_set_decrypt_key_AESNI's !userKey/!aes:
its valid-argument (false) half needs an AES-NI decrypt-key setup that the
current aesni test set does not exercise; left as a documented residual.
This commit is contained in:
Daniele Lacamera
2026-07-06 23:04:55 +02:00
parent 27b1a40bdd
commit e63555a924
1 changed files with 77 additions and 0 deletions
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tests/unit-mcdc/test_aes_whitebox.c
+77
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@@ -249,6 +249,82 @@ static void wb_aesnew_common(void)
WB_NOTE("_AesNew_common default cross-arg pairs exercised");
}
/* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- *
* Class 3: AES-NI internal pointer guards (WOLFSSL_AESNI).
*
* When aes.c is compiled with AES-NI (the campaign's "aesni" variant), the
* AES-NI code paths add file-static helpers whose NULL/size guards every public
* caller pre-rejects, exactly like the classic GHASH guards:
*
* AES_set_encrypt_key_AESNI / AES_set_decrypt_key_AESNI
* line 1068 / 1099: if (!userKey || !aes) -> idx0 !userKey, idx1 !aes
* AesGcmAadUpdate_aesni
* line 12136: if (aSz != 0 && a != NULL) -> idx1 (a != NULL)
* AesGcmEncryptUpdate_aesni
* line 12305: AesGcmAadUpdate_aesni(..., (cSz > 0) && (c != NULL))
* -> idx1 (c != NULL)
* line 12310: if (cSz != 0 && c != NULL) -> idx1 (c != NULL)
* AesGcmDecryptUpdate_aesni
* line 12635: if (cSz != 0 && p != NULL) -> idx1 (p != NULL)
*
* The key setters return BAD_FUNC_ARG before any AES-NI work. For the GCM
* updaters, a data pointer == NULL with size != 0 short-circuits its guarded
* block before dereferencing, so the NULL calls are memory-safe. A valid GCM
* streaming state (wc_AesGcmInit) supplies gcm->H; on an AES-NI host use_aesni
* is set, so calling the *_aesni updaters directly is state-consistent.
* ASSERT_SAVED_VECTOR_REGISTERS is a no-op unless WOLFSSL_CHECK_VECTOR_REGISTERS.
* ------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#ifdef WOLFSSL_AESNI
static void wb_aesni(void)
{
{ /* key-expansion !userKey / !aes halves */
Aes aes;
byte key[16];
XMEMSET(key, 0, sizeof(key));
XMEMSET(&aes, 0, sizeof(aes));
(void)AES_set_encrypt_key_AESNI(NULL, 128, &aes); /* !userKey -> true */
(void)AES_set_encrypt_key_AESNI(key, 128, NULL); /* !userKey F, !aes T */
(void)AES_set_decrypt_key_AESNI(NULL, 128, &aes); /* !userKey -> true */
(void)AES_set_decrypt_key_AESNI(key, 128, NULL); /* !userKey F, !aes T */
}
#if defined(HAVE_AESGCM) && defined(WOLFSSL_AESGCM_STREAM)
{ /* AES-NI GCM streaming ptr guards; both halves within this binary */
Aes aes;
byte key[16], iv[12], in[16], out[16];
XMEMSET(key, 0, sizeof(key)); XMEMSET(iv, 0, sizeof(iv));
XMEMSET(in, 0, sizeof(in)); XMEMSET(out, 0, sizeof(out));
if (wc_AesInit(&aes, NULL, INVALID_DEVID) == 0 &&
wc_AesGcmInit(&aes, key, sizeof(key), iv, sizeof(iv)) == 0) {
/* 12136: if (aSz != 0 && a != NULL) -- hold aSz!=0, flip a!=NULL */
aes.aOver = 0;
(void)AesGcmAadUpdate_aesni(&aes, in, 16, 0); /* a!=NULL T */
aes.aOver = 0;
(void)AesGcmAadUpdate_aesni(&aes, NULL, 16, 0); /* a!=NULL F */
/* 12305 + 12310: c!=NULL -- hold cSz!=0, flip c (out) */
aes.aOver = 0; aes.cOver = 0;
(void)AesGcmEncryptUpdate_aesni(&aes, out, in, 16, in, 16); /* c T */
aes.aOver = 0; aes.cOver = 0;
(void)AesGcmEncryptUpdate_aesni(&aes, NULL, in, 16, in, 16); /* c F */
/* 12635: p!=NULL -- hold cSz!=0, flip p (out) */
aes.aOver = 0; aes.cOver = 0;
(void)AesGcmDecryptUpdate_aesni(&aes, out, in, 16, in, 16); /* p T */
aes.aOver = 0; aes.cOver = 0;
(void)AesGcmDecryptUpdate_aesni(&aes, NULL, in, 16, in, 16); /* p F */
wc_AesFree(&aes);
}
else {
WB_NOTE("AES-NI GCM streaming init failed; GCM guards skipped");
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_AESGCM && WOLFSSL_AESGCM_STREAM */
WB_NOTE("AES-NI internal ptr-guard pairs exercised");
}
#else
static void wb_aesni(void) { WB_NOTE("WOLFSSL_AESNI off; AES-NI internals skipped"); }
#endif
int main(void)
{
printf("aes.c white-box MC/DC supplement\n");
@@ -259,6 +335,7 @@ int main(void)
wb_ghash_classic();
wb_ghash_update();
wb_aesnew_common();
wb_aesni();
printf("done (%s)\n", wb_fail ? "with skips" : "ok");
/* Setup failures are surfaced as skips, not test failures: the campaign
* treats a nonzero exit as a failed variant and discards its coverage. */